Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Modern War Studies)

Closing with the Enemy picks up where D-Day leaves off. From Normandy through the "breakout" in France to the German army's last gasp in the Battle of the Bulge, Doubler deals with the deadly business of warclosing with the enemy, fighting and winning battles, taking and holding territory. His study provides a provocative reassessment of how American GIs accomplished these dangerous and costly tasks. Doubler portrays a far more capable and successful American fighting force than previous historiansnotably Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld, and S.L.A. Marshallhave depicted. True, the GIs weren't fully prepared or organized for a war in Europe and have often been viewed as inferior to their German opponent. But, Doubler argues, they more than compensated for this by their ability to learn quickly from mistakes, to adapt in the face of unforeseen obstacles, and to innovate new tactics on the battlefield. This adaptability, Doubler contends, was far more crucial to the American effort than we've been led to believe. Fueled by a fiercely democratic and entrepreneurial spirit, GI innovations emerged from every level within the ranks-from the novel employment of conventional weapons and small units to the rapid retraining of troops on the battlefield. Their most dramatic success, however, was with combined arms warfarethe coordinated use of infantry, tanks, artillery, air power, and engineersin which they perfected the use of air support for ground operations and tank-infantry teams for breaking through enemy strongholds. Doubler argues that, without such ingenuity and imaginative leadership, it would have been impossible to defeat an enemy as well trained and heavily fortified as the German army the GIs confronted in the tortuous hedgerow country of northern France, the narrow cobble-stoned streets of Aachen and Brest, the dark recesses of the Huertgen Forest, and the frigid snow-covered hills of the Ardennes. Doubler offers a timely reminder that "the tremendous effects of firepower and technology will still not relieve ground troops of the burden of closing with the enemy." As even Desert Storm suggests, that will likely prove true for future high-tech battlefields, where an army's adaptability will continue to be prized. Cover......Page 1 Title......Page 2 ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES......Page 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 5 GLOSSARY......Page 6 Introduction......Page 8 CHAPTER ONE Lessons Learned in the North African and Mediterranean Campaigns......Page 14 CHAPTER TWO Busting the Bocage......Page 28 CHAPTER THREE The Air-Ground Battle Team......Page 51 CHAPTER FOUR Battles of Buildings and Cobblestones......Page 67 CHAPTER FIVE Struggles against Steel and Concrete......Page 84 CHAPTER SIX In Spite of Hell and High Water......Page 106 CHAPTER SEVEN Confusion and Slaughter among the Firs......Page 128 CHAPTER EIGHT Defense in the Ardennes......Page 145 CHAPTER NINE The American Soldier......Page 165 CHAPTER TEN The Schoolhouse of War......Page 194 NOTES......Page 222 BIBLIOGRAPHY......Page 244 This work offers a view of how the GI and his officers fought the war. The author sets out to demonstrate that the key to the US success was the flexibility and ingenuity of its soldiers. He points out that the most important element in overcoming the Germans was intelligent front-line troops. From Normandy through to the Battle of the Bulge, this book deals with the deadly business of war - closing with the enemy, fighting and winning battles, taking and holding territory. It provides a reassessment of how American GIs accomplished these dangerous and costly tasks. 'Unflinchingly objective. Doubler makes a convincing case for seeing the GI as an amateur who learned quickly and well and who, by the end of the war, had turned himself into a formidable enemy.' -- John Keegan in the Washington Times