[Contributions to Political Science] Adoption of EU Business and Human Rights Policy (The Use of Discretion in the National Transposition of EU Directives) ||

This book explores how and why the transposition of EU directives in the new and contentious policy area ‘Business and Human Rights’ differs between member states. It reveals the extent to which individual member states are pursuing diverging approaches in dealing with the ‘discretionary space’ in EU directives, and highlights theoretical and political explanations. Drawing on historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism, the book establishes a link between the degree of corporatism in a given political economy and government behaviour in terms of Business and Human Rights policy. Moreover, it identifies political salience within the policy subsystem as a pertinent factor for explaining national transposition outcomes. Acknowledgements Contents Abbreviations List of Figures List of Tables List of Boxes 1 Introduction 1.1 Academic Relevance for Europeanization and Voluntarism in the EU 1.2 Political Relevance for Assessing EU Human Rights Commitments and Corporate Accountability 1.3 Theoretical Approach, Scope, and Structure of the Book References 2 Business and Human Rights: A New and Contentious EU Policy Area 2.1 Legal and Living Constitution of Human Rights in the EU 2.1.1 The Development of a European Human Rights Regime 2.1.2 Assessing the European Human Rights Regime 2.2 The International Business and Human Rights Agenda 2.3 Forming EU Business and Human Rights Policy 2.3.1 The Development of EU BHR Policy 2.3.2 Discussion of EU BHR Policy 2.3.3 State of Play of EU BHR Policy 2.4 The Public Procurement Directives 2.5 The Non-financial Reporting Directive 2.6 Conclusion References 3 Theoretical Explanations for the Domestic Impact of EU Law 3.1 New Institutionalist Theory 3.2 Europeanization and the Analysis of Directive Transpositions 3.2.1 The Emergence of Europeanization 3.2.2 Expounding the Concept 3.2.3 The Analysis of Directive Transpositions 3.2.4 The Concept of Misfit in Europeanization and Directive Transposition Research 3.2.5 The Roles of Facilitating Factors and Domestic Politics 3.2.6 The ‘Worlds of Compliance’ Typology 3.3 Policy Transfer 3.4 Voluntary Compliance with EU Rules 3.4.1 Conceptual Approaches to Explaining Voluntary Compliance with EU Rules 3.4.2 Observations from Studies on EU Directive Transposition 3.5 Constructing the Analytical Framework 3.5.1 Using ‘Discretion’ to Build the Dependent Variable 3.5.2 Determining Independent Variables and Formulating Hypotheses 3.5.3 Two Logics of Directive Transposition References 4 Research Design 4.1 Methodological Approach 4.2 Selection of EU Directives 4.3 Selection of Cases 4.4 Dependent and Independent Variables 4.5 Operationalization of the Dependent Variable 4.6 Operationalization of the Independent Variables 4.6.1 Policy Misfit 4.6.2 Institutional Misfit 4.6.3 Government Composition 4.6.4 Political Salience Within the Policy Subsystem 4.6.5 International Policy Transfer 4.6.6 Administrative Effectiveness 4.7 Data Collection References 5 Empirical Analysis I: Transposition of the Directives 5.1 Transposition of the Public Procurement Directives 5.1.1 Human Rights Provisions in the Public Procurement Directives 5.1.2 Comparative Transposition of the Three Public Procurement Directives 5.1.3 Overview of Transposition Results 5.2 Transposition of the Non-financial Reporting Directive 5.2.1 Human Rights Provisions in the Non-financial Reporting Directive 5.2.2 Comparative Transposition of the Non-financial Reporting Directive 5.2.3 Overview of Transposition Results 5.3 Account of Transposition Variation References 6 Empirical Analysis II: Explanation of Transposition Variation 6.1 Country Transposition Background 6.1.1 United Kingdom 6.1.2 France 6.1.3 Germany 6.1.4 Denmark 6.2 Testing Hypotheses for the Public Procurement Directives 6.2.1 Policy Misfit 6.2.2 Institutional Misfit 6.2.3 Government Composition 6.2.4 Political Salience Within the Policy Subsystem 6.2.5 International Policy Transfer 6.2.6 Administrative Effectiveness 6.3 Testing Hypotheses for the Non-financial Reporting Directive 6.3.1 Policy Misfit 6.3.2 Institutional Misfit 6.3.3 Government Composition 6.3.4 Political Salience Within the Policy Subsystem 6.3.5 International Policy Transfer 6.3.6 Administrative Effectiveness 6.4 Explaining Transposition Processes 6.4.1 United Kingdom 6.4.2 France 6.4.3 Germany 6.4.4 Denmark References 7 Conclusion 7.1 Discussion of Empirical Results 7.1.1 Country-Specific Transposition Patterns 7.1.2 Cross-Country Transposition Patterns 7.2 Theoretical Conclusions 7.3 Political Conclusions 7.4 Outlook References Appendix A List of Expert Interviews Appendix B Briefing note by the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) on the transposition of the NFR-Directive 1. The Scope Should Not Be Limited to Public Interest Entities (PIEs) with More than 500 Employees 2. Legislation Should Ensure Robust Reporting on Due Diligence and Risks, Including in Supply Chains, Building on the Redefined Approach to Materiality 3. Comply or Explain 4. The “Safe Harbor Clause” Could Render NFR Requirements Meaningless and Should Be Left Out 5. Clarify the Use of Standards 6. EU and National Guidance 7. Non-financial Statement Should Remain Fully Integrated in the Management Report and Not Be Presented in a Separate Report 8. Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanisms Need to Be Put in Place