Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law : The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life

Corruption Flouts Rules Of Fairness And Gives Some People Advantages That Others Don't Have. Corruption Is Persistent; There Is Little Evidence That Countries Can Escape The Curse Of Corruption Easily-or At All. Instead Of Focusing On Institutional Reform, Uslaner Suggests That The Roots Of Corruption Lie In Economic And Legal Inequality And Low Levels Of Generalized Trust (which Are Not Readily Changed) And Poor Policy Choices (which May Be More Likely To Change). Economic Inequality Provides A Fertile Breeding Ground For Corruption-and, In Turn, It Leads To Further Inequalities. Just As Corruption Is Persistent, Inequality And Trust Do Not Change Much Over Time In My Cross-national Aggregate Analyses. Uslaner Argues That High Inequality Leads To Low Trust And High Corruption, And Then To More Inequality-an Inequality Trap And Identifies Direct Linkages Between Inequality And Trust In Surveys Of The Mass Public And Elites In Transition Countries. Eric M. Uslaner Is Professor Of Government And Politics At The University Of Maryland-college Park, Where He Has Taught Since 1975. He Has Written Seven Books Including The Moral Foundations Of Trust (cambridge University Press, 2002), And The Decline Of Comity In Congress (university Of Michigan Press, 1993). In 1981-82 He Was Fulbright Professor Of American Studies And Political Science At The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel And In 2005, He Was A Fulbright Senior Specialist Lecturer At Novosibirsk State Technical University, Novosibirsk, Siberia, Russia. In 2006 He Was Appointed The First Senior Research Fellow At The Center For American Law And Political Science At The Southwest University Of Political Science And Law, Chongqing, China. -- Publisher Description. Corruption : The Basic Story -- Corruption And The Inequality Trap -- Corruption, Inequality, And Trust : The Linkages Across Nations -- Transition And The Road To The Inequality Trap -- The Rocky Road To Transition : The Case Of Romania -- Half Empty Or Almost Full? : Mass And Elite Perceptions Of Corruption In Estonia, Slovakia, And Romania -- The Easy And Hard Cases : Africa And Singapore And Hong Kong -- Corruption Isn't Inevitable, But ... -- Conclusions. Eric M. Uslaner. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 297-315) And Index. Cover......Page 1 Half-Title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 Preface......Page 11 1 Corruption: The Basic Story......Page 17 The Roots of Corruption......Page 20 What Is Corruption?......Page 22 Measuring Corruption......Page 27 Plan of the Book......Page 33 A Motif for the Book......Page 37 2 Corruption and the Inequality Trap......Page 39 Why an Inequality Trap?......Page 42 The Roots of Corruption......Page 44 Corruption and Institutional Design......Page 47 No Justice, No Peace?......Page 54 Corruption and the Inequality Trap......Page 58 Some Preliminary Evidence......Page 61 Trust, Inequality, and Corruption......Page 64 Closing the Loop: From Corruption to Inequality......Page 70 3 Corruption, Inequality, and Trust: The Linkages Across Nations......Page 74 The Aggregate Model......Page 75 The Corruption Model......Page 79 Evaluating the Model......Page 85 Escaping the Inequality Trap?......Page 89 Is It Better to Be Efficient or Clean?......Page 90 Cops, Robbers, and Grand Theft......Page 96 How People Think About Corruption......Page 100 Corruption and Inequality Reconsidered......Page 107 Appendix......Page 108 4 Transition and the Road to the Inequality Trap......Page 110 The Inequality Trap and the Transition from Communism......Page 116 Inequality, Social Solidarity, and the Transition to a Market Democracy......Page 121 How Inequality and Corruption Matter......Page 123 The Consequences of Inequality and Corruption......Page 127 Reprise......Page 135 5 The Rocky Road to Transition: The Case of Romania......Page 137 Romania: A Legacy of Low Trust and High Corruption......Page 142 The Economic Psychology of Transition Dynamics......Page 147 Connections, Inequality, Trust, and Malfeasance: Big Corruption and Little Corruption......Page 156 The Demands of a Successful Transition......Page 164 6 Half Empty or Almost Full?: Mass and Elite Perceptions of Corruption in Estonia, Slovakia, and Romania......Page 167 The Path to Transition in Estonia and Slovakia......Page 170 Estonians' Views of Corruption: Masses and Elites......Page 174 Corruption and Inequality in Slovakia and Romania......Page 184 Corruption, Inequality, and Trust in Government......Page 192 An Inequality Trap?......Page 194 7 The Easy and Hard Cases: Africa and Singapore and Hong Kong......Page 196 Corruption, Inequality, and Low Trust in Africa......Page 200 Testing the Inequality Trap in Africa......Page 205 Corruption and Inequality in Mali and Nigeria......Page 211 The Inequality Trap in Nigeria......Page 214 Singapore and Hong Kong: The Great Exceptions......Page 218 Why Singapore and Hong Kong Are Not Easily Replicable......Page 227 8 Corruption Isn’t Inevitable, But . . .......Page 230 Equal, Trusting, and Honest: The Nordics......Page 231 The Middle Case: The United States......Page 233 Corruption in the American States: The Link to Inequality......Page 240 The Historical Roots of Corruption in the United States......Page 245 9 Conclusions......Page 250 Broken Windows, Broken State?......Page 251 The End of a Machine?......Page 252 Poverty Reduction and Economic Equality as an Anti-Corruption Tool......Page 257 Conclusion......Page 262 Reprise......Page 264 Appendix......Page 267 References......Page 313 Index......Page 333

Corruption flouts rules of fairness and gives some people advantages that others don't have. Corruption is persistent; there is little evidence that countries can escape the curse of corruption easily - or at all. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, Eric M. Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality, low levels of generalized trust (which are not readily changed), and poor policy choices (which may be more likely to change). Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption, which, in turn, leads to further inequalities.

Just as corruption is persistent, inequality and trust do not change much over time, according to Uslaner's cross-national aggregate analyses. He argues that high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption, and then to more inequality - an inequality trap - and identifies direct linkages between inequality and trust in surveys of the mass public and elites in transition countries.

Corruption flouts rules of fairness and gives some people advantages that others don't have. Corruption is persistent; there is little evidence that countries can escape the curse of corruption easily - or at all. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, in this book Eric M. Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality, low levels of generalized trust (which are not readily changed), and poor policy choices (which may be more likely to change). Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption, which, in turn, leads to further inequalities. Just as corruption is persistent, inequality and trust do not change much over time, according to Uslaner's cross-national aggregate analyses. He argues that high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption, and then to more inequality - an inequality trap - and identifies direct linkages between inequality and trust in surveys of the mass public and elites in transition countries. Corruption flouts rules of fairness and gives some people advantages that others don't have. Corruption is persistent; there is little evidence that countries can escape the curse of corruption easily - or at all. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality and low levels of generalized trust and poor policy choices. Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption and, in turn, it leads to further inequalities. Just as corruption is persistent, inequality and trust do not change much over time in my cross-national aggregate analyses. Uslaner argues that high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption, and then to more inequality, an inequality trap and identifies direct linkages between inequality and trust in surveys of the mass public and elites in transition countries. Instead of focusing on institutional reform, Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality and low levels of generalized trust and poor policy choices. Economic inequality, he argues, provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption and, in turn, leads to further inequalities Based on cross-national aggregate analyses, in this book Uslaner suggests that the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality and low levels of generalized trust; high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption, and then to more inequality - an inequality trap.