Critique of Halakhic Reason: Divine Commandments and Social Normativity (AAR Reflection and Theory in the Study of Religion)

Norms and obligations are central components of many religious traditions. Yet they have often been neglected as objects of reflection in the study of religion relative to belief, experience, and even the related category of ritual. More surprisingly, despite the centrality of mitzvah (commandment) in Judaism, halakhah (Jewish law) has only recently become a central topic in modern Jewish thought. This book rectifies these deficiencies while forging new connections between reflection on religion and modern Jewish thought by offering what it calls a critique of halakhic reason. Such a critique delineates the rational constraints on the justification of the commandments and the practical consequences for their jurisprudence. It also asks whether uniquely "religious reasons" even exist and draws conclusions for several areas of study. Critique of Halakhic Reason offers fresh assessments of twentieth century Jewish thinkers, including Joseph Soloveitchik, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, and Eliezer Berkovits, as deeply engaged in reason-giving about the commandments yet simultaneously denying the normativity of practical reason. Against them, it contends that, when reasons are understood as generated by the structure of agency and the relations among subjects, they are the source of normativity. This constructivist theory of practical reason provides a basis for conceptions of authority, norms, and obligations that are applicable even to God's commands. Divine commandments too operate within a "space of reasons," and so are constrained by rationality and morality. Whether commandments are justified and how they are implemented depends on the reasons offered for and against them by humans. Reasons and practices of reason-giving are thus central to religious thought and life. Yonatan Y. Brafman examines the reasoning operative in the justification and jurisprudence of the Jewish commandments, and develops the consequences of reasoning for the study and philosophy of religion. Cover Series Critique of Halakhic Reason Copyright Dedication Contents Acknowledgments Introduction I.1. Metzitzah be-​Peh: Normativity, Deliberation, Reason I.2. A Critique of Halakhic Reason I.3. Parting of Ways: Philosophy and Law I.4. Looking Ahead PART I. Philosophy of Halakhah and the Dialectic of Normativity 1. Normative World: Joseph Soloveitchik’s Axiological Realism 1.1. Axiological Realism and the Justification of the Commandments 1.1.1. Epistemology, Ontology, and Methodology 1.1.2. Rejection of Practical Reason 1.1.3. Halakhic Practice as a Virtue Ethics 1.2. From Virtue Ethics to Virtue Jurisprudence 1.2.1. Emotions and Values in Ruling 1.2.2. The Cultivation of a Decisor 1.3. Halakhic Domination and Weird Values 2. Normative Self: Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s Axiological Voluntarism 2.1. Axiological Voluntarism and the Justification of the Commandments 2.1.1. Interpretation and Objectivity 2.1.2. Axiology: Facts versus Values 2.1.3. Theology: Worship of God as the Religious Value 2.1.4. Two Types of Autonomous Theocentrism 2.2. Worship of God as the Principle of Jurisprudence 2.2.1. Pure Theory of Halakhah 2.2.2. Principles of Change: Halakhah and Zionism 2.2.3. Worship of God as the Criterion of Validity of Halakhah 2.2.4. Worship of God as the Basic Norm of Halakhah 2.3. Empty Jurisprudence, Justification, and Self 3. Normative God: Eliezer Berkovits’s Divine Command Theory 3.1. Divine Command and the Justification of the Commandments 3.1.1. Questions of the Commandments and Problems of Moral Philosophy 3.1.2. Philosophical Assumptions: Morality and Reason 3.1.3. Revelation and Moral Obligation 3.1.4. Ritual Commandments and Moral Motivation 3.1.5. Righteousness: Highest Value and Commanded Obligation 3.1.6. A Jewish Modified Divine Command Theory 3.2. Teleological Jurisprudence 3.2.1. The Authentic Nature and Function of Halakhah 3.2.2. The Priority of the Ethical 3.2.3. The Wisdom of the Feasible 3.2.4. Legal Rules and Moral Principles 3.3. Limited Autonomy, Superfluous Commandments, and Constricted Reason PART II. Normativity and the Analytic of the Commandments 4. Reasons Rehabilitated: A Constructivist Theory 4.1. Critique of Commands and Values 4.2. Rejection of the Desire-​Based Reasons Thesis 4.3. Reasons Centralism 4.4. Constructivism about Practical Reason 4.4.1. Preliminary Distinctions 4.4.2. Rationality, Autonomy, and Morality 4.4.3. The Second-​Person Standpoint 4.4.4. Constructivism: Interim Summary and Implications 4.5. Theological Excursus 1: Constructivism and Theism 5. Two Conceptions of Authority: Instrumental and Relational 5.1. Differentiating Reasons, Norms, and Obligations 5.2. Two Conceptions of Authority and their Directives 5.2.1. Instrumental Authority and Norms 5.2.2. Relational Authority and Obligation 5.3. Constraints on Norms and Obligations 5.4. Theological Excursus 2: Divine Authority 5.4.1. On the Very Question of Divine Authority 5.4.2. An Instrumental Model of Divine Authority 5.4.3. A Relational Model of Divine Authority 6. Analytic of the Commandments: A Mediated Relation between Justification and Jurisprudence 6.1. Reasons of the Commandments and Reasons for the Commandments 6.2. Commandments as Norms or as Obligations 6.2.1. Commandments as Obligations 6.2.2. Commandments as Norms 6.2.3. Analytic of the Commandments and Constructivism about Reasons 6.3. Justification and Jurisprudence 6.3.1. Reasons, Intentions, and Implementation 6.3.2. Noahide Commandment: Eating a Limb from a Living Animal 6.3.3. Israelite Commandment: Circumcision Conclusion C.1. Law and Philosophy in Judaism C.2. Theology C.3. Study and Philosophy of Religion C.4. Legal and Political Philosophy C.5. Moral Philosophy Bibliography Index