Contingency and Convergence: Toward a Cosmic Biology of Body and Mind (Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology)

Can we can use the patterns and processes of convergent evolution to make inferences about universal laws of life, on Earth and elsewhere? In this book, Russell Powell investigates whether we can use the patterns and processes of convergent evolution to make inferences about universal laws of life, on Earth and elsewhere. Weaving together disparate philosophical and empirical threads, Powell offers the first detailed analysis of the interplay between contingency and convergence in macroevolution, as it relates to both complex life in general and cognitively complex life in particular. If the evolution of mind is not a historical accident, the product of convergence rather than contingency, then, Powell asks, is mind likely to be an evolutionarily important feature of any living world? Stephen Jay Gould argued for the primacy of contingency in evolution. Gould's “radical contingency thesis” (RCT) has been challenged, but critics have largely failed to engage with its core claims and theoretical commitments. Powell fills this gap. He first examines convergent regularities at both temporal and phylogenetic depths, finding evidence that both vindicates and rebuffs Gould's argument for contingency. Powell follows this partial defense of the RCT with a substantive critique. Among the evolutionary outcomes that might defy the RCT, he argues, cognition is particularly important—not only for human-specific issues of the evolution of intelligence and consciousness but also for the large-scale ecological organization of macroscopic living worlds. Turning his attention to complex cognitive life, Powell considers what patterns of cognitive convergence tell us about the nature of mind, its evolution, and its place in the universe. If complex bodies are common in the universe, might complex minds be common as well? Contents Series Foreword Acknowledgments Introduction: The Big Picture I. CONVERGENT BODIES 1. Visions of the Living Cosmos 1. The Cosmic Imperative of Life 1.1 On Lacunae and Laws 1.2 The Timing and Likelihood of Life’s Origin 1.3 The Single Origin Anomaly 2. Extending the Cosmic Imperative: Nonbiological Approaches 2.1 The Copernican Principle and Observer Selection Effects 2.2 The Uniformity of Nature 3. The Cosmic Contingency Thesis 3.1 The Biologist as SETI Spoilsport 2. The Radical Contingency Thesis 1. Counterfactuals in the Historical Sciences 2. Counterfactuals in Animal Evolution 3. The Radical Contingency Thesis 3.1 Stochastic Extinction 3.2 Faunal Turnover 3.3 Developmental Entrenchment 3.4 The Causal Topography of Development 3.5 Decimation and Diversification 4. Two Empirical Critiques 4.1 The Critique from Taxonomy 4.2 The Critique from Paleoecology 3. A Philosophical Theory of Evolutionary Contingency 1. Conceptions of Evolutionary Contingency 1.1 Two Senses of Gouldian Contingency 1.2 Contingency, Stochasticity, and Path Dependence 1.3 Contingency as Sensitive Dependence 1.4 Characterizing Radical Contingency 1.5 A Problem with a Solution 2. Radical Contingency and the Laws of Life 2.1 The Nomological Vacuum of Biology 2.2 The Case for Biological Laws 2.3 Modal Frequencies 3. Framing the Antithesis: Robust Replicability 3.1 The Robust Replicability Thesis 3.2 Robust Adaptationism 4. The Critique from Convergent Evolution 1. Is Extinction Forever? 1.1 Finding Empirical Traction 1.2 The “N = Many” Scenario 1.3 The Case for Convergence 1.4 Convergence as Evidence 2. Matters of (Mis)interpretation 2.1 Misconception 1: Contingency ⇒ Nonrepetition 2.2 Two Readings of Developmental Constraint 2.3 Misconception 2: Contingency ⇒ Unpredictability 3. Macroevolutionary Overdetermination 5. Convergent Evolution as Natural Experiment 1. The Experimental Logic of Convergence 1.1 The Nature of Natural Experiments 1.2 Evaluating Natural Experiments in Convergent Evolution 1.3 The Lumping Problem 2. Parsing the Reference Class 2.1 Gouldian Repetitions versus True Convergence 3. The Problem of Parallelism 3.1 Parallelism as Homoplasy in Closely Related Groups 3.2 Causal Accounts of Parallelism 3.3 The Specific Causes of Parallelism 3.4 Parallelism and Modal Robustness 6. The Entanglement Problem 1. The Bundling Problem 1.1 Cognitive Biases, Essentialism, and the Humanoid Epidemic 1.2 From Humanoids to Heptapods 2. Disentanglement 2.1 The Specificity of Iterations 2.1.1 Specifying the Specificity at Stake 2.1.2 Macroevolutionary Bait and Switch 2.2 The Independence of Iterations 2.2.1 A Two-Pronged Analysis 2.3 The Scope of Iterations 2.3.1 Replay Depth 2.4. Case Study: Image-Forming Eyes Coda to Part I: Convergence at the Grandest Scales 1. Major Transitions in Evolution 2. Iterated Transitions 3. Singular Transitions 4. Summary of Part I II. CONVERGENT MINDS 7. Convergent Ways of Seeing 1. Image-Forming Sensory Modalities 2. Vision 2.1 Phototaxis 2.2 True Spatial Vision 2.3 Robustness, Invariance, and Evolvability 3. Echolocation 3.1 Echoic Object Recognition 3.2 Passive Listening and Active Feeling 3.3 Universal Constraints on Acoustic ISMs 4. Electrolocation 4.1 Passive Electroreception versus Active Electrolocation 4.2 Electric Object Recognition 4.3 Phenomenology of the Electric Sense 5. Evolutionary Robustness of the ISM 8. Convergent Evolution of the Umwelt 1. The Deep Structure of Experience 2. Umweltian Cognition and Consciousness 2.1 Adapting a Nonevolutionary Concept 2.2 Sentio Ergo Sum 3. The Umwelt Experience 3.1 The Evolutionary Replicability of Cognition 3.2 Information and Integration 3.3 The Binding Problem(s) 4. Evolutionary Gateways to the Umwelt 4.1 Consciousness as Evolutionary Explanandum 4.2 Phenomenology of the ISM 4.3 The Cosmic Umwelt 9. Finding Minds: Evidence from Neuroanatomy 1. Convergent Bilaterian Brains 1.1 Observer Selection Effects and Contingency Credences 1.2 How Many Times Have Brains Evolved 1.3 Gains, Losses, and Evolutionary Parsimony 1.4 When Ceteris Is Not Paribus 1.5 The Curious Case of the Coleoids 1.6 The Gateway Revisited 2. The Perplexing Phylogeny of the Neuron 2.1 A View from the Abyss 2.2 The Evolvability of Functional Neurons 2.3 From Brains to Minds 10. Finding Minds: Evidence from Behavior 1. Cephalopod Smarts 1.1 Measuring an Alien Mind 2. The Tiny Brain Revolution 2.1 What Do Insects See 2.1.1 Holism versus Localism 2.1.2 Inverted Faces and Abstract Paintings 2.1.3 Mimicry as a Natural Experiment in Visual Perception 2.2 What Do Insects Think 2.2.1 Causal Reasoning and Social Learning 2.2.2 Abstract Concepts 2.2.3 Numerosity, Time, and Planning for the Future 2.2.4 Mental Maps and Spatial Awareness 2.2.5 Metacognition 2.3 What Do Insects Feel? 2.3.1 Sentience 2.3.2 Emotional intelligence 3. Umweltian Teleology and Macroevolutionary Ecology 3.1 Goal-Direction in an Umweltian Informational Space 3.2 Active Predation and the Modern Evolutionary Arms Race Coda to Part II: Homage to Homo Sapiens 1. Where Are They? 2. The Replicability of Higher Cognition 3. Tool Use and Intelligence 4. Technology Made Human 5. Let the Parlor Games Begin 6. A Silence Less Eerie 7. Summary of Part II Conclusion: The Morals of Macroevolution Notes Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Coda to Part I Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Coda to Part II Index "In this book, Russell Powell investigates whether we can use the patterns and processes of convergent evolution to make inferences about universal laws of life, on Earth and elsewhere. Weaving together disparate philosophical and empirical threads, Powell offers the first detailed analysis of the interplay between contingency and convergence in macroevolution, as it relates to both complex life in general and cognitively complex life in particular. If the evolution of mind is not a historical accident, the product of convergence rather than contingency, then, Powell asks, is mind likely to be an evolutionarily important feature of any living world? 0Stephen Jay Gould argued for the primacy of contingency in evolution. Gould's "radical contingency thesis" (RCT) has been challenged, but critics have largely failed to engage with its core claims and theoretical commitments. Powell fills this gap. He first examines convergent regularities at both temporal and phylogenetic depths, finding evidence that both vindicates and rebuffs Gould's argument for contingency. Powell follows this partial defense of the RCT with a substantive critique. Among the evolutionary outcomes that might defy the RCT, he argues, cognition is particularly important-not only for human-specific issues of the evolution of intelligence and consciousness but also for the large-scale ecological organization of macroscopic living worlds. Turning his attention to complex cognitive life, Powell considers what patterns of cognitive convergence tell us about the nature of mind, its evolution, and its place in the universe. If complex bodies are common in the universe, might complex minds be common as well?."--Page 4 de la couverture