Concentrated Corporate Ownership (National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report)

Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy. Standard Economic Models Assume That Many Small Investors Own Firms. This Is So In Most Large U.s. Firms, But Wealthy Individuals Or Families Generally Hold Controlling Blocks In Smaller U.s. Firms And In Virtually All Firms In Most Other Countries. Given This, The Lack Of Theoretical And Empirical Work On Tightly Held Firms In Surprising. Drawing Together Leading Scholars From Law, Economics, And Finance, This Volume Examines The Economic And Legal Issues Of Concentrated Ownership And Their Impact On A Shifting Global Economy.--jacket. The Determinants Of Corporate Venture Capital Success: Organizational Structure, Incentives, And Complementarities -- Ownership Structures And The Decision To Go Public: Private Versus Social Optimality / Lucian Arye Bebchuk And Luigi Zingales -- Some Of The Causes And Consequences Of Corporate Ownership Concentration In Canada -- Corporations And Taxation: A Largely Private Matter? -- Constraints On Large-block Shareholders -- Trust And Opportunism In Close Corporations -- Waiting For The Omelette To Set: Match-specific Assets And Minority Oppression -- Adverse Selection And Gains To Controllers In Corporate Freezouts / Lucian Arye Bebchuk And Marcel Kahan -- Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, And Corporate Governance -- Stock Pyramids, Cross-ownership, And Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms And Agency Costs Of Separating Control From Cash-flow Rights / Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, And George G. Triantis -- Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, And Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease? Edited By Randall Morck. Includes Bibliographical References And Indexes. "Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in virtually all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms in surprising.". "Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy."--BOOK JACKET. The structure of private equity organizations-in particular, the reliance on limited partnerships of finite life with substantial profit sharing-has been identified as critical to their success.