Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The US in Iraq and the Future of American Military Intervention

In __Death, Dominance, and State-Building__, the eminent scholar of conflict Roger D. Petersen provides the first comprehensive analytic history of post-invasion Iraq. Although the war is almost universally derided as one of the biggest foreign policy blunders of the post-Cold War era, Petersen argues that the course and conduct of the conflict is poorly understood. He begins by outlining an accessible framework for analyzing complex, fluid, and violent internal conflicts. He then applies that framework to a variety of diverse case studies to break down the strategic interplay among the US military forces and Shia and Sunni insurgent organizations as it played out in Baghdad, Anbar, and Hawija. Highlighting the struggle for dominance between Shia and Sunni in Baghdad, Petersen offers a reconsideration of the Surge. He also addresses failures of state-building in Iraqi Kurdistan. Critically, he shows how the legacy of the US occupation and presence from 2003-2011 shaped Iraq's political and security contours from 2011-2023. Comprehensive, analytically sophisticated, and subtle, this book draws lessons relevant to future American military interventions from what most regard as the US's most disastrous foreign policy adventure since Vietnam. The US cannot simply wish away insurgencies, which are always going to occur. The question is what the US and other great powers might do about them in the future. Dedication Contents List of Acronym SECTION I: FRAMEWORK 1. Death, Dominance, and State- Building: The United States in Iraq and the Future of American Intervention 2. The Analytical Framework I: Roles and Strategy 3. The Analytical Framework II: Mechanisms and Strategy 4. US Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice SECTION II: THE IRAQ CONFLICT, 2003–2011 5. Violence, State-Building, and the Shia- Sunni Cleavage 6. Ghazaliyah: Sunni Mobilization, Sectarian War, US Success and Failure 7. Sadr City, the Mahdi Army, and the Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad 8. Mansour, 2003–2007: The Failure to Mobilize Moderates 9. The Failure to Establish Local Security 10. Captain Wright Goes to Baghdad (co-written with Timothy Wright) 11. Anbar, 2003–2011: The Generation of a Community Mobilization Strategy (co-written with Jon Lindsay) 12. The Battle of Sadr City, 2008: Innovations in Urban Counterinsurgency 13. The Surge: A Reconsideration 14. Iraqi Kurdistan: Dual Cleavages and Their Impact on War and State-Building SECTION III: IRAQ, 2011–2020 15. Hawija: Explaining Sunni Resurgence 16. The Third Iraq War 17. Hybrid Actors: The Emergence and Persistence of the Popular Mobilization Forces 18. How Minorities Make Their Way: The Case of Christian Militias in the Nineveh Plains (co-written with Matt Cancian) 19. The Kurdistan Regional Government Revisited: Death, War, Machinations, and Little Change 20. The Decline of Dominance Politics? Emotions and Institutions in Iraq 10 Years after the 2011 US Withdrawal SECTION IV: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION 21. Findings and Lessons 22. Constraints on Learning: The Influence of the Changing International System and US Domestic Politics 23. The Future of American Military Intervention Appendix A: Application of the Framework to Classic Theories and Cases of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Appendix B: An Application of the Framework to Review Recent Social Science Literature Notes References Index The definitive work on the course, conduct, and aftermath of the Iraq war. In Death, Dominance, and State-Building , the eminent scholar of conflict Roger D. Petersen provides the first comprehensive analytic history of post-invasion Iraq. Although the war is almost universally derided as one of the biggest foreign policy blunders of the post-Cold War era, Petersen argues that the course and conduct of the conflict is poorly understood. He begins by outlining an accessible framework for analyzing complex, fluid, and violent internal conflicts. He then applies that framework to a variety of diverse case studies to break down the strategic interplay among the US military forces and Shia and Sunni insurgent organizations as it played out in Baghdad, Anbar, and Hawija. Highlighting the struggle for dominance between Shia and Sunni in Baghdad, Petersen offers a reconsideration of the Surge. He also addresses failures of state-building in Iraqi Kurdistan. Critically, he shows how the legacy of the US occupation and presence from 2003-2011 shaped Iraq's political and security contours from 2011-2023. Comprehensive, analytically sophisticated, and subtle, this book draws lessons relevant to future American military interventions from what most regard as the US's most disastrous foreign policy adventure since Vietnam. The US cannot simply wish away insurgencies, which are always going to occur. The question is what the US and other great powers might do about them in the future.