Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Problems of International Politics)

Competitive Authoritarian Regimes - In Which Autocrats Submit To Meaningful Multiparty Elections But Engage In Serious Democratic Abuse - Proliferated In The Post-cold War Era. Based On A Detailed Study Of 35 Cases In Africa, Asia, Latin America, And Post-communist Eurasia, This Book Explores The Fate Of Competitive Authoritarian Regimes Between 1990 And 2008. It Finds That Where Social, Economic, And Technocratic Ties To The West Were Extensive, As In Eastern Europe And The Americas, The External Cost Of Abuse Led Incumbents To Cede Power Rather Than Crack Down, Which Led To Democratization. Where Ties To The West Were Limited, External Democratizing Pressure Was Weaker And Countries Rarely Democratized. In These Cases, Regime Outcomes Hinged On The Character Of State And Ruling Party Organizations. Where Incumbents Possessed Developed And Cohesive Coercive Party Structures, They Could Thwart Opposition Challenges, And Competitive Authoritarian Regimes Survived; Where Incumbents Lacked Such Organizational Tools, Regimes Were Unstable But Rarely Democratized-- Introduction And Theory. Introduction ; Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories: International Linkage And The Organizational Power Of Incumbents -- High Linkage And Democratization: Eastern Europe And The Americas. Linkage, Leverage, And Democratization In Eastern Europe ; Linkage, Leverage, And Democratization In The Americas -- The Dynamics Of Competitive Authoritarianism In Low-linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, And Asia. The Evolution Of Post-soviet Competitive Authoritarianism ; Africa: Transitions Without Democratization ; Diverging Outcomes In Asia ; Conclusion. Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 381-491) And Index. Half-title 3 Series-title 5 Title 7 Copyright 8 Dedication 9 Contents 11 Acknowledgments 13 Acronyms and Abbreviations 17 I Introduction and Theory 21 1 Introduction 23 What is competitive authoritarianism? 25 Situating the Concept 25 Elections 27 Civil Liberties 28 An Uneven Playing Field 29 Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty in Nondemocracies 32 Alternative Conceptualizations of Hybrid Regimes: Do We Need a New Subtype? 33 The rise of competitive authoritarianism 36 Diverging outcomes: competitive authoritarian regime trajectories, 1990–2008 40 Explaining divergent outcomes: the argument in brief 43 Theoretical implications 44 The distinctive logic of competitive authoritarian politics 46 Informal Institutions 47 Succession Politics 48 Party Behavior 49 Case selection and methods 52 Plan of the book 56 2 Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories: International Linkage and the Organizational Power of Incumbents 57 The international dimension: linkage and leverage 58 Western Leverage 60 Linkage to the West 63 Shaping Incentives: International Reverberation and the Cost of Government Abuse 65 Shaping Interests: Creating Domestic Constituencies for Democratic Behavior 67 Shaping the Distribution of Power and Resources 68 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization 70 The domestic dimension: organizational power and authoritarian stability 74 State Coercive Capacity 76 Party Strength 81 State Economic Control as a Substitute for Coercive and Party Organization 86 Combining State and Party Strength 87 The Impact of Opposition Strength 88 Synthesis of the argument 90 Alternative approaches 94 Economic Explanations: Modernization, Inequality, and Economic Performance 94 Institutional Design 98 The Role of Leadership 101 Conclusion: a structuralist argument 103 II High Linkage and Democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas 105 3 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in Eastern Europe 107 Linkage, democratization, and the eu: slovakia and romania 111 Slovakia 111 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 111 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 113 Romania 117 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 118 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 119 Linkage and democratization amid ethnic civil war: serbia and croatia 124 Serbia 124 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 124 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 126 Croatia 133 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 134 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 135 Linkage and democratization amidst state collapse: albania and macedonia 139 Albania 139 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 139 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 141 Macedonia 144 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 144 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 145 Conclusion 148 4 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in the Americas 150 High linkage, high leverage, and democratization: the dominican republic, nicaragua, and guyana 152 Dominican Republic 152 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 153 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 154 Nicaragua 157 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 158 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 160 Guyana 165 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 165 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 167 Mexico: linkage without leverage 169 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 169 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 173 Medium linkage and high leverage: peru and haiti 181 Peru 181 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 181 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 183 Haiti 190 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 191 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 193 Conclusion 197 III The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia 201 5 The Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive Authoritarianism 203 Leverage, organizational power, and authoritarian stability: russia, belarus, and armenia 206 Russia 206 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 206 Origins and Evolution of the Regime under Yeltsin (1992–1999) 210 Authoritarian Consolidation under Putin: 2000–2008 217 Belarus 221 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 221 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 223 Armenia 227 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 227 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 229 Organizational weakness and authoritarian instability: ukraine, georgia, and moldova 233 Ukraine 233 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 234 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 235 Georgia 240 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 241 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 242 Moldova 248 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 248 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 250 Conclusion 252 6 Africa 256 Organizational power and authoritarian stability: zimbabwe, mozambique, botswana, and tanzania 258 Zimbabwe 258 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 258 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 260 Mozambique 266 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 266 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 268 Tanzania 271 Botswana 274 Black knights and regime survival: cameroon and gabon 278 Cameroon 278 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 278 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 279 Gabon 283 Political machines, crisis, and turnover without democratization: kenya and senegal 285 Kenya 286 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 286 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 287 Senegal 293 Low organizational power and regime instability 296 Madagascar 296 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 297 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 298 Malawi 302 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 302 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 303 Zambia 308 Benin 311 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 312 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 313 Mali 317 Ghana: lessons from an outlier 319 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 320 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 321 Conclusion 325 7 Diverging Outcomes in Asia 329 Taiwan 329 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 330 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 333 Malaysia 338 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 338 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 340 Cambodia 348 Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power 349 Origins and Evolution of the Regime 350 The Transition to Competitive Authoritarianism (1989–1993) 351 Authoritarian Reconsolidation, 1993–2008 352 Conclusion 357 8 Conclusion 359 Evaluating the theory’s performance 360 Comparison over Time and across Regions 363 Alternative Explanations 365 Theoretical extensions 371 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization 372 Political Parties, Elite Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability 373 Organizational Power, Regime Transitions, and Democracy: Two Paradoxes 374 Institutional Weakness 378 Conclusion: understanding authoritarian persistence 380 Appendix I: Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Stability 385 I. Full authoritarianism 385 II. Competitive authoritarianism 385 (1) Unfair Elections 386 (2) Violation of Civil Liberties 386 (3) Uneven Playing Field 388 III. Democracy 388 Coding regime outcomes 388 Democratization 388 Stable Authoritarianism 388 Unstable Authoritarianism 389 Regime scores 389 Appendix II: Measuring Leverage 392 Appendix III: Measuring Linkage 394 Appendix IV: Measuring Organizational Power 396 State coercive capacity 396 Scope 396 Cohesion 396 Party strength 397 Scope 397 Cohesion 397 Discretionary state control of the economy 398 Scoring Organizational Power 398 References 401 Index 513 0521709156,9780521709156,0521882524,9780521882521 Cambridge University Press "Competitive authoritarian regimes - in which autocrats submit to meaningful multiparty elections but engage in serious democratic abuse - proliferated in the post-Cold War era. Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized"-- Provided by publisher