Coalitions and Compliance : The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America

This book shows how international changes can reconfigure domestic politics. Since the late 1980s, developing countries have come under considerable pressure to revise their intellectual property policies and practices. One area where pressures have been exceptionally controversial is in pharmaceuticals: historically, developing countries did not grant patents to drugs. Now they must do so. This book analyses different forms of compliance with this new imperative in Latin America, comparing the political economy of pharmaceutical patents in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The book focuses on two periods of politics: initial conflicts over how to introduce drug patents, and subsequent conflicts over how countries’ new patent systems should function. In contrast to explanations of national policy based on external pressures, domestic institutions, or ideologies, this book attributes cross-national and longitudinal variation in patent policy to the ways that changing social structures affect political leaders’ abilities to construct and sustain supportive coalitions. The analysis begins with the relative resources and capabilities of national and transnational pharmaceutical sectors, and these rival actors’ strategies for attracting allies. From this starting point, emphasis is placed on two ways that social structures are transformed so as to affect coalition-building possibilities: how exporters may be converted into allies of transnational drug firms, and the differential patterns of adjustment among state and societal actors that are inspired by the introduction of new policies. It is within the changing structural conditions produced by these processes that political leaders build coalitions in support of different forms of compliance. Cover Coalitions and Compliance: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America Copyright Acknowledgments Contents Abbreviations List of Figures and Tables Part I: Context, Theory, Explanatory Framework 1: Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses Harmonization, Differentiation, and Coalitional Politics The Drivers of Compliance and Over-Compliance Research Design, Data Sources, Methodology, and Organization 2: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents Intellectual Property, Patents, and Pharmaceutical Conflicts Two Periods of Conflict: The Key Issues The Political Economy of Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents The Political Economy of Tailoring Pharmaceutical Patent Systems Conclusion Part II: Introducing PharmaceuticalPatents 3: Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina External Pressures, Executive-Legislative Conflict, and Argentina ́s New Patent Law Power and Preferences in the Pharmaceutical Industry CILFA ́s Coalition Export Profile and CAEME ́s Unsuccessful Political Mobilization Conclusion 4: Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Compliance in Mexico External Pressures, New Opportunities, and Changing Executive Preferences Liberalization, NAFTA, and Pharmaceutical Patents Completing the Rout: NAFTA, Business Politics, and the Expansive Coalition for Over-Compliance Mobilization, Coalitions, and Patent Politics Conclusion 5: Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency: From Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil External Pressures, Legislative Activism, and Brazil ́s New Patent Law Brazilian Over-Compliance in Comparative Perspective Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, and Political Coalitions A Weak Pharmaceutical Sector in a Strong Defensive Coalition External Pressures, Exporter Mobilization, and Executive Coalition Building Conclusion Part III: Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems 6: The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and Argentina ́s Market-Preserving Patent System Patents, Adjustment, and the New Political Economy of Pharmaceuticals in Argentina External Pressures and ARGENTINEAN Defiance, Again Data Protection Preliminary Injunctions Local Labs, Secondary Patents, and Patent Examination Guidelines Pharmaceutical Producer Power and State Regulatory Capacity Conclusion 7: What ́s Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexico ́s Internationalist Patent System The Legacies of Early and Extreme Over-Compliance Legislative Perversity: Reforming Mexico ́s Compulsory Licensing Provisions Extending Protection through the Courts Unfulfilled Ambition: Introducing Pre-Grant ``Opposition ́ ́ Conclusion 8: Patent Policy in the Shadows of Over-Compliance: Neo-Developmentalism in Brazil Patents, Industry, and Treatment Challenges: The Legacies of Over-Compliance Modifying Over-Compliance Discovering and Confronting the Achilles ́ Heel Social Structure, Coalition Building, and Executive Agency Tensions within the Neo-Developmental Project Conclusion Part IV: Conclusion 9: Patents and Development in the New Global Economy The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico Lessons and Extensions Looking Forward References Cited Interviews Index "Coalitions and Compliance examines how international changes can reconfigure domestic politics. Since the late 1980s, developing countries have been subject to intense pressures regarding intellectual property rights. These pressures have been exceptionally controversial in the area of pharmaceuticals. Historically, fearing the economic and social costs of providing private property rights over knowledge, developing countries did not allow drugs to be patented. Now they must do so, an obligation with significant implications for industrial development and public health. This book analyses different forms of compliance with this new imperative in Latin America, comparing the politics of pharmaceutical patenting in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Coalitions and Compliance focuses on two periods of patent politics: initial conflicts over how to introduce drug patents, and then subsequent conflicts over how these new patent systems function. In contrast to explanations of national policy choice based on external pressures, domestic institutions, or Presidents' ideological orientations, this book attributes cross-national and longitudinal variation to the ways that changing social structures constrain or enable political leaders' strategies to construct and sustain supportive coalitions. The analysis begins with assessment of the relative resources and capabilities of the transnational and national pharmaceutical sectors, and these rival actors' efforts to attract allies. Emphasis is placed on two ways that social structures are transformed so as to affect coalition-building possibilities: how exporters fearing the loss of preferential market access may be converted into allies of transnational drug firms, and differential patterns of adjustment among state and societal actors that are inspired by the introduction of new policies. It is within the changing structural conditions produced by these two processes that political leaders build coalitions in support of different forms of compliance." -- Provided by publisher Abbreviations, P.i -- List Of Figures And Tables, P.x -- Part I. Context,theory, Explanatory Framework -- 1. Global Change, Political Coalitions, And National Responses, P.xiii -- 2. The Political Economy Of Pharmaceutical Patents, P.3 -- Part Ii. Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents, P.28 -- 3. Power To The Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional Expansion, And Minimalist Compliance In Argentina, P.63 -- 4. Not If But How: Nafta And Extreme Over-cornpliance In Mexico, P.88 -- 5. Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, And Executive Ageney: From Reluctant Acquiescence To Enthusiastic Over-compliance In Brazil, P.110 -- Part Iii. Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems -- 6. The Defensive Coalition On The Offensive: National Industry And Argentina's Market-preserving Patent System, P.141 -- 7. What's Good For Us Is Good For You: The Transnational Pharmaceutical Sector And Mexico's Internationalist Patent System, P.168 -- 8. Patent Policy In The Shadows Of Over-compliance: Neo-developmentalism In Brazil, P.193 -- Part Iv. Conclusion -- 9. Patents And Development In The New Global Economy, P.227 -- Fieldwork Appendix, P.247 -- References, P.249 -- Cited Interviews, P.289 -- Index, P.291. Kenneth C. Shadlen. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 249-288) And Index. This book offers systematic comparative analysis of the political economy of pharmaceutical patents in Latin America, and examines the diverse ways that international changes can reconfigure domestic politics.