Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet (Oxford Series in Neuroscience, Law and Philosophy)

We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility and to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research--including findings in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by John-Dylan Haynes--that raises novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel have brought together prominent experts in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and law to discuss whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other. We All Seem To Think That We Do The Acts We Do Because We Consciously Choose To Do Them. This Commonsense View Is Thrown Into Dispute By Benjamin Libet's Eyebrow-raising Experiments, Which Seem To Suggest That Conscious Will Occurs Not Befor But After The Start Of Brain Activity That Produces Physical Action. Libet's Striking Results Are Often Claimed To Undermine Traditional Views Of Free Will And Moral Responsibility And Also To Have Practical Implications For Criminal Justice. His Work Has Also Stimulated A Flurry Of Further Fascinating Scientific Research--including Findings In Psychology By Dan Wegner And In Neuroscience By John-dylan Haynes--that Raise Novel Questions About Whether Conscious Will Plays Any Causal Role In Action. Critics Respond That Both Commonsense Views Of Action And Traditional Theories Of Moral And Legal Responsibility, As Well As Free Will, Can Survive The Scientific Onslaught Of Libet And His Progeny. To Further This Lively Debate, Walter Sinnott-armstrong And Lynn Nadel Have Brought Together Prominent Experts In Neuroscience, Psychology, Philosophy, And Law To Discuss Whether Our Conscious Choices Really Cause Our Actions, And What The Answers To That Question Mean For How We View Ourselves And How We Should Treat Each Other.--book Jacket. Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will? -- Adina L. Roskies, Why Libet's Studies Don't Pose A Threat To Free Will? -- Alfred R. Mele, Libet On Free Will : Readiness Potentials, Decisions, And Awareness? -- Susan Pockett And Suzanne Purdy, Are Voluntary Movements Initiated Preconsciously? : The Relationships Between Readiness Potentials, Urges, And Decisions? -- William P. Banks And Eve A. Isham, Do We Really Know What We Are Doing? : Implications Of Reported Time Of Decision For Theories Of Volition? -- Elisabeth Pacherie And Patrick Haggard, What Are Intentions? -- Mark Hallett, Volition : How Physiology Speaks To The Issue Of Responsibility? -- John-dylan Haynes, Beyond Libet : Long-term Prediction Of Free Choices From Neuroimaging Signals? -- F. Carota, M. Desmurget, And A. Sirigu, Forward Modeling Mediates Motor Awareness? -- Tashina Graves, Brian Maniscalco, And Hakwan Lau, Volition And The Function Of Consciousness? -- Deborah Talmi And Chris D. Frith, Neuroscience, Free Will, And Responsibility? -- Jeffrey P. Ebert And Daniel M. Wegner, Bending Time To One's Will? -- Thalia Wheatley And Christine Looser, Prospective Codes Fulfilled : A Potential Neural Mechanism Of The Will? -- Terry Horgan, The Phenomenology Of Agency And The Libet Results? -- Thomas Nadelhoffer, The Threat Of Shrinking Agency And Free Will Disillusionism? -- Gideon Yaffe, Libet And The Criminal Law's Voluntary Act Requirement? -- Larry Alexander, Criminal And Moral Responsibility And The Libet Experiments? -- Michael S. Moore, Libet's Challenge(s) To Responsible Agency? -- Walter Sinnott-armstrong, Lessons From Libet? Edited By Walter Sinnott-armstrong And Lynn Nadel. Includes Bibliographical References And Indexes. Contents......Page 8 Introduction......Page 12 1. Do We Have Free Will?......Page 18 2. Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will......Page 28 3. Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness......Page 40 4. Are Voluntary Movements Initiated Preconsciously? The Relationships between Readiness Potentials, Urges, and Decisions......Page 51 5. Do We Really Know What We Are Doing? Implications of Reported Time of Decision for Theories of Volition......Page 64 6. Volition: How Physiology Speaks to the Issue of Responsibility......Page 78 7. What Are Intentions?......Page 87 8. Beyond Libet: Long-term Prediction of Free Choices from Neuroimaging Signals......Page 102 9. Forward Modeling Mediates Motor Awareness......Page 114 10. Volition and the Function of Consciousness......Page 126 11. Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility......Page 141 12. Bending Time to One’s Will......Page 151 13. Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will......Page 163 14. The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results......Page 176 15. The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism......Page 190 16. Libet and the Criminal Law’s Voluntary Act Requirement......Page 206 17. Criminal and Moral Responsibility and the Libet Experiments......Page 221 18. Libet’s Challenge(s) to Responsible Agency......Page 224 19. Lessons from Libet......Page 252 B......Page 264 F......Page 265 J......Page 266 M......Page 267 R......Page 268 T......Page 269 Z......Page 270 B......Page 272 D......Page 273 I......Page 274 M......Page 275 R......Page 276 U......Page 277 W......Page 278