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Clean Air at What Cost?: The Rise of Blunt Force Regulation in China (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society)

معرفی کتاب «Clean Air at What Cost?: The Rise of Blunt Force Regulation in China (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society)» نوشتهٔ «italic»Denise Sienli van der Kamp«/italic»، منتشرشده توسط نشر Cambridge University Press در سال 2023. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.

"China's green transition is often perceived as a lesson in authoritarian efficiency. In just a few years, the state managed to improve air quality, contain dissent, and restructure local industry. Much of this was achieved through top-down, "blunt force" solutions, such as forcibly shuttering or destroying polluting factories. This book argues that China's blunt force regulation is actually a sign of weak state capacity and ineffective bureaucratic control. Integrating case studies with quantitative evidence, it shows how widespread industry shutdowns are used, not to scare polluters into respecting pollution standards, but to scare bureaucrats into respecting central orders. These measures have improved air quality in almost all Chinese cities, but at immense social and economic cost. This book delves into the negotiations, trade-offs, and day-to-day battles of local pollution enforcement to explain why governments employ such costly measures, and what this reveals about a state's powers to govern society"-- Provided by publisher Cover Half-title Series page Title Copyright Dedication Contents List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Chapter 1 Introduction: Clean Air at What Cost? 1.1 The Argument in Brief 1.2 Why Such a Costly Solution? 1.3 The Long-Term Consequences 1.4 Why Not Regulate Through the Law? 1.5 Environmental Policies and Credible Punishment 1.6 Observable Implications and Scope Conditions 1.7 What Are the Alternatives, and Will China Use Them? 1.7.1 Force of Habit 1.7.2 Authoritarian Compromise 1.8 Comparative Implications 1.9 Method of Inquiry 1.10 Plan of the Book Notes Chapter 2 Blunt Force Regulation 2.1 What Is Blunt Force Regulation? 2.2 Why Is Blunt Force Regulation Distinctive? 2.2.1 Command and Control 2.2.2 Regulatory Bans 2.2.3 Campaign-Style Enforcement 2.3 Unintended Consequences 2.3.1 Deterring Investment 2.3.2 Devaluing Compliance 2.4 The Puzzle of Blunt Force Regulation in China Notes Chapter 3 Why Blunt Force Regulation? 3.1 State Capacity and Environmental Enforcement in China 3.2 Information Asymmetries and Credible Punishment 3.3 Infrastructural Power in China 3.4 The Logic of Blunt Force Regulation 3.5 What about Regulatory Complexity? 3.6 Summary Notes Chapter 4 Blunt Force Regulation and Bureaucratic Control 4.1 Blunt Force Regulation in Qingyuan 4.2 Existing Explanations 4.2.1 Blunt Force Regulation as a Deterrence Campaign 4.2.2 Blunt Force Regulation as Industrial Policy 4.2.3 Blunt Force Regulation as Political Signaling 4.3 Blunt Force Regulation to Discipline the Bureaucracy 4.4 What Drives Blunt Force Regulation? 4.4.1 Data 4.4.2 Independent Variable 4.4.3 Other Explanatory Variables 4.5 Findings 4.6 Summary Notes Chapter 5 The Impact of Blunt Force Regulation 5.1 Political Theater or Policy Implementation? 5.2 Blunt Force Policy Implementation in China 5.3 The Impact of Blunt Force Regulation 5.3.1 Research Design and Data 5.3.2 Dependent Variable 5.3.3 Explanatory and Control Variables 5.3.4 Model Specifications 5.4 Findings 5.5 Implications Notes Chapter 6 What Are the Alternatives? 6.1 Bottom-Up Enforcement: An Alternative to Blunt Force Regulation 6.2 Bottom-Up Enforcement in China 6.3 Bottom-Up Enforcement and the Case of District X 6.4 Discretion and Bottom-Up Enforcement 6.5 Why Selective Enforcement Backfires 6.6 The Authoritarian Dilemma 6.7 The Future of Bottom-Up Enforcement 6.8 Conclusion Notes Chapter 7 Managing the Risks 7.1 The Political Risks of Blunt Force Regulation 7.2 Mitigating the Political Risks 7.2.1 Labor 7.2.2 Businesses 7.2.3 Is This Just Industrial Restructuring? 7.3 Assessing the State's Strategy 7.3.1 Targeting Small Firms 7.3.2 Protecting SOEs 7.4 Implications 7.5 Protecting Bureaucratic Relations 7.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 8 Comparative Implications 8.1 Rethinking State Capacity 8.2 Is Blunt Force Regulation Unique to China? 8.2.1 The Philippines: Blunt Force Regulation in Boracay 8.2.2 India: Blunt Force Regulation in Delhi 8.3 Is Blunt Force Regulation Unique to Developing Countries? 8.4 Conclusion Notes Chapter 9 Conclusion 9.1 The End to ''Growth at All Costs'' 9.2 Is This Just a Transition Phase? 9.3 Clean Air at What Cost? Notes Appendix Chapter 4 Data Notes 1. PITI Transparency Data 2. Table 4.3: Effect of Bureaucratic Noncompliance on Blunt Force Regulation 3. A Note on the Use of SO2 as a Measure of Industrial Pollution 4. A Note on the Use of SO2 Remote Sensing Data Chapter 5 Data Notes for Chapter 5 1. Measurement of Enforcement Variables in Tables 5.1 and A5.1, and Figures 5.5 and 5.6 2. Using SO2 Remote Sensing Data and the Use of SO2 as a Measure of Industrial Pollution Bibliography Index How can governments enforce urgent environmental policies that threaten key political and economic interests? This book highlights an unusual, top-down approach where the state forcibly destroys industries to reduce pollution. It examines why states use 'blunt force regulation' despite its severe social and economic consequences.
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