Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940-1941 (Cacu)

This book offers a reappraisal of Churchill's role as Britain's wartime leader, and in particular reconsiders his response to the dominant strategic challenges of his first year as prime minister. Based on a detailed examination of the public and private records of both political and military leaders, Dr Lawlor analyses what were often conflicting views and reactions to events. She suggests that Churchill's own position reflected the uncertainties, differences and vacillations of his colleagues, and that he was a far more sophisticated and astute politician than he allowed himself to appear. The first part of the book considers the various reactions among the British leadership to the fall of France and the Battle of Britain. The second and third parts analyse the discussions and decisions which led to British action in the Middle East and to sending military support to Greece. Cover......Page 1 Frontmatter......Page 2 Contents......Page 10 Acknowledgements......Page 12 List of abbreviations......Page 14 Introduction......Page 18 Retrospect......Page 42 Part 1 - Churchill, the conservative party and the war......Page 48 1 - The opposition to Churchill and its causes......Page 50 2 - Events and reactions -- (1): The German attack on France and its aftermath......Page 62 3 - Events and reactions -- (2): The Battle of Britain......Page 78 4 - Chamberlain, Churchill and the conservative party......Page 105 Part 2 - The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)......Page 130 5 - Churchill and the Middle East......Page 132 6 - Eden and the Middle East......Page 151 7 - Halifax and the Middle East......Page 162 8 - The military and the Middle East......Page 170 Part 3 - The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)......Page 182 9 - The Greek decision: the background......Page 184 10 - Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941......Page 193 11 - The chiefs of staff at home and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941......Page 208 12 - The Middle East command and the Greek decision......Page 223 13 - The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941......Page 236 General conclusion......Page 274 Bibliography......Page 277 Index......Page 284

This is a new examination of the politics of strategy and the background to them during Churchill's first year as Britain's wartime leader. It draws extensively both on official archives and on the private papers of many of the political and military leaders. Among the individual topics considered and reinterpreted are Churchill's relations with Chamberlain and the Conservative Party, the political repercussions of the fall of France and the Battle of Britain, and the emergence of a strategy for the Middle East and Greece that would affect the postwar settlement of Europe.

When he came to write his history of the Second World War, Churchill described his becoming prime minister in terms of destiny: Thus, then, on the night of the 10th of May ... I acquired the chief power in the State ... I went to bed at about 3 a.m.