Corporate Security Surveillance: An Assessment of Host Country Vulnerability to Terrorism (Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications)

In a world of globalization and technological change, terrorism continues to pose grave threats not only to more traditional targets such as civilians and government targets, but according to many experts, increasingly to multinational corporations and other international economic enterprises. This book broadens the understanding of the threats posed to the private sector thereby helping business executives in charge of security affairs prepare for new threats and unconventional threats in a continuously evolving world. Chasdi's Terrorist Assault Business Vulnerability Index (TABVI) now provides C-class executives with a way to measure (potential) host country and host country industry vulnerability and thus contributes a critical new standard to help appraise where and when MNCs and other international enterprises should marshal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and other resources. In addition, his statistical findings about different country operational environments work to frame TABVI findings and provide in-depth understandings of risk in several different (potential) host countries. While the focus is on traditional terrorist groups and criminal syndicalist organizations that use terrorism in particular developing world host countries, Chasdi's research also informs the business community about the context of political issues of contention defined by terrorist groups and their constituent supporters. Business leaders, government officials at national and local government levels, the academic community, and the media benefit from ideas proposed in this book. Brian M. Jenkins writes a carefully reasoned, comprehensive, and insightful Foreword that describes the importance of this topic; about Chasdi, he writes, "...I am an admirer of his uniquely imaginative approaches and always rigorous analysis. His work is invariably intellectually challenging and thought provoking. Read on." Foreword Terrorists Target Business The Terrorist Threat Evolves Business Responds Security Strategy Options Terrorism Databases Permit Quantitative Analysis Increasing Attention and Increasingly Sophisticated Analysis References Acknowledgements Contents 1 Introduction 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Host Countries Examined 1.3 An Operational System of Terrorism 1.4 Terrorism—New Challenges in Research 1.5 Related Conflict Conditions 1.6 Terrorism Definition 1.7 The Concept of Security 1.8 The Concepts of Vulnerability and Risk 1.9 The Security Issue Agenda 1.10 Definitions of Business Security 1.11 The Threat to Multinational Corporations and Small and Middle Size Enterprises (SME’s) 1.12 The “Just-In-Time” Inventory System 1.13 Framework of the Book 1.14 Conclusions References 2 Concepts, Methods, and Typology 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Corporate Security Crossroads—Some Major Findings 2.3 The Total Security Measure Index (TSMI) 2.4 Corporate Security Surveillance—Terrorist Assault Business Vulnerability Index (TABVI) 2.5 The Numerator 2.6 The Denominator 2.7 The Numerator and Denominator 2.8 Corporate Security Surveillance—Data Sources 2.9 Data Coding Guidelines 2.10 Coder Reliability Test 2.11 Relative Frequencies and Bivariate Crosstabulation Table Analysis 2.12 Additional Coding Guidelines for Host Countries 2.12.1 India 2.12.2 Mexico 2.12.3 Brazil and South Africa 2.12.4 Thailand 2.13 A Three-Dimensional Typology of Terrorist and “Hybrid” Criminal-Terrorist Group-Types 2.14 The Theoretical Framework 2.15 Summary References 3 The Case of India 3.1 Indian Maoist (Marxist-Leninist) Terrorist Groups 3.2 Indian National-Irredentist Terrorist Groups 3.3 The United Liberation Front of Assam 3.4 The Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) 3.5 The United Democratic Liberation Army (UDLA) 3.6 Indian Islamic Extremist Terrorist Groups 3.7 Indian Right-Wing Hindutva Terrorist Groups 3.8 Terrorist Assault Business Vulnerability Index (TABVI) 3.9 Some Empirical Observations About Indian Terrorism 3.9.1 Relative Frequencies and Percentages of Commercial Target Terrorist Assaults 3.10 Terrorist Assault by Business Target-Type, Firm Origin, Terrorist Group-Type, and Terrorist Group 3.11 Terrorist Assaults by State 3.12 Terrorist Assaults by District 3.13 Terrorist Assaults by Cities, Towns, and Villages 3.14 Business Firms Attacked 3.15 Variable Analysis 3.16 Political Ideology X Business Target-Type 3.17 Political Ideology X Numbers of Deaths 3.18 Political Ideology X Numbers of Injuries 3.19 Business Target-Type X Deaths 3.20 Business Target X Number of Perpetrators 3.21 Business Target X State 3.22 Group-Type X Political Events 3.23 The “Structuralist—Non-structuralist” Terrorist Group-Type Continuum—Indian Terrorist Group Placement 3.24 Conclusions References 4 The Case of Mexico 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Mexico—The Political Context of Criminal Syndicalism 4.3 Terrorist Groups Operative in the Political Landscape 4.4 Mexico’s War Against Drug Traffickers 4.5 Globalization Links to Terrorism and Criminal Syndicalism 4.6 The Theoretical Dimensions of Terrorism 4.7 Should “Terrorist Group” Describe Criminal Syndicalists and Gangs? 4.8 Conceptual Placement of “Hybrid” Criminal-Terrorist Groups 4.9 Terrorist Group-Types and Terrorist Groups in Mexico 4.10 The Pumba and Tata Cartel: Possible Links Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacána, or the Sinaloa Cartel 4.11 The Individuals Tending Towards Savagery (ITS) 4.12 Terrorist Assault Business Vulnerability Index (TABVI) 4.13 Relative Frequencies and Percentages of Commercial Target Terrorist Assaults 4.14 Targets by Year 4.15 Terrorist Assault by Business Target 4.16 Business Related Terrorist Assaults by Organization 4.17 Business Related Terrorist Assaults by State 4.18 Business Related Terrorist Assaults by Municipality 4.19 Terrorist Assault by City and Town 4.20 Business Firms Attacked 4.21 Reaction to Political Events 4.22 Variable Analysis 4.23 Political Ideology X Numbers of Deaths 4.24 Conclusions References 5 The Case of Brazil 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Political Context of Business Related Terrorism in Brazil 5.3 The 1964 Military Coup and Terrorist Groups Spawned 5.4 The National Liberation Alliance (ALN) 5.5 The 8 October Revolutionary Movement (MR-8) 5.6 Other Brazilian Terrorist Groups 5.7 The Role of Historical Continuities—Brazil’s “Tri-border Area (TBA)”—Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil 5.8 Terrorist Groups and Criminal Syndicalists in TBA 5.9 Terrorist Assault Business Vulnerability Index (TABVI) 5.10 Relative Frequencies of Commercial Target Terrorist Assaults 5.11 Targets by Year 5.12 Terrorist Assault by Business Target 5.13 Business Related Terrorist Assaults by Organization 5.14 Business Related Terrorist Assaults by State 5.15 Business Related Terrorist Assaults by Municipality 5.16 Terrorist Assault by City and Town 5.17 Business Firms Targeted and Reaction to Political Events 5.18 Final Reflections References 6 The Case of South Africa 6.1 Introduction 6.2 African National Congress (ANC) 6.3 The Umkhonto We Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”) 6.4 The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 6.5 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) Influence: SASO, SASM, and Soweto 6.6 Poqo—The Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) 6.7 The Threat of Terrorism Post-apartheid (1994–) 6.8 People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) 6.9 Terrorist Assault Business Vulnerability Index (TABVI) 6.10 Some Empirical Observations About South African Terrorism 6.10.1 Relative Frequencies of Commercial Target Terrorist Assaults by Year 6.11 Terrorist Assaults by Business Target-Type, Firm Origin, Terrorist Group Type, and Terrorist Group 6.12 Business Related Terrorist Assaults by Province 6.13 Business Related Terrorist Assault by Municipality 6.14 Terrorist Assault by City, Town, Township 6.15 Business Firms Attacked, Assault Type, and Reaction to Political Events 6.16 Conclusions References 7 The Case of Thailand 7.1 Introduction 7.2 A Conflict Framework 7.3 Historical Prelude to Conflict 7.4 Haji Sulong Abdulkadir Al-Fatani 7.5 Bangkok’s Twin Systems of Political Control 7.6 Thailand’s Labyrinth Bureaucracy 7.7 Two Terrorism Phases in Thailand 7.7.1 Phase One 7.7.2 Phase Two 7.8 First Phase Terrorist Organizations in Thailand 7.8.1 Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya—GAMPAR 7.9 Barisan Nasional Pemebasan Pattani (BNPP) 7.10 BNPP Demise and Spinoff Group: From BNPP to BBMP to BIPP 7.11 The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 7.12 The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 7.13 Second Phase Terrorist Organizations in Thailand 7.13.1 Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) Splinter Organizations 7.14 New PULO—A PULO Splinter Group 7.15 Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) 7.16 Runda Kumulan Kecil (RKK)—Small Patrol Groups 7.17 Terrorist Assault Business Vulnerability Index (TABVI) 7.18 Empirical Observations About Terrorism in Thailand 7.18.1 Relative Frequencies and Percentages of Commercial Target Terrorist Assaults 7.19 Terrorist Assault by Business Target-Type, Firm Origin, Terrorist Group-Type, and Terrorist Group 7.20 Terrorist Assaults by Province (Changwat) 7.21 Terrorist Assaults by District 7.22 Terrorist Assaults by Tambon (Sub-district) Nakhon (City), Mueang (Town), and Ban (Village) 7.23 Business Firms Attacked 7.24 Variable Analysis 7.24.1 Terrorist Group-Name X Business Target 7.25 Political Ideology X Business Targets 7.26 Business Target-Type X Number of Deaths 7.27 Group-Type X Reaction to Political Events 7.28 Business Target X Province—Region 7.29 Conclusions References 8 Conclusions 8.1 Qualitative Findings 8.1.1 The Interrelated Concepts of Vulnerability, Security, and Risk 8.2 Joint Government and MNC Efforts to Manipulate Terrorist Group Splintering and Spinoff Group Formation 8.3 Dashboard of Possible Explanatory Factors Linked to Terrorist Group Fragmentation 8.4 Terrorist Organizations, Criminal Syndicalists, and Terrorism: Conceptualizations 8.5 TABVI Scores: A Cross-Country Comparison 8.5.1 Aggregate TABVI Scores 8.6 TABVI Scores by Target-Type 8.7 A First Pass Comparison of Three Host Countries by Region—Some Preliminary Findings 8.8 The Cases of Mexico and Brazil; Examples of “Impure” Terrorism Systems 8.9 Quantitative Analysis 8.10 India, Thailand, and South Africa 8.11 Mexico and Brazil 8.12 Final Reflections References Appendix A Methodological Appendix A—India Appendix B Methodological Appendix B—India Index