Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters. Contents......Page 7 Figures......Page 9 Tables......Page 10 Notes on contributors......Page 12 Preface......Page 17 1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory......Page 21 DEFINING DELEGATION......Page 25 Node 1. Unilateralism......Page 28 Node 3. Delegation to IOs......Page 29 WHY DELEGATE?......Page 30 Specialization......Page 31 Policy externalities......Page 33 Collective decision-making......Page 34 Dispute resolution......Page 35 Credibility......Page 36 “Lock-in” (creating policy bias)......Page 37 Preference heterogeneity......Page 38 Institutional rules, power, and delegation......Page 39 STRUCTURES OF DELEGATION......Page 41 Agency problems......Page 42 The nature of the agent......Page 43 Mechanisms of control......Page 44 Rules versus discretion......Page 45 Screening and selection procedures......Page 46 Institutional checks and balances......Page 47 Sanctions......Page 48 Agents as actors......Page 49 Variation in principal characteristics......Page 51 Preferences of the principals......Page 52 Variation in agent characteristics......Page 53 Agent tasks or functions......Page 54 Agent strategies and permeability......Page 55 INTRODUCTION......Page 59 COMPLEX PRINCIPALS......Page 62 US SOCIAL FOREIGN AID POLICY: SINGLE OR MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL?......Page 64 Conceiving the United States as a single principal......Page 65 Multiple principals within the US government......Page 68 MODELING MDBS AS COLLECTIVE PRINCIPALS......Page 72 Number of actors......Page 74 Derivation of individual member states' preferences......Page 75 Modeling a collective principal......Page 76 Data and dependent variables......Page 77 Independent variables......Page 78 Methods and results......Page 83 CONCLUSION......Page 92 INTRODUCTION......Page 95 ORGANIZATION OF THE IMF......Page 98 APPROACH AND ARGUMENT......Page 100 Private actors and the IMF......Page 101 Congress and the IMF......Page 103 IMF policy-makers and IMF policy......Page 104 DATA AND ANALYSIS: CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL VOTING ON IMF QUOTA INCREASES......Page 105 Discussion......Page 112 IMF LENDING PATTERNS......Page 114 Data and analysis: IMF outcomes......Page 116 CONCLUSION......Page 120 Appendix: data and sources......Page 121 INTRODUCTION......Page 125 THE PUZZLE? THE COSTS OF MULTILATERAL AID FOR DONOR COUNTRIES......Page 129 THE BENEFITS OF MULTILATERAL AID FOR DONOR COUNTRIES......Page 132 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS......Page 140 CONCLUSIONS......Page 156 5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality......Page 158 DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT AND PRIVATE INFORMATION AS SOURCES OF AUTONOMY......Page 159 Distributional concerns......Page 160 Informational concerns......Page 163 IMF structure......Page 165 The first years......Page 167 Evolution of mechanisms......Page 173 PRECONDITIONS AND TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION......Page 177 CONCLUSION......Page 181 6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union......Page 183 PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS: DELEGATING FUNCTIONS, LIMITING DISCRETION......Page 185 DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE EMPIRICAL RECORD......Page 193 Delegation of functions to the Commission in the treaties......Page 194 Agenda setting......Page 195 Implementation and regulation......Page 196 The range of member-state control mechanisms......Page 197 Cross-sectoral variation in Commission discretion......Page 199 Delegation and discretion in secondary legislation......Page 203 Analysis......Page 205 THE ANOMALOUS ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT......Page 208 Why did they do it?......Page 209 Multiple principals?......Page 210 CONCLUSIONS: COMPETING HYPOTHESES AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES......Page 211 7 How agents matter......Page 217 WHEN DO STRATEGIES MATTER? AGENCY COSTS AND POOL SIZE AS SCOPE CONDITIONS......Page 221 HOW AGENT STRATEGIES INFLUENCE DELEGATION AND AUTONOMY......Page 223 Agents interpret and reinterpret rules......Page 224 Agents increase their permeability to third parties......Page 226 Agents buffer principal monitoring using dualism and ceremonialism......Page 228 HUMAN RIGHTS AGENTS......Page 230 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION......Page 243 INTRODUCTION......Page 247 THE SCREENING FUNCTION OF IOs......Page 250 Information on intentions and policy consequences......Page 252 THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IRAQ, 1990–1991......Page 255 Screening US intentions......Page 256 Overcoming public opposition......Page 261 INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION AND FORUM SHOPPING......Page 265 CONCLUSION......Page 271 9 Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO......Page 273 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SLACK......Page 276 CASES......Page 280 The World Health Organization......Page 281 The World Trade Organization......Page 289 CONCLUSION......Page 297 INTRODUCTION......Page 299 Existing literature on the IMF’s agency slack......Page 301 Gauging agency slack......Page 303 The principal......Page 305 The agent......Page 306 Predictions of the principal-agent model......Page 307 Delegation of conditionality......Page 309 First Conditionality Guidelines......Page 311 Second Conditionality Guidelines and conformity assessment......Page 313 Third Conditionality Guidelines......Page 317 Additional evidence of principal preferences......Page 318 EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN CONTROL AND CONFORMITY: THE STRENGTHS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH......Page 321 WHAT EXPLAINS VARIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY? THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK......Page 324 CONCLUSION......Page 327 11 Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power......Page 330 ( RE-)CONTRACTING POWER AND STATE INFLUENCE OVER ICS......Page 334 Screening and appointment processes as tools of principal control......Page 335 Control of the budget as a tool of principal control......Page 339 Clear rules as a tool of principal control......Page 340 Sanctions through rewriting the delegation contract as a tool of principal control......Page 342 Why are principal re-contracting tools so weak?......Page 344 WHAT DOES SHAPE WHETHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS ARE MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENT?......Page 349 HOW STATES LIVE WITH INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COURTS: MOVING BEYOND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY......Page 352 12 The logic of delegation to international organizations......Page 359 DELEGATION, AGENTS, AND AUTONOMY......Page 360 WHEN DOES DELEGATION SUCCEED?......Page 362 Common features of delegation relationships......Page 365 A model of delegation......Page 367 The conditions for persuasion......Page 370 Conditions for successful delegation......Page 372 DELEGATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS......Page 376 CONCLUSION......Page 385 References......Page 387 Index......Page 412 Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, And Principal Agent Theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, And Michael J. Tierney -- Variation In Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, And Private Benefits -- Who Delegates? : Alternative Models Of Principals In Development Aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, And Michael J. Tierney -- Us Domestic Politics And International Monetary Fund Policy / J. Lawrence Broz And Michael Brewster Hawes -- Why Multilateralism? : Foreign Aid And Domestic Principal-agent Problems / Helen V. Milner -- Distribution, Information, And Delegation To International Organizations : The Case Of Imf Conditionality / Lisa L. Martin -- Delegation And Discretion In The European Union / Mark A. Pollack -- Variation In Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, And Permeability -- How Agents Matter / Darren G. Hawkins And Wade Jacoby -- Screening Power : International Organizations As Informative Agents / Alexander Thompson -- Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, Or Both? : Staffing, Voting Rules, And Slack In The Who And Wto / Andrew P. Cortell And Susan Peterson -- Delegating Imf Conditionality : Understanding Variations In Control And Conformity / Erica R. Gould -- Delegation To International Courts And The Limits Of Re-contracting Political Power / Karen J. Alter -- Directions For Future Research -- The Logic Of Delegation To International Organizations / David A. Lake And Mathew D. Mccubbins. Edited By Darren G. Hawkins ... [et Al.]. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 369-393) And Index. International organizations are important actors in international politics but are frequently criticised for being either over-powerful and unaccountable, or weak and ineffective. This book seeks to explain these seemingly contradictory views by examining the variations in international organizations' roles as agents of states and the nature of the delegation of authority Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this text explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs