Choosing war : the lost chance for peace and the escalation of war in Vietnam

In one of the most detailed and powerfully argued books published on American intervention in Vietnam, Fredrik Logevall examines the last great unanswered question on the war: Could the tragedy have been averted? His answer: a resounding yes. Challenging the prevailing myth that the outbreak of large-scale fighting in 1965 was essentially unavoidable, Choosing War argues that the Vietnam War was unnecessary, not merely in hindsight but in the context of its time. Why, then, did major war break out? Logevall shows it was partly because of the timidity of the key opponents of U.S. involvement, and partly because of the staunch opposition of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to early negotiations. His superlative account shows that U.S. officials chose war over disengagement despite deep doubts about the war's prospects and about Vietnam's importance to U.S. security and over the opposition of important voices in the Congress, in the press, and in the world community. They did so because of concerns about credibility--not so much America's or the Democratic party's credibility, but their own personal credibility. Based on six years of painstaking research, this book is the first to place American policymaking on Vietnam in 1963-65 in its wider international context using multiarchival sources, many of them recently declassified. Here we see for the first time how the war played in the key world capitals--not merely in Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi, but also in Paris and London, in Tokyo and Ottawa, in Moscow and Beijing. Choosing War is a powerful and devastating account of fear, favor, and hypocrisy at the highest echelons of American government, a book that will change forever our understanding of the tragedy that was the Vietnam War.

masterful. . . . Logevall Presents A Vivid And Tragic Portrait Of The Elements Of U.s. Decision-making On Vietnam From The Beginning Of The Kennedy Administration Through The Announcement Of The American Ground War In July 1965.
in The Process He Reveals A Troubling Picture Of Top Officials In Both The Kennedy And Johnson Administrations Persisting In Efforts To Boost The Fortunes Of Sucessive Governments Of South Vietnam, Even While They Acknowledged That Their Chances For Success Were Remote.
in Addition, He Places The Decision-making Squarely In The International Context.—robert D. Schulzinger, Author Of a Time For War: The United States And Vietnam, 1941-1975

stunning In Its Research And Highly Sophisticated In Its Analysis, choosing War is Far And Away The Best Study We Have Of Lyndon Johnson's Escalation Of The Conflict In Vietnam.—george C. Herring

in This Fine Book, Fredrick Logevall Offers The First Detailed Examination Of Why Diplomacy Failed To Head Off The Vietnam War. Grounding Himself In Documentary Research And Other Sources From Several Countries, Logevall Comes Closer Than Anyone Ever Has To Explaining What Happened. His Clear Writing And Deep Analysis May Well Change Our Understanding Of Vietnam As A Quagmire.—john Prados, Author Of the Hidden History Of The Vietnam War

a Rising Star Among A New Generation Of Historians, Fredrik Logevall Has Written The Most Important Vietnam Book In Years. By Explaining The International Context Of That Tragic Conflict, choosing War Provides Startling Answers To The Question, Why Did The War Happen? Controversial Yet Fair, This Account Challenges The Reader To Think Through John F. Kennedy's And Lydon B. Johnson's Individual Responsibility For Vietnam. The Effect Is Compelling, Unforgettable History.—timothy Naftali, Co-author Of one Hell Of A Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, And Kennedy, 1958-1964

jack F. Matlock Jr.

his Account Of The Diplomatic Context In Which President Lyndon B. Johnson Decided To Send American Troops To Fight In Vietnam Is Thorough And Nuanced, And Expressed With Admirable Clarity....[argues] That The Decision To Americanize The War In Vietnam, Taken In What Logevall Calls The Long 1964 (mid-1963 To Early 1965), Was An Error As Clearly Avoidable As It Was Tragic. —the New York Times Book Review

In one of the most detailed and powerfully argued books publishedon American intervention in Vietnam, Fredrik Logevall examines thelast great unanswered question on the war: Could the tragedy havebeen averted? His answer: a resounding yes. Challenging theprevailing myth that the outbreak of large-scale fighting in 1965was essentially unavoidable, Choosing War argues that theVietnam War was unnecessary, not merely in hindsight but in thecontext of its time. Why, then, did major war break out? Logevallshows it was partly because of the timidity of the key opponents ofU.S. involvement, and partly because of the staunch opposition ofthe Kennedy and Johnson administrations to early negotiations. Hissuperlative account shows that U.S. officials chose warover disengagement despite deep doubts about the war's prospectsand about Vietnam's importance to U.S. security and over theopposition of important voices in the Congress, in the press, andin the world community. They did so because of concerns aboutcredibility-not so much America's or the Democratic party'scredibility, but their own personal credibility. Based on six yearsof painstaking research, this book is the first to place Americanpolicymaking on Vietnam in 1963-65 in its wider internationalcontext using multiarchival sources, many of them recentlydeclassified. Here we see for the first time how the war played inthe key world capitals-not merely in Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi,but also in Paris and London, in Tokyo and Ottawa, in Moscow andBeijing. Choosing War is a powerful and devastatingaccount of fear, favor, and hypocrisy at the highest echelons ofAmerican government, a book that will change forever ourunderstanding of the tragedy that was the Vietnam War In one of the most detailed and powerfully argued books published on American intervention in Vietnam, Fredrik Logevall examines the last great unanswered question on the war: Could the tragedy have been averted? His answer: a resounding yes. Challenging the prevailing myth that the outbreak of large-scale fighting in 1965 was essentially unavoidable, argues that the Vietnam War was unnecessary, not merely in hindsight but in the context of its time.Why, then, did major war break out? Logevall shows it was partly because of the timidity of the key opponents of U.S. involvement, and partly because of the staunch opposition of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to early negotiations. His superlative account shows that U.S. chose war over disengagement despite deep doubts about the war's prospects and about Vietnam's importance to U.S. security and over the opposition of important voices in the Congress, in the press, and in the world community. They did so because of concerns about credibility—not so much America's or the Democratic party's credibility, but their own personal credibility.Based on six years of painstaking research, this book is the first to place American policymaking on Vietnam in 1963-65 in its wider international context using multiarchival sources, many of them recently declassified. Here we see for the first time how the war played in the key world capitals—not merely in Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi, but also in Paris and London, in Tokyo and Ottawa, in Moscow and Beijing.__Choosing War__ "In Choosing War Fredrik Logevall presents the first truly comprehensive examination of the making of a major war in Vietnam in 1963-65. Placing U.S. decision making in its wider international and domestic political contexts, he shows that the Vietnam War was unnecessary, not merely in hindsight but from the perspective of key players at the time, American-officials chose war over disengagement despite deep pessimism about U.S. prospects in the war and over the objections of important voices in the United States and abroad."--BOOK JACKET. We begin not in Washington or Saigon or Hanoi but in Paris: Paris with its long and tangled attachment to the affairs of Vietnam, Paris where French leaders had ruled Indochina for three-quarters of a century and where generations of privileged Vietnamese had gone to be educated. This text examines the great unanswered question on the Vietnam War: could the tragedy have been averted? It challenges prevailing myth that the outbreak of large-scale fighting in 1965 was unavoidable and argues that the war was unnecessary