Constituents Before Assembly: Participation, Deliberation, and Representation in the Crafting of New Constitutions (Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy)

Présentation de l'éditeur : "Under what circumstances do new constitutions improve a nation's level of democracy? Between 1974 and 2014, democracy increased in 77 countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but it decreased or stayed the same in 47 others. This book demonstrates that increased participation in the forming of constitutions positively impacts levels of democracy. It is discovered that the degree of citizen participation at the 'convening stage' of constitution-making has a strong effect on levels of democracy. This finding defies the common theory that levels of democracy result from the content of constitutions, and instead lends support to 'deliberative' theories of democracy. Patterns of constitutions are then compared, differentiating imposed and popular constitution-making processes, using case studies from Chile, Nigeria, Gambia, and Venezuela to illustrate the dynamics specific to imposed constitution-making, and case studies from Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, and Tunisia to illustrate the specific dynamics of popular constitution-making." Cover 1 Half-Title 3 Series page 4 Title page 7 Imprints page 8 Dedication 9 Contents 11 List of Figures 13 List of Tables 15 Introducing Constitutions as Political Process 17 1 A Call to Pens (Even If Not Mightier than Swords): How Context and Process Prevail over Content in Constitutional Change 25 Literature Review: Adding Political Explanations to Traditional Legal Ones 33 Outline of the Book 40 Conclusion: The Call for Closer Attention to Constitutional Process 47 2 Making the Constituents King: How Constituent Deliberation on New Constitutions Democratizes More than Mere Citizen Participation 49 Introduction 49 Designing Constitutionalism and Democracy Database 50 What Counts as Constitutional Change? 50 Operationalizing Citizen Participation in Constitution-Making 51 Empirical Tests of Participatory Constitution-Making on Democracy 55 First Stage: Process Does Drive Democracy 56 Second Stage: Democratic Convening Matters for Democracy 63 Caveats on Formal Constitutional Powers: Rule via Metaconstitutionalism in Mexico 71 Implications and Conclusions 75 3 Parchment Politics: The Importance of Context and Conditions to the Drafting of Constitutions 79 Constitution-Making Processes: Modes and Actors 80 Drivers of Popular Constitutionalism 83 Bottom-up Hypothesis 85 Top-down Hypotheses 87 Statistical Tests and Analysis 94 Process Variable Pathways 99 Conclusion 106 4 The Logic of “Top-Down” Elite Constitutionalism: How Imposed Processes May (But Usually Do Not) Produce Better Democracy 108 Literature Review: Constitutions as Pacts – Democratic or Otherwise 112 The Frequent Coincidence of Imposed Constitutions and Elite Bargains 117 “Trusteeship” Elitism and Political Theorists’ Arguments for Constitutional Stewardship 117 Empirical Studies of Why Elites Might Bind Themselves to Constitutions 120 Cases in Point: Top-down Constitutional Legacies 123 Top-Down Constitutionalism Not Improving Democracy: Venezuela and the Gambia 123 Top-Down Constitutionalism Improving Democracy: Chile and Nigeria 128 Conclusion: How Top-down Constitutionalism Reproduces the Flaws of Pacts 134 5 The Logic of “Bottom-Up” Constitutionalism: How Popular Processes Tilt the Odds in Favor of Democracy 138 The Power of “Bottom-Up” Popular Constitution Drafting When Reformers Take the Lead 140 Democratic Theory, Constitutionalism from Below and Interest Group Mediation 143 Cases in Point: Bottom-Up Constitutional Legacies 149 Bottom-Up Constitutionalism Improving Democracy: Colombia and Tunisia 149 Bottom-Up Constitutionalism Not Improving Democracy: Ecuador and Egypt 155 Conclusion: Passions, Interests and Their Mediation in Constitutionalism from Below 162 6 Interest Groups Versus Individual Participation, and the Gap Between Ideal Constitutional Process and Real-World Practices 167 Iceland’s Decentralized Drafting: Aggregation without Deliberation 172 Whither Individuals and “Mini-Publics” in a World of Interest Aggregation 175 Interest Groups, Individuals, and Constitutional Process 179 The Centrality of Content 181 The Limited Benefits of Plebiscites and Electoral Ratifications for Instilling Democracy 184 Conclusions: Front-Load the Participation of Interest Groups in Order to Back-Load Democracy 185 Appendix A: Additional Statistical Analyses as Checks on Robustness of Models 189 Appendix B: Coding of Pathways According to 27 Possible Combinations 195 Appendix C: List of the Constitutions with the Most Recurring Pathways 197 References 199 Index 217 Under What Circumstances Do New Constitutions Improve A Nation's Level Of Democracy? Between 1974 And 2014, Democracy Increased In 77 Countries Following The Adoption Of A New Constitution, But It Decreased Or Stayed The Same In 47 Others. This Book Demonstrates That Increased Participation In The Forming Of Constitutions Positively Impacts Levels Of Democracy. It Is Discovered That The Degree Of Citizen Participation At The 'convening Stage' Of Constitution-making Has A Strong Effect On Levels Of Democracy. This Finding Defies The Common Theory That Levels Of Democracy Result From The Content Of Constitutions, And Instead Lends Support To 'deliberative' Theories Of Democracy. A Call To Pens (even If Not Mightier Than Swords) : How Context And Process Prevail Over Content In Constitutional Change -- Making The Constituents King : How Constituent Deliberation On New Constitutions Democratizes More Than Mere Citizen Participation -- Parchment Politics : The Importance Of Context And Conditions To The Convening Of Constitutions -- The Logic Of Top Down Elite Constitutionalism : How Imposed Processes May (but Usually Do Not) Produce Better Democracy -- The Logic Of Bottom Up Constitutionalism : How Popular Processes Tilt The Odds In Favor Of Democracy -- Interest Groups Versus Individual Participation, And The Gap Between Ideal Constitutional Process And Real World Practices -- Appendix A: Additional Statistical Analyses As Checks On Robustness Of Models -- Appendix B: Coding Of Pathway According To 27 Possible Combinations -- Appendix C: List Of The Constitutions With The Most Recurring Pathways. Todd A. Eisenstadt, A. Carl Levan, Tofigh Maboudi. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Présentation de l'éditeur : "Under what circumstances do new constitutions improve a nation's level of democracy? Between 1974 and 2014, democracy increased in 77 countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but it decreased or stayed the same in 47 others. This book demonstrates that increased participation in the forming of constitutions positively impacts levels of democracy. It is discovered that the degree of citizen participation at the 'convening stage' of constitution-making has a strong effect on levels of democracy. This finding defies the common theory that levels of democracy result from the content of constitutions, and instead lends support to 'deliberative' theories of democracy. Patterns of constitutions are then compared, differentiating imposed and popular constitution-making processes, using case studies from Chile, Nigeria, Gambia, and Venezuela to illustrate the dynamics specific to imposed constitution-making, and case studies from Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, and Tunisia to illustrate the specific dynamics of popular constitution-making." Under what circumstances do new constitutions improve a nation's level of democracy? Between 1974 and 2014, democracy increased in seventy-seven countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but it decreased or stayed the same in forty-seven others. This book demonstrates that increased participation in the forming of constitutions positively impacts levels of democracy. It is discovered that the degree of citizen participation at the'convening stage'of constitution-making has a strong effect on levels of democracy. This finding defies the common theory that levels of democracy result from the content of constitutions, and instead lends support to'deliberative'theories of democracy. Patterns of constitutions are then compared, differentiating imposed and popular constitution-making processes, using case studies from Chile, Nigeria, Gambia, and Venezuela to illustrate the dynamics specific to imposed constitution-making, and case studies from Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, and Tunisia to illustrate the specific dynamics of popular constitution-making. This book demonstrates that new constitutions can, but often do not, improve a nation's level of democracy. The authors explore patterns of constitution-making with cases from Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to show that participation is a better predictor of levels of democracy than the constitution itself.