Confederate tide rising : Robert E. Lee and the making of Southern strategy, 1861-1862

"Confederate Tide Rising is one of the most significant evaluations of Civil War strategy to be published in the past fifty years. It contributes critically to our understanding of the war, and it will influence the course of Civil War scholarship for decades to comes. I cannot overemphasize the importance of this book."—Richard J. Sommers, U.S. Army Military History Institute In this reexamination of Confederate war aims, Joseph L. Harsh analyzes the military policy and grand strategy adopted by Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis in the first two years of the Civil War. Recent critics of Lee have depicted him as a general of tactical brilliance, but one who lacked strategic vision. He has been accused of squandering meager military resources in vain pursuit of decisive victories during his first year in field command. Critics of Davis claim he went too far in adopting a "perimeter" policy which attempted to defend every square mile of Southern territory, scattering Confederate resources too thinly. Harsh argues, to the contrary, that Davis and Lee's policies allowed the Confederacy to survive longer than it otherwise could have and were the policies best designed to win Southern independence. In This Reexamination Of Confederate War Aims, The Author Analyzes The Military Policy And Grand Strategy Adopted By Robert E. Lee And Jefferson Davis In The First Two Year Of The Civil War. Overture. The Most Propitious Time: Fate In Lee's Hands, September 3, 1862 -- 1. He Who Makes The Assault: Confederate Strategy From Sumter To Seven Pines, April 1861-may 1862 -- Confederate War Aims -- Confederate Military Policy -- Confederate Grand Strategy -- The First Phase Of The War, April-october 1861 -- The Second Phase Of The War, November 1861-april/may 1862 -- The Start Of Phase Three, April-may 1862 -- 2. It Would Change The Character Of The War: The Ascent Of Lee, To June 1, 1862 -- Lee's Running Start -- Every Victory Should Bring Us Nearer -- Easy Fighting And Heavy Victories -- They Ought Always To Be Turned -- 3. How Do We Get At Those People? Lee's Strategy In The Seven Days Campaign, June 1-july 2, 1862 -- Lee Plans To Turn Mcclellan, June 1-16 -- Lee Concentrates His Army -- Lee Wrestles With Grand Tactics, June 4-24 -- The Seven Days, June 25-july 2 -- 4. The Enemy Is Congregating About Us: Lee In Strategic Stalemate, July 2-august 9, 1862 -- Lee Loses The Initiative, July 2-5 -- Concentration And Estrays -- Threat From The North: Strategy, July 6-13 -- Lee Marches In Place, July 14-august 4 -- The Crisis Crests, August 5-9 -- 5. Richmond Was Never So Safe: Lee Evolves A Border Strategy, August 9-26, 1862 -- The Longstreet Gamble, August 9-14 -- The Rapidan Stall, August 15-20 -- The Rappahannock Waltz, August 21-24 -- Lee Plots A Wider Turn, August 24 -- The Turning Movement Launched, August 25-26 -- 6. If We Expect To Reap Advantage: Lee Pursues Total Victory, August 27-31, 1862 -- Jackson The Raider, August 26-27 -- Jackson The Aggressor, August 28 -- Lee Hesitates, August 29 -- Combat Finds Lee, August 30 -- Lee Returns To Maneuver To Finish, August 31 -- Intermezzo. The War Was Thus Transferred From Interior To Frontier: The Chantilly Fumble, September 1, 1862. Joseph L. Harsh. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 255-265) And Index. In this reexamination of Confederate war aims, Joseph L. Harsh analyzes the military policy and grand strategy adopted by Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis in the first two years of the Civil War. Recent critics of Lee have depicted him as a general of tactical brilliance, but one who lacked strategic vision. Critics of Davis claim he went too far in adopting a "perimeter" policy which attempted to defend every square mile of Southern territory, scattering Confederate resources too thinly. Harsh argues, to the contrary, that Davis and Lee's policies allowed the Confederacy to survive longer than it otherwise could have and were the policies best designed to win Southern independence. The Confederacy needed to retain the resources of the upper South, and wanted to include the border states, so its aims were offensive rather than defensive. For the most part, Davis encouraged his field commanders to undertake aggressive operations, but it was not until Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia that Davis found a general with the intelligence and courage to invent and then execute a cogent strategy which gave the South a chance to win the war.