Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics (Bradford Books)

Winner in the category of Medical Science in the 2003 Professional/Scholarly Publishing Annual Awards Competition presented by the Association of American Publishers, Inc. In this provocative book, Paul Glimcher argues that economic theory may provide an alternative to the classical Cartesian model of the brain and behavior. Glimcher argues that Cartesian dualism operates from the false premise that the reflex is able to describe behavior in the real world that animals inhabit. A mathematically rich cognitive theory, he claims, could solve the most difficult problems that any environment could present, eliminating the need for dualism by eliminating the need for a reflex theory. Such a mathematically rigorous description of the neural processes that connect sensation and action, he explains, will have its roots in microeconomic theory. Economic theory allows physiologists to define both the optimal course of action that an animal might select and a mathematical route by which that optimal solution can be derived. Glimcher outlines what an economics-based cognitive model might look like and how one would begin to test it empirically. Along the way, he presents a fascinating history of neuroscience. He also discusses related questions about determinism, free will, and the stochastic nature of complex behavior. Economics -- Behavioral Ecology -- Historical Approaches -- Rene Descartes And The Birth Of Neuroscience -- Vaucanson's Duck -- Rene Descartes -- Understanding The Ancients -- The Renaissance -- Francis Bacon -- William Harvey -- Descartes's Synthesis -- Inventing The Reflex -- Enlightenment Views Of Determinism In The Physical And Biological World -- Determinism In Geometrical Mathematics And Geometrical Physics -- Determinism And Behavior -- Nondeterministic Behavior -- The Birth Of Analytic Mathematics: The End Of Geometric World Models -- Beyond Clockworks: Analytic Models Of The Determinate Brain -- Vaucanson's Duck In A Deterministic, But Analytic, World -- Charles Sherrington And The Propositional Logic Of Reflexes -- Testing The Limits Of Determinate Analytic Mathematics -- Charles Scott Sherrington: The Confluence Of Logic And Physiology -- Sherrington's System: The Logic Of The Nervous System -- Dualism -- The Godel Theorem: Finding The Limits Of Determinate Mathematics -- Alan Turing And Computability -- Finding The Limits Of The Sherringtonian Paradigm -- Reflexes: Empirical Fact, Philosophical Paradigm, Or Both? -- The Reflex Model Is Not Adequate To Account For All Determinate Behavior. Additional Mechanisms Are Required -- Sherrington's Cat -- T. Graham Brown And Internal Rhythms -- Erik Von Holtz: Adding To Reflex Theory -- Reflexes Are Not, As Sherrington Argued, The Organizational Element For Behavior. Behavior May Be Structured Hierarchically -- Paul Weiss -- Nickolai Bernstein -- Beyond Reflexes. Paul W. Glimcher. A Bradford Book. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [347]-354) And Index. In this work, Paul Glimcher argues that economic theory may provide an alternative to the classical Cartesian model of the brain and behavior. Ren Descartes (1596-1650) believed that all behaviors could be divided into two categories, the simple and the complex. Simple behaviors were those in which a given sensory event gave rise deterministically to an appropriate motor response. Complex behaviors were those in which the relationship between stimulus and response was unpredictable. These behaviors were the product of a process that Descartes called the soul, but that a modern scientist might call cognition or volition. Glimcher argues that Cartesian dualism operates from the false premise that the reflex is able to describe behavior in the real world that animals inhabit. A mathematically rich cognitive theory, he claims, could solve the most difficult problems that any environment could present, eliminating the need for dualism by eliminating the need for a reflex theory. Such a mathematically rigorous description of the neural processes that connect sensation and action, he explains, will have its roots in microeconomic theory. Economic theory allows physiologists to define both the optimal course of action that an animal might select and a mathematical route by which that optimal solution can be derived. Glimcher outlines what an economics-based cognitive model might look like and how one would begin to test it empirically. Along the way, he presents a fascinating history of neuroscience. He also discusses related questions about determinism, free will, and the stochastic nature of complex behavior.