Critique of the Power of Judgment (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)

The Critique of the Power of Judgment (a more accurate rendition of what has hitherto been translated as the Critique of Judgment) is the third of Kant's great critiques following the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. This translation of Kant's masterpiece follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. This volume, first published in 2000, includes: the indispensable first draft of Kant's introduction to the work; an English edition notes to the many differences between the first (1790) and second (1793) editions of the work; and relevant passages in Kant's anthropology lectures where he elaborated on his aesthetic views. All in all this edition offers the serious student of Kant a dramatically richer, more complete and more accurate translation. Cover......Page 1 Series-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 General editors’ preface......Page 11 I. BACKGROUND: THE POSSIBILITY OF A CRITIQUE OF TASTE AND TELEOLOGY......Page 15 II. AN OUTLINE OF THE WORK......Page 25 III. THE COMPOSITION AND PUBLICATION OF THE WORK......Page 41 IV. NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION......Page 48 V. BIBLIOGRAPHY......Page 51 1. German editions......Page 52 3. Bibliographical resources......Page 53 First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment......Page 55 I. On philosophy as a system.......Page 57 Remark......Page 59 II. On the system of the higher cognitive faculties, which grounds philosophy.......Page 62 III. On the system of all the faculties of the human mind.......Page 65 IV. On experience as a system for the power of judgment.......Page 67 V. On the reflecting power of judgment.......Page 69 VI. On the purposiveness of the forms of nature as so many particular systems.......Page 74 VII. On the technique of the power of judgment as the ground of the idea of a technique of nature.......Page 75 VIII. On the aesthetic of the faculty of judging.......Page 78 Remark......Page 82 IX. On teleological judging.......Page 87 X. On the search for a principle of the technical power of judgment.......Page 91 XI. Encyclopedic introduction of the critique of the power of judgment into the system of the critique of pure reason.......Page 95 XII. Division of the Critique of the Power of Judgment......Page 101 Critique of the Power of Judgment......Page 107 Preface to the first edition, 1790......Page 109 I. On the division of philosophy.......Page 113 II. On the domain of philosophy in general.......Page 115 III. On the critique of the power of judgment, as a means for combining the two parts of philosophy into one whole.......Page 118 IV. On the power of judgment as an a priori legislative faculty.......Page 120 V. The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of the power of judgment.......Page 122 VI. On the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature.......Page 127 VII. On the aesthetic representation of the purposiveness of nature.......Page 129 VIII. On the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature.......Page 132 IX. On the connection of the legislations of understanding and reason through the power of judgment.......Page 134 First Part Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment......Page 141 § 1. The judgment of taste is aesthetic.......Page 143 § 2. The satisfaction that determines the judgment of taste is without any interest.......Page 144 § 3. The satisfaction in the agreeable is combined with interest.......Page 145 § 4. The satisfaction in the good is combined with interest.......Page 146 § 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction.......Page 148 § 6. The beautiful is that which, without concepts, is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction.......Page 150 § 7. Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good through the above characteristic.......Page 151 § 8. The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgment of taste only as subjective.......Page 153 § 9. Investigation of the question: whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judginga of the object or the latter precedes the former.......Page 156 The definition of the beautiful drawn from the second moment.......Page 158 § 10. On purposiveness in general.......Page 159 § 12. The judgment of taste rests on a priori grounds.......Page 160 § 13. The pure judgment of taste is independent from charm and emotion.......Page 161 § 14. Elucidation by means of examples.......Page 162 § 15. The judgment of taste is entirely independent from the concept of perfection.......Page 165 § 16. The judgment of taste through which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a determinate concept is not pure.......Page 168 § 17. On the ideal of beauty.......Page 170 Definition of the beautiful inferred from this third moment.......Page 174 § 19. The subjective necessity that we ascribe to the judgment of taste is conditioned.......Page 175 § 21. Whether one has good reason to presuppose a common sense.......Page 176 § 22. The necessity of the universal assent that is thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense.......Page 177 General remark on the first section of the Analytic.......Page 178 § 23. Transition from the faculty for judging the beautiful to that for judging the sublime.......Page 182 § 24. On the division of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime.......Page 184 § 25. Nominal definition of the sublime.......Page 185 § 26. On the estimation of the magnitude of things of nature that is requisite for the idea of the sublime.......Page 188 § 27. On the quality of the satisfaction in the judging of the sublime.......Page 194 § 28. On nature as a power.......Page 197 § 29. On the modality of the judgment on the sublime in nature.......Page 202 General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments.......Page 203 § 30. The deduction of aesthetic judgments concerning the objects of nature may not be directed towards that which we call sublime among them, but only to the beautiful.......Page 214 § 31. On the method of the deduction of judgments of taste.......Page 215 § 32. First peculiarity of the judgment of taste.......Page 216 § 33. Second peculiarity of the judgment of taste.......Page 218 § 34. No objective principle of taste is possible.......Page 220 § 35. The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general.......Page 221 § 36. On the problem for a deduction of judgments of taste.......Page 222 § 37. What is really asserted a priori of an object in a judgment of taste?......Page 223 Remark......Page 224 § 39. On the communicability of a sensation.......Page 225 § 40. On taste as a kind of sensus communis.......Page 227 § 41. On the empirical interest in the beautiful.......Page 230 § 42. On the intellectual interest in the beautiful.......Page 232 § 43. On art in general.......Page 236 § 44. On beautiful art.......Page 238 § 45. Beautifulart is an art to the extent that it seems at the same time to be nature.......Page 239 § 46. Beautiful art is art of genius.......Page 240 § 47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of genius.......Page 241 § 48. On the relation of genius to taste.......Page 243 § 49. On the faculties of the mind that constitute genius.......Page 245 § 50. On the combination of taste with genius in products of beautiful art.......Page 250 § 51. On the division of the beautiful arts.......Page 251 § 53. Comparison of the aesthetic value of the beautiful arts with each other.......Page 257 Remark......Page 261 § 55.......Page 267 § 56. Representation of the antinomy of taste.......Page 268 § 57. Resolution of the antinomy of taste.......Page 269 Remark I.......Page 271 Remark II.......Page 273 § 58. On the idealism of the purposiveness of nature as well as art, as the sole principle of the power of aesthetic judgment.......Page 275 § 59. On beauty as a symbol of morality.......Page 279 § 60. Appendix On the methodology of taste.......Page 282 Second Part Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment......Page 285 § 61. On the objective purposiveness of nature.......Page 287 § 62. On the objective purposiveness which is merely formal, in distinction to that which is material.......Page 289 § 63. On the relative purposiveness of nature in distinction from internal purposiveness.......Page 293 § 64. On the special character of things as natural ends.......Page 296 § 65. Things, as natural ends, are organized beings.......Page 298 § 66. On the principle for the judging of the internal purposiveness in organized beings.......Page 301 § 67. On the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of ends.......Page 303 § 68. On the principle of teleology as an internal principle of natural science.......Page 306 § 69. What is an antinomy of the power of judgment?......Page 311 § 70. Representation of this antinomy.......Page 312 § 71. Preparation for the resolution of the above antinomy.......Page 314 § 72. On the various systems concerning the purposiveness of nature.......Page 315 § 73. None of the above systems accomplishes what it pretends to do.......Page 318 § 74. The cause of the impossibility of a dogmatic treatment of the concept of a technique of nature is the inexplicability of a natural end.......Page 320 § 75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of reason for the reflecting power of judgment.......Page 322 § 76. Remark.......Page 325 § 77. On the special character of the human understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural end is possible for us.......Page 328 § 78. On the unification of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the technique of nature.......Page 333 § 79. Whether teleology must be treated as part of the doctrine of nature.......Page 339 § 80. On the necessary subordination of the principle of mechanism to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural end.......Page 340 § 81. On the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural end as a product of nature.......Page 344 § 82. On the teleological system in the external relations of organized beings.......Page 347 § 83. On the ultimate end of nature as a teleological system.......Page 351 § 84. On the final end of the existence of a world, i.e., of creation itself.......Page 355 § 85. On physicotheology.......Page 357 § 86. On ethicotheology.......Page 362 Remark......Page 365 § 87. On the moral proof of the existence of God.......Page 367 § 88. Restriction of the validity of the moral proof.......Page 372 Remark......Page 376 § 89. On the utility of the moral argument.......Page 377 § 90. On the kind of affirmation involved in a moral proof of the existence of God.......Page 379 § 91. On the kind of affirmation produced by means of a practical faith.......Page 385 General Remark on the Teleology......Page 392 Method of citation and abbreviations......Page 401 Editor’s Introduction......Page 405 First Introduction......Page 412 Preface and Introduction......Page 416 ‘‘Analytic of the Beautiful’’ (§§ 1–22)......Page 419 ‘‘Analytic of the Sublime’’ (§§ 23–29)......Page 427 Deduction and theory of fine art (§§ 30–53 and remark)......Page 431 ‘‘Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment’’ (§§ 55–60)......Page 439 ‘‘Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment’’ (§§ 61–68)......Page 442 ‘‘Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment’’ (§§ 69–78)......Page 444 ‘‘Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgment’’ (§§ 79–91)......Page 445 German-English......Page 453 English-German......Page 459 Index......Page 467 The Critique of the Power of Judgment (a more accurate rendition of what has hitherto been translated into English as the Critique of Judgment) is the third of Kant's great Critiques following the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. In the third Critique Kant unified the principles of human cognition and conduct expounded in the first two Critiques. He argued that in scientific inquiry, in moral and practical conduct, and even in the experience of such aesthetic phenomena as the beautiful and the sublime as well as in the creation of art, human beings must be understood as autonomous agents whose thoughts and actions are grounded on principles independent of experience but who are also at home and effective in nature. Kant thus revealed a deep unity where previously the causal realm of nature and the free domain of human intentions had been thought unrelated. The third Critique argues against the division of human thought and conduct and offers an integrated picture of the human condition in which we can make sense of ourselves only if we believe that our autonomy of will and imagination can be effective in nature. This powerful new description of the human condition was to exert a deep influence on such writers as Schiller and Schopenhauer, and would also shape conceptions of science from Goethe to the present day.This entirely new translation of Kant's masterpiece follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant with extensive annotation, glossaries, and an index. This volume includes the indispensable first draft of Kant's introduction to the work. It is the only English edition to note the many differences between the first (1790) and second (1793) editions of the work, and among the copious citations and sources are references to the relevant passages on aesthetics in Kant's lectures on anthropology recently published for the first time in German. "This entirely new translation of Kant's masterpiece follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant with extensive annotation, glossaries, and an index. This volume includes the indispensable first draft of Kant's introduction to the work. It is the only English edition to note the many differences between the first (1790) and second (1793) editions of the work, and among the copious citations and sources are references to the relevant passages on aesthetics in Kant's lectures on anthropology recently published for the first time in German." "All in all, this new edition offers the serious student of Kant a richer, more complete, and more accurate translation than has ever been available in English."--Jacket The Critique of the Power of Judgment (1970) was the third of Kant's three great critiques, and unified the visions of the principles of human inquiry and human conduct that Kant had previously developed in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Critique of Practical Reason respectively. In the third Critique, Kant showed how in scientific inquiry, in moral and practical conduct, and even in the experience of natural beauty and sublimity as well as their creation of art, human being s must be understood as autonomous agents who most fundamental principles are independent of experience but who are yet at home in and effective in nature around them. This entirely new translation of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. This volume includes for the first time the first draft of Kant's introduction to the work; the only English edition notes to the many differences between the first (1790) and second (1793) editions of the work; and relevant passages in Kant's anthropology lectures where he elaborated on his aesthetic views.