Conflicted Are the Peacemakers : Israeli and Palestinian Moderates and the Death of Oslo

The 1993 Oslo Accords were a key attempt to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict whose failure was largely attributed to extremists on both sides. The book challenges this conventional wisdom by examining the role of Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers themselves in derailing the peace process. Looking at the role of moderates before and after Oslo, the different agreements and peace proposals they negotiated, and their rhetoric, the book shows that these peacemakers retained an inherent ambivalence toward the peace process and one another. This prevented them and their constituents from committing to the process and achieving a lasting peace. This unique survey shows how the people who drive the peace process can not only undermine it, but also prevent its successful conclusion. By dealing with such an important aspect of negotiation, the book will foster a better understanding of the role of moderates and why peace processes may falter. It will fill a gap in the literature and be a valuable research tool for anyone studying conflict processes, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Middle East politics. Cover HalfTitle Title Copyright Contents Acknowledgments 1 Introduction: The Moderates and the Elusive Search for Peace The moderates and the peace process The moderates and the conflict resolution process The moderates as a threat to the peace process Layout of the book 2 The Road to Oslo On the road to Oslo Oslo and its critics The Declaration of Principles and the three principles Conclusion 3 The Road from Oslo After Oslo: The challenge of implementation The Gaza-Jericho Agreement Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement on the West Bankand Gaza Strip (Oslo II) Hebron agreement Wye River Memorandum Israeli and Palestinian moderates after Oslo Conclusion 4 Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Talk the Talk? Israeli and Palestinian rhetoric and the peace process Conclusion 5 Israeli and Palestinian Peacemakers: Can They Walk the Walk? Barak’s election and the initial optimism pre-Camp David The Camp David Summit Camp David and the three principles Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners Conclusion 6 The Death of Oslo: What Lessons Can We Learn? Oslo’s death and the three principles Oslo’s death: Lessons for the future Appendix A: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993 Article I: Aim of the Negotiations Article II: Framework for the Interim Period Article III: Elections Article IV: Jurisdiction Article V: Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations Article VI: Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Article VII: Interim Agreement Article VIII: Public Order and Security Article IX: Laws and Military Orders Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation In Economic Fields Article XII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli Forces Article XIV: Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area Article XV: Resolution of Disputes Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs Article XVII: Miscellaneous Provisions Annex I: Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area Annex III: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs Annex IV: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs Appendix B: The Beilin-Abu Mazen Document (October 31, 1995) Article I: The Establishment of the Palestinian State and Its Relations with the State of Israel Article II: The Delineation of Secure and Recognized Borders Article III: The Creation of Normal and Stable Inter-State Relations Article IV: Schedule of Israeli Military Withdrawal and Security Arrangements Article V: Israeli Settlements Article VI: Jerusalem Article VII: Palestinian Refugees Article VIII: Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee Article IX: Water Resources Article X: Time Frame and Implementation Appendix C: The National Conciliation Document Preamble Bibliography Index "The 1993 Oslo Accords were a key attempt to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict whose failure was largely attributed to extremists on both sides. The book challenges this conventional wisdom by examining the role of Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers themselves in derailing the peace process. Looking at the role of moderates before and after Oslo, the different agreements and peace proposals they negotiated, and their rhetoric, the book shows that these peacemakers retained an inherent ambivalence toward the peace process and one another. This prevented them and their constituents from committing to the process and achieving a lasting peace. This unique survey shows how the people who drive the peace process can not only undermine it, but also prevent its successful conclusion. By dealing with such an important aspect of negotiation, the book will foster a better understanding of the role of moderates and why peace processes may falter. It will fill a gap in the literature and be a valuable research tool for anyone studying conflict processes, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Middle East politics."--Bloomsbury Publishing. This unique survey examines how the inherent ambivalence of Palestinians and Israeli moderates toward the peace process and one another undermined the Oslo Peace Accords.