Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

This study offers a theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book, first published in 2005, contradict some assumptions that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study uses the tools of positive political theory to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government. In addition to shedding light on the dynamics of court-executive relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions, instability, and the rule of law. In the process, the study builds a set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics. This Study Offers A New Theoretical Framework For Understanding How Institutional Instability Affects Judicial Behavior Under Dictatorship And Democracy. In Stark Contrast To Conventional Wisdom, The Central Findings Of The Book Challenge The Longstanding Assumption That Only Independent Judges Rule Against The Government Of The Day. Set In The Context Of Argentina, The Study Brings Together Qualitative Case Studies And Statistical Analyses With Spatial And Game Theoretical Model To Explore The Conditions Under Which Courts Rule Against The Government.--book Jacket. Ruling Against The Rulers -- The Logic Of Strategic Defection -- A Theory Of Court-executive Relations : Insecure Tenure, Incomplete Information, And Strategic Behavior -- Judges, Generals, And Presidents : Institutional Insecurity On The Argentine Supreme Court, 1976-1999 -- The Reverse Legal-political Cycle : An Analysis Of Decision Making On The Argentine Supreme Court -- The Dynamics Of Defection : Human Rights, Civil Liberties, And Presidential Power -- Conclusion: Broader Lessons And Future Directions. Gretchen Helmke. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 195-207) And Index.

This 2005 study offers a theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict some assumptions that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study uses the tools of positive political theory to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government. In addition to shedding light on the dynamics of court-executive relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions, instability, and the rule of law. In the process, the study builds a set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics.

This study offers a new theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict the longstanding assumption that only independent judges rule against the government of the day