China Crosses the Yalu : The Decision to Enter the Korean War

## To My Father and Mother Preface from bases in Japan. In addition, despite both Russian and American possession of atomic bombs, no nuclear weapons had been employed by either side. What import did these limitations have for the Chinese Communist decision to intervene? Did that decision leave room for maneuver in the event of miscalculation about the effect such intervention might have upon these limitations of combat? This case study offers clues concerning the stability of limitations, the problem of testing their observance by the enemy, and the question of how one side communicates to the other the conditions which might induce it to override such limitations. This last problem raises still another aspect of limited war, namely, the role of expectations of enemy behavior. Such expectations may be derived from direct communication between belligerents or indirect communication through third parties, and from statements primarily designed for domestic audiences but monitored by the enemy. In addition, expectations may be inferred from ideological assumptions about the enemy and past experience of him. What are the enemy's war aims? How likely are they to fluctuate according to the shifting tides of battle? How credible are his deterrent threats or his hints of compromise? If the enemy signals a willingness to negotiate, how can his intentions be tested while safeguarding freedom of maneuver and advantages at the battle front? Some insight into these problems may be gained from study of the interaction between Sino-Soviet moves and United States decisions in the fateful months of August and September 1950. These considerations have determined the framework within which the Chinese Communist decisions that led to Peking's involvement in the Korean War have been examined. This work does not, therefore, purport to analyze Chinese Communist military strategy per se, nor does it examine the Soviet strategy behind North Korean aggression. Even less is it a comprehensive history of the first six months of the war. Necessarily, however, it probes key Sino-Soviet decisions relating to Peking's reactions, and so may throw light on certain obscure aspects of the conflict about which there has been considerable speculation but little research. In particular, the postponement of Peking's attack against Taiwan, Chinese Communist charges of U.S. air violations across the Yalu River, the movements of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into Northeast China, and the three-week break-off in contact between ## China Crosses the Y alu CCP struggle against Chinese and Japanese opponents. These three influences help to explain the domestic and foreign policies adopted by Communist China in 1949-1950, including its reaction to the Korean War. ## The Chinese Component The Chinese component of the Chinese Communist outlook combines xenophobic attitudes with expansionist tendencies. Both elements stem in part from the problem of territorial security, prominent in China's history. The symbolic importance of this problem was enhanced by the traditional Chinese allocation of authority and legitimacy to the regime that could lay claim to the so-called "Mandate of Heaven." Such a claim was dependent upon the regime's ability to defend the frontiers against "barbarian" incursions while maintaining the peace against domestic insurrection. ## The Mandate of Heaven and Irredentism Without explicitly supporting the Mandate of Heaven definition of legitimacy, twentieth century Chinese elites turned to the extensive empire of the Middle Kingdom for their delineation of China's territorial sovereignty. Both Nationalists and Communists have variously included among "lost territories" portions of contemporary Russia, India, Burma, and VietNam. Some of these claims derive from tenuous historical relationships involving suzerainty and military protection, often manifested by little more than ceremonial exchanges of "tribute." Alternatively they are based upon disputed texts of maps and unsurveyed frontiers. 1 In 1936 Mao Tse-tung upheld this tradition, projecting his future rule over considerably more land than lay under de facto Chinese control at the time: It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the claims of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa. . . . The Outer \* Although this chronology is based on Eastern Daylight Saving Time in the United States, subsequent references to Chinese moves will be based on Peking time, twelve hours ahead of EDST. NOTES PREFACE 1. My understanding of this broader problem was stimulated and enhanced by discussions wiith Alexander George and with Thomas C. Schelling.