Confrontation, Strategy And War Termination: Britain's Conflict With Indonesia (military Strategy And Operational Art)

At the heart of this book is the problem of war termination. Britain won an almost unbroken string of tactical military victories during an undeclared war against the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, yet it proved difficult to translate this into strategic success. Using conflict termination theories, this book argues that British strategy during Confrontation was both exemplary and flawed, both of which need not be mutually exclusive. The British experience in Indonesia represents an illuminating case study of the difficulties associated with strategy and the successful termination of conflicts. The value of this book lies in two areas: as a contribution to the literature on British counter-insurgency operations and as a contribution to the debates on the problems of war termination in the context of strategic thought. Series Page 3 Title Page 4 Copyright 5 Table of Contents 6 Mapd 8 Introduction 10 1 Fighting Indonesia: British Strategy and the Emergence of Confrontation 24 2 Theories of War Termination 48 3 ‘Bristling with Difficulties’: British Objectives 90 4 ‘Soldiering On’: British Options and Assessment 114 5 British Planning: The Paradox of Preparation 160 6 Britain’s War Termination Problem: The External Dimension 182 7 Britain’s War Termination Problem: The Internal Dimension 206 Conclusions 236 Bibliography 244 Index 258 At the heart of this book is the problem of war termination. The British experience in Indonesia in the 1960s represents an illuminating case study of the difficulties associated with strategy and the successful termination of conflicts. The value of this book lies in two areas: as a contribution to the literature on British counter-insurgency operations and as a contribution to the debates on the problems of war termination in the context of strategic thought