Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience (Studies in Brain and Mind Book 6)

This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http://consciousnessonline.com in February and March 2011. Chapters range over epistemological issues in the science and philosophy of perception, what neuroscience can do to help us solve philosophical issues in the philosophy of mind, what the true nature of black and white vision, pain, auditory, olfactory, or multi-modal experiences are, to higher-order theories of consciousness, synesthesia, among others. Each chapter includes a target article, commentaries, and in most cases, a final response from the author. Though wide-ranging all of the papers aim to understand consciousness both from the inside, as we experience it, and from the outside as we encounter it in our science. The Online Consciousness Conference, founded and organized by Richard Brown, is dedicated to the rigorous study of consciousness and mind. The goal is to bring philosophers, scientists, and interested lay persons together in an online venue to promote high-level discussion and exchanging of views, ideas and data related to the scientific and philosophical study of consciousness. Contents 6 Chapter 1: Introduction 9 Part I: First-Person Data and the Science of Consciousness 19 Chapter 2: An Epistemology for Phenomenology? 20 2.1 Introduction 20 2.2 Introducing Unicepts 21 2.3 The General Epistemological Question 24 2.4 The Epistemological Question for Phenomenology 26 2.5 Our Ideas of Some Ordinary Perceptual Properties 27 2.6 Phenomenological Description 31 References 32 Chapter 3: From Phenomenology to the Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data 34 References 39 Part II: Phenomenal Properties and Dualism 40 Chapter 4: Consciousness and the Introspection of `Qualitative Simples' 41 4.1 Introduction 41 4.2 On the Determination of Essences 44 4.3 Subjective Knowledge Versus Objective Knowledge 47 4.4 Back to the Sensations Themselves 52 4.5 The Explanatory Performance of Epiphenomenal Qualia 55 References 62 Chapter 5: Churchland on Arguments Against Physicalism 63 5.1 Introduction 63 5.2 Explanatory Impenetrability 64 5.3 The Knowledge Argument 65 5.4 Chalmers and the Conceivability Argument 68 5.5 Conclusion 71 References 71 Chapter 6: Response to Torin Alter 74 Part III: Property Dualism and Panpsychism 77 Chapter 7: Orthodox Property Dualism+The Linguistic Theory of Vagueness=Panpsychism 78 7.1 Conceptual Dualism and Phenomenal Transparency 79 7.1.1 Conceptual Dualism 79 7.1.2 Phenomenal Transparency 80 7.1.3 Aside: Why Not Translucency? 82 7.2 Orthodox Property Dualism+Linguistic Theory of Vagueness=Phenomenal Precision 84 7.3 From Phenomenal Precision to Panpsychism 87 7.4 Common Sense and Serious Metaphysics 92 References 94 Chapter 8: A Wake Up Call 95 8.1 Preliminaries 96 8.2 Consciousness Tout Court vs. Self-Consciousness 97 8.3 Real Continuity 98 8.4 Why Does Consciousness Seem Binary? 100 8.5 Gradual Disappearance of Self-Consciousness 102 8.6 Conclusion 103 References 103 Chapter 9: What Is Acquaintance with Consciousness? 104 9.1 (One) from Knowledge and Conceivability Arguments to Phenomenal Transparency? 105 9.2 (Two) from Transparency to Non-vagueness? 115 9.3 (Three) from Non-vagueness to Panpsychism? 118 References 118 Chapter 10: Reply to Simon and Robinson 120 10.1 Response to Simon 120 10.2 Response to Robinson 123 Part IV: Naïve Realism, Hallucinations, and Perceptual Justification 125 Chapter 11: It's Still There! 126 11.1 The Big Picture 126 11.2 A Hallucination Puzzle 127 11.3 Phenomenology Meets Epistemology 128 11.4 Lucid Dreaming 130 11.5 Bedrock 132 11.6 The Importance of the Second-Person Perspective 134 References 135 Chapter 12: Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness 136 12.1 Introduction 136 12.2 Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness 137 12.3 Potential Replies 140 12.4 Conclusions 143 References 144 Chapter 13: Some Thoughts About Hallucination, Self-Representation, and “There It Is” 145 References 152 Chapter 14: But Where Is a Hallucinator's Perceptual Justification? 153 References 158 Chapter 15: Yep—Still There 160 15.1 Berger 160 15.1.1 Why Did I Do It? 160 15.2 Logue and Speaks 162 15.3 Summary 166 Part V: Beyond Color-Consciousness 167 Chapter 16: Black and White and Colour 168 16.1 Part I 168 16.1.1 Introduction 168 16.1.2 Luminance Vision in the Rod Achromat 170 16.1.3 Luminance Information 173 16.1.4 A Scenic Detour: Chromatic Processing 188 16.1.5 Albedo Perception: Perceiving Surfaces as Light or Dark 197 16.2 Conclusions 207 References 216 Chapter 17: What Is Visual and Phenomenal but Concerns Neither Hue Nor Shade? 219 17.1 Introducing Akins's Problem 219 17.2 Undermining the Nordby Argument 220 17.3 What Akins's Problem Isn't 221 17.4 Orthodox Philosophy of Mind and the Negative Answer to Akins's Problem 222 17.5 Akins on How Luminance Vision and Chromatic Vision Work 223 17.6 Conceptualism and Phenomenology 225 References 227 Part VI: Phenomenal Externalism and the Science of Perception 228 Chapter 18: The Real Trouble with Phenomenal Externalism: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain-Based Theory of Consciousness 229 18.1 What Is Tracking Intentionalism? 231 18.2 It's Only in Your Head: The Neural Basis of Some Phenomenal Facts 233 18.2.1 Taste 235 18.2.2 Smell 236 18.2.3 Pain 240 18.2.4 Audition 243 18.3 First Argument: The Internal-Dependence Argument 244 18.3.1 Why Actual Cases Fall Short 244 18.3.2 Yuck and Yum 246 18.3.3 Sniff and Snort 250 18.3.4 Mild and Severe 253 18.3.5 Soft and Loud 256 18.3.6 The Official Internal-Dependence Argument 260 18.4 Second Argument: The Structure Argument 260 18.4.1 Three Illustrations of the Initial Challenge 261 18.4.2 Three Unsatisfactory Responses to the Challenge 265 18.5 No Refuge for Externalist Intentionalists 272 18.6 An Edenic Theory of Sensory Consciousness? 287 References 288 Chapter 19: No Problem 291 19.1 Perception Is Not Magic 291 19.2 Feeling Curved 292 19.3 Tracking Systematically 296 19.4 Conclusion 298 References 298 Chapter 20: Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: A Reply to Hilbert and Klein 299 20.1 Hilbert and Klein's Red Herring Points 299 20.2 Do Hilbert and Klein Address the Arguments? 302 References 309 Part VII: The Ontology of Audition 310 Chapter 21: What We Hear 311 21.1 Seeing Sounds? 312 21.2 Berkeley v. Heidegger 313 21.3 Phenomenological Independence 315 21.4 Phenomenological Intimacy 318 21.5 Phenomenological Binding 320 References 323 Chapter 22: Audible Independence and Binding 325 References 331 Chapter 23: Commentary on Leddington 332 References 337 Part VIII: Multi-Modal Experience 338 Chapter 24: Making Sense of Multiple Senses 339 24.1 Introduction 339 24.2 Is Crossmodal Perception Like Flavor Perception? 341 24.3 Do We Perceive Audio-Visual Bounces? 344 24.4 Do We Need Multimodal Content to Explain Multisensory Integration? 345 24.5 Crossmodal Cases Without Fundamentally Multimodal Content 347 24.6 Conclusion 350 References 351 Chapter 25: Explaining Multisensory Experience: Comment on Kevin Connolly’s “Making Sense of Multiple Senses” 353 25.1 Introduction 353 25.2 Clarifying the Target: Sensory Conservatism 355 25.3 Conclusion 359 References 360 Part IX: Synesthesia 362 Chapter 26: Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery 363 26.1 Seeing: The Traditional View 363 26.2 Grapheme-Color Synesthesia 365 26.3 Mathematical Synesthesia 370 26.4 Seemings and Seeings 372 26.5 Visual Imagery 375 26.6 Conclusion 377 References 379 Chapter 27: Synesthesia: An Experience of the Third Kind? 381 27.1 Introduction 381 27.2 An Experience of the Third Kind: The Neurological Criterion 385 27.3 Synesthesia and Incorporation: Do We Need to Posit a Third Kind of Visual Experience? 388 27.4 Conclusions 390 References 391 Chapter 28: Varieties of Synesthetic Experience 394 References 397 Part X: Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex 398 Chapter 29: Not a HOT Dream 399 29.1 Introduction 399 29.2 The Neural Correlate of Cognitive Accessibility for Visual Experiences: dlPFC 401 29.3 Dreams and dlPFC 404 29.3.1 Neurophysiology of Sleep 405 29.4 The Argument 406 29.5 Replies 409 29.5.1 HOTs Have a Different Neural Correlate During Dreams 409 29.5.2 We Do Not Have Conscious Experience During Dreams 411 29.6 Conclusions 413 References 414 Chapter 30: Sweet Dreams Are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián 417 30.1 The Argument 417 30.2 Are REM Dreams Conscious? 419 30.3 Is There dlPFC Activity in REM Sleep? 421 30.4 Is HOT Realized by dlPFC Activity? 422 References 426 Chapter 31: The dlPFC is not a NCHOT: A Reply to Sebastián 428 31.1 Introduction 428 31.2 The Function of the dlPFC 429 31.3 HOTs, Categorization, and Indeterminate Content 430 31.4 Two Potential Problems 430 References 431 Chapter 32: I Cannot Tell You (Everything) About My Dreams: Reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg 433 32.1 Conclusions 438 References 438 Front Matter....Pages i-vii Introduction....Pages 1-10 Front Matter....Pages 11-11 An Epistemology for Phenomenology?....Pages 13-26 From Phenomenology to the Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data....Pages 27-32 Front Matter....Pages 33-33 Consciousness and the Introspection of ‘Qualitative Simples’....Pages 35-56 Churchland on Arguments Against Physicalism....Pages 57-67 Response to Torin Alter....Pages 69-71 Front Matter....Pages 73-73 Orthodox Property Dualism+The Linguistic Theory of Vagueness=Panpsychism....Pages 75-91 A Wake Up Call....Pages 93-101 What Is Acquaintance with Consciousness?....Pages 103-118 Reply to Simon and Robinson....Pages 119-123 Front Matter....Pages 125-125 It’s Still There!....Pages 127-136 Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness....Pages 137-145 Some Thoughts About Hallucination, Self-Representation, and “There It Is”....Pages 147-154 But Where Is a Hallucinator’s Perceptual Justification?....Pages 155-161 Yep—Still There....Pages 163-169 Front Matter....Pages 171-171 Black and White and Colour....Pages 173-223 What Is Visual and Phenomenal but Concerns Neither Hue Nor Shade?....Pages 225-233 Front Matter....Pages 235-235 The Real Trouble with Phenomenal Externalism: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain-Based Theory of Consciousness....Pages 237-298 No Problem....Pages 299-306 Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: A Reply to Hilbert and Klein....Pages 307-317 Front Matter....Pages 319-319 What We Hear....Pages 321-334 Audible Independence and Binding....Pages 335-341 Commentary on Leddington....Pages 343-348 Front Matter....Pages 349-349 Making Sense of Multiple Senses....Pages 351-364 Explaining Multisensory Experience....Pages 365-373 Front Matter....Pages 375-375 Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery....Pages 377-394 Synesthesia: An Experience of the Third Kind?....Pages 395-407 Varieties of Synesthetic Experience....Pages 409-412 Front Matter....Pages 413-413 Not a HOT Dream....Pages 415-432 Sweet Dreams Are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián....Pages 433-443 The dlPFC is not a NCHOT: A Reply to Sebastián....Pages 445-449 I Cannot Tell You (Everything) About My Dreams: Reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg....Pages 451-457 This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http://consciousnessonline.com in February and March 2011. Chapters range over epistemological issues in the science and philosophy of perception, what neuroscience can do to help us solve philosophical issues in the philosophy of mind, what the true nature of black and white vision, pain, auditory, olfactory, or multi-modal experiences are, to higher-order theories of consciousness, synesthesia, among others. Each chapter includes a target article, commentaries, and in most cases, a final response from the author. Though wide-ranging all of the papers aim to understand consciousness both from the inside, as we experience it, and from the outside as we encounter it in our science.0The Online Consciousness Conference, founded and organized by Richard Brown, is dedicated to the rigorous study of consciousness and mind. The goal is to bring philosophers, scientists, and interested lay persons together in an online venue to promote high-level discussion and exchanging of views, ideas and data related to the scientific and philosophical study of consciousness.