Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

"This book challenges the conventional wisdom that natural resource wealth promotes autocracy. Oil and other forms of mineral wealth can promote both authoritarianism and democracy, the book argues, but they do so through different mechanisms; an understanding of these different mechanisms can help elucidate when either the authoritarian or democratic effects of resource wealth will be relatively strong. Exploiting game-theoretic tools and statistical modeling as well as detailed country case studies and drawing on fieldwork in Latin America and Africa, this book builds and tests a theory that explains political variation across resource-rich states. It will be read by scholars studying the political effects of natural resource wealth in many regions, as well as by those interested in the emergence and persistence of democratic regimes."--Jacket Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 List of Tables......Page 11 List of Figures......Page 13 Preface and Acknowledgments......Page 17 1 Does Oil Promote Democracy?......Page 25 1.1 The Authoritarian and Democratic Effects of Natural Resources......Page 29 1.2 Explaining Variation......Page 39 1.3 Method and Plan of the Book......Page 49 2 The Foundations of Rentier States......Page 61 2.1 Sources of Rents......Page 63 2.2 Fiscal Effects: Natural Resources and Taxation......Page 69 2.3 Toward the Political Effects of Rents......Page 76 2.3.1 The Democratic Effect of Resource Rents......Page 78 3 Resource Rents and the Political Regime......Page 85 3.1.1 The Setting......Page 88 3.1.2 Timing of the Coup Game and Definition of Equilibrium......Page 92 3.1.3 Solving the Coup Game......Page 94 3.1.4 Comparative Statics......Page 100 3.1.5 Explaining Variation......Page 105 3.2 A Model of Democratization......Page 112 3.2.1 Timing of Democratization Game......Page 113 3.2.2 Analysis......Page 115 3.2.3 Comparative Statics......Page 122 3.3 Discussion and Interpretation......Page 124 4 Statistical Tests on Rents and the Regime......Page 131 4.1.1 Resource Rents......Page 135 4.1.2 Resource Dependence......Page 137 4.1.3 Private Inequality......Page 138 4.1.4 Democracy......Page 143 4.2.1 A Direct Test......Page 145 4.2.2 An Indirect Test......Page 152 4.2.3 Dichotomous Regimes......Page 156 4.2.4 The Authoritarian Effect of Resource Dependence......Page 158 4.3.1 A Dynamic Probit Model......Page 160 4.3.2 Coups......Page 163 4.4 Assessing the Large-N Evidence......Page 164 5 The Democratic Effect of Rents......Page 172 5.1 Case Selection: Probing the Mechanisms......Page 173 5.2 Venezuela: The Rise and Demise of Rentier Democracy......Page 176 5.2.1 The Rise of the Democratic Rentier State......Page 180 5.2.2 The Demise of the Democratic Rentier State......Page 190 5.2.3 The Renewal of the Democratic Rentier State?......Page 207 5.2.4 Alternative Explanations......Page 227 6 Rentier Democracy in Comparative Perspective......Page 234 6.1 Chile: Class Conflict in a Rentier Democracy......Page 237 6.1.1 The Rentier State and Democracy in Chile......Page 239 6.1.2 Redistributive Conflict and the Coup of 1973......Page 251 6.2 Bolivia: Rents, Revolution, and Democracy......Page 255 6.2.1 The Rule of la Rosca and the Bolivian Revolution......Page 257 6.2.2 Rentier Statism after 1952......Page 262 6.2.3 Oil, Gas, and the Rise and Demise (and Rise) of the Rentier State......Page 266 6.3 Ecuador: Oil Booms and Democratization......Page 277 6.3.1 The Coup of 1972 and Redemocratization in 1979......Page 278 6.4 Botswana: An African Anomaly......Page 282 7 Theoretical Extensions......Page 292 7.1 Revenue Volatility......Page 293 7.2 The Dutch Disease......Page 296 7.3 Resource Ownership......Page 298 8 Conclusion: Whither the Resource Curse?......Page 302 8.1 Crude Democracies and Crude Autocracies......Page 303 8.2 Resources and Democracy: A Normative Coda......Page 313 Appendix: Construction of the Simulations......Page 317 Bibliography......Page 321 Index......Page 341 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title 7 Copyright 8 Contents 11 List of Figures 13 List of Tables 11 Preface and Acknowledgments 17 1 Does Oil Promote Democracy? 25 1.1 The Authoritarian and Democratic Effects of Natural Resources 29 1.2 Explaining Variation 39 1.3 Method and Plan of the Book 49 2 The Foundations of Rentier States 61 2.1 Sources of Rents 63 2.2 Fiscal Effects: Natural Resources and Taxation 69 2.3 Toward the Political Effects of Rents 76 2.3.1 The Democratic Effect of Resource Rents 78 3 Resource Rents and the Political Regime 85 3.1 A Model of Coups against Democracy 88 3.1.1 The Setting 88 3.1.2 Timing of the Coup Game and Definition of Equilibrium 92 3.1.3 Solving the Coup Game 94 3.1.4 Comparative Statics 100 3.1.5 Explaining Variation 105 3.2 A Model of Democratization 112 3.2.1 Timing of Democratization Game 113 3.2.2 Analysis 115 3.2.3 Comparative Statics 122 3.3 Discussion and Interpretation 124 4 Statistical Tests on Rents and the Regime 131 4.1 Concepts and Measures 135 4.1.1 Resource Rents 135 4.1.2 Resource Dependence 137 4.1.3 Private Inequality 138 4.1.4 Democracy 143 4.2 Rents and the Level of Democracy 145 4.2.1 A Direct Test 145 4.2.2 An Indirect Test 152 4.2.3 Dichotomous Regimes 156 4.2.4 The Authoritarian Effect of Resource Dependence 158 4.3 Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns 160 4.3.1 A Dynamic Probit Model 160 4.3.2 Coups 163 4.4 Assessing the Large-N Evidence 164 5 The Democratic Effect of Rents 172 5.1 Case Selection: Probing the Mechanisms 173 5.2 Venezuela: The Rise and Demise of Rentier Democracy 176 5.2.1 The Rise of the Democratic Rentier State 180 5.2.2 The Demise of the Democratic Rentier State 190 5.2.3 The Renewal of the Democratic Rentier State? 207 5.2.4 Alternative Explanations 227 6 Rentier Democracy in Comparative Perspective 234 6.1 Chile: Class Conflict in a Rentier Democracy 237 6.1.1 The Rentier State and Democracy in Chile 239 6.1.2 Redistributive Conflict and the Coup of 1973 251 6.2 Bolivia: Rents, Revolution, and Democracy 255 6.2.1 The Rule of la Rosca and the Bolivian Revolution 257 6.2.2 Rentier Statism after 1952 262 6.2.3 Oil, Gas, and the Rise and Demise (and Rise) of the Rentier State 266 6.3 Ecuador: Oil Booms and Democratization 277 6.3.1 The Coup of 1972 and Redemocratization in 1979 278 6.4 Botswana: An African Anomaly 282 7 Theoretical Extensions 292 7.1 Revenue Volatility 293 7.2 The Dutch Disease 296 7.3 Resource Ownership 298 8 Conclusion: Whither the Resource Curse? 302 8.1 Crude Democracies and Crude Autocracies 303 8.2 Resources and Democracy: A Normative Coda 313 Appendix: Construction of the Simulations 317 Bibliography 321 Index 341