Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy

Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their own: what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is incomplete: what happens in the physical world must be partly due to the laws of nature. Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy examines the debate between these views from Descartes to Hume. Ott argues that the competing models of causation in the period grow out of the scholastic notion of power. On this Aristotelian view, the connection between cause and effect is logically necessary. Causes are "intrinsically directed" at what they produce. But when the Aristotelian view is faced with the challenge of mechanism, the core notion of a power splits into two distinct models, each of which persists throughout the early modern period. It is only when seen in this light that the key arguments of the period can reveal their true virtues and flaws. To make his case, Ott explores such central topics as intentionality, the varieties of necessity, and the nature of relations. Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser-known writers such as Pierre-Sylvain Régis, Nicolas Malebranche, and Robert Boyle. Some Philosophers Think Physical Explanations Stand On Their Own: What Happens, Happens Because Things Have The Properties They Do. Others Think That Any Such Explanation Is Incomplete: What Happens In The Physical World Must Be Partly Due To The Laws Of Nature. Causation And Laws Of Nature In Early Modern Philosophy Examines The Debate Between These Views From Descartes To Hume. Ott Argues That The Competing Models Of Causation In The Period Grow Out Of The Scholastic Notion Of Power. On This Aristotelian View, The Connection Between Cause And Effect Is Logically Necessary. Causes Are 'intrinsically Directed' At What They Produce. But When The Aristotelian View Is Faced With The Challenge Of Mechanism, The Core Notion Of A Power Splits Into Two Models, Each Of Which Persists Throughout The Early Modern Period. It Is Only When Seen In This Light That The Key Arguments Of The Period Can Reveal Their True Virtues And Flaws. To Make His Case, Ott Explores Such Central Topics As Intentionality, The Varieties Of Necessity, And The Nature Of Relations. Arguing For Controversial Readings Of Many Of The Canonical Figures, The Book Also Focuses On Lesser-known Writers Such As Pierre-sylvain Régis, Nicolas Malebranche, And Robert Boyle. Introduction -- Themes -- The Origin And Status Of Laws Of Nature -- The Ontology Of Powers -- Necessity -- Models Of Causation -- Plan Of The Book -- The Aristotelian Background -- Necessity -- The Ontology Of Relations -- Manifest And Occult Qualities -- The Cartesian Predicament -- What Mechanism Isn't -- The Rejection Of Aristotelianism -- The Nude Wax : Cartesian Ontology -- The Laws Of Nature -- Force -- Occasionalism -- The Concurrentist Reading -- The Argument From Laws Of Nature -- Thoroughgoing Occasionalism -- The Problem Of Mental Causation -- The Dialectic Of Occasionalism -- Malebranche And The Cognitive Model Of Causation -- The Argument From Nonsense -- The Argument From Elimination -- The Divine Concursus Argument -- 'little Souls' Revisited -- The 'no Necessary Connection' Argument -- The Epistemic Argument -- Laws And Divine Volitions -- The Content Of Divine Volitions -- The Problem Of Efficacious Laws -- Causation And Explanation -- A Scholastic Mechanism -- Régis Against The Occasionalists -- Power And Necessity -- A Dead Cadaverous Thing -- Relations And Powers -- Boyle's Paradox -- Boyle And The Concurrentists -- Locke On Relations -- Locke On Powers : The Geometrical Model -- Locke's Mechanisms -- Hume -- The Two Humes -- Intentionality -- Meaning -- Against The Positivist Reading -- Signification -- Judgment And Belief -- Semiotic Empiricism -- Relative Ideas -- The Argument From Nonsense -- Necessity -- Finding Hume's Target -- Against The Cognitive And Geometrical Models -- The Neighboring Fields -- The Practicality Requirement -- Relations -- The Status Of Relations -- Two Kinds Of Relations -- The Nature Of Necessity -- The Definition Of Causation -- The Problem -- Subjectivism Or Projectivism? -- Conclusion. Walter Ott. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Contents......Page 8 Abbreviations and Conventions......Page 11 Introduction......Page 14 1.1 The Origin and Status of Laws of Nature......Page 18 1.2 The Ontology of Powers......Page 23 1.3 Necessity......Page 25 1.4 Models of Causation......Page 27 2. Plan of the Book......Page 29 3.1 Necessity......Page 33 3.2 The Ontology of Relations......Page 40 3.3 Manifest and Occult Qualities......Page 43 PART I: THE CARTESIAN PREDICAMENT......Page 46 4. What Mechanism Isn’t......Page 48 5. The Rejection of Aristotelianism......Page 52 6. The Nude Wax: Cartesian Ontology......Page 57 7. The Laws of Nature......Page 64 8. Force......Page 74 9. Occasionalism......Page 77 9.1 The Concurrentist Reading......Page 78 9.2 The Argument from Laws of Nature......Page 81 9.3 Thoroughgoing Occasionalism......Page 83 9.4 The Problem of Mental Causation......Page 89 PART II: THE DIALECTIC OF OCCASIONALISM......Page 92 10. Malebranche and the Cognitive Model of Causation......Page 94 10.1 The Argument from Nonsense......Page 95 10.2 The Argument from Elimination......Page 96 10.3 The Divine Concursus Argument......Page 99 10.4 ‘Little Souls’ Revisited......Page 103 10.5 The ‘No Necessary Connection’ Argument......Page 105 10.6 The Epistemic Argument......Page 110 11.1 The Content of Divine Volitions......Page 115 11.2 The Problem of Efficacious Laws......Page 119 12. Causation and Explanation......Page 123 13. A Scholastic Mechanism......Page 125 14. Régis Against the Occasionalists......Page 133 PART III: POWER AND NECESSITY......Page 144 15. ‘A Dead Cadaverous Thing’......Page 148 16. Relations and Powers......Page 153 17. Boyle’s Paradox......Page 164 18. Boyle and the Concurrentists......Page 170 19. Locke on Relations......Page 172 20. Locke on Powers: The Geometrical Model......Page 183 21. Locke’s Mechanisms......Page 190 22. Conclusion......Page 200 PART IV: HUME......Page 202 23. The Two Humes......Page 204 24. Intentionality......Page 210 24.1 Meaning......Page 212 24.2 Against the Positivist Reading......Page 213 24.3 Signification......Page 216 24.4 Judgment and Belief......Page 219 24.5 Semiotic Empiricism......Page 221 24.6 Relative Ideas......Page 223 24.7 The Argument from Nonsense......Page 228 25.1 Finding Hume’s Target......Page 232 25.2 Against the Cognitive and Geometrical Models......Page 235 25.3 The Neighboring Fields......Page 239 25.4 The Practicality Requirement......Page 241 26.1 The Status of Relations......Page 243 26.2 Two Kinds of Relations......Page 245 26.3 The Nature of Necessity......Page 248 27.1 The Problem......Page 251 27.2 Subjectivism or Projectivism?......Page 253 Conclusion......Page 260 References......Page 264 O......Page 272 W......Page 273 Introduction Themes The origin and status of laws of nature The ontology of powers Necessity Models of causation Plan of the book The Aristotelian background Necessity The ontology of relations Manifest and occult qualities The Cartesian predicament What mechanism isn't The rejection of aristotelianism The nude wax : Cartesian ontology The laws of nature Force Occasionalism The concurrentist reading The argument from laws of nature Thoroughgoing occasionalism The problem of mental causation The dialectic of occasionalism Malebranche and the cognitive model of causation The argument from nonsense The argument from elimination The divine concursus argument Little souls revisited The no necessary connection argument The epistemic argument Laws and divine volitions The content of divine volitions The problem of efficacious laws Causation and explanation A scholastic mechanism Regis against the occasionalists Power and necessity A dead cadaverous thing Relations and powers Boyle's paradox Boyle and the concurrentists Locke on relations Locke on powers : the geometrical model Locke's mechanisms Hume The two humes Intentionality Meaning Against the positivist reading Signification Judgment and belief Semiotic empiricism Relative ideas The argument from nonsense Necessity Finding Hume's target Against the cognitive and geometrical models The neighboring fields The practicality requirement The status of relations Kinds of relations The nature of necessity The definition of causation The problem Subjectivism or projectivism? Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is what happens in the physical world must be partly due to the laws of nature. Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy examines the debate between these views from Descartes to Hume. Ott argues that the competing models of causation in the period grow out of the scholastic notion of power. On this Aristotelian view, the connection between cause and effect is logically necessary. Causes are 'intrinsically directed' at what they produce. But when the Aristotelian view is faced with the challenge of mechanism, the core notion of a power splits into two distinct models, each of which persists throughout the early modern period. It is only when seen in this light that the key arguments of the period can reveal their true virtues and flaws. To make his case, Ott explores such central topics as intentionality, the varieties of necessity, and the nature of relations. Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser-known writers such as Pierre-Sylvain Regis, Nicolas Malebranche, and Robert Boyle. ## Abstract Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their own: what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is incomplete: what happens in the physical world must be partly due to the laws of nature. This book follows the debate between these views from Descartes to Hume. The book argues that the competing models of causation in the period grow out of the scholastic notion of power. On this Aristotelian view, the connection between cause and effect is logically necessary. Causes are “intrinsically directed” at what they produce. But when the Aristotelian view is faced with the challenge of mechanism, the core notion of a power splits into two distinct models, each of which persists throughout the early modern period. It is only when seen in this light that the key arguments of the period can reveal their true virtues and flaws. To make this case, the book explores such central topics as intentionality, the varieties of necessity, and the nature of relations. Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser‐known writers such as Pierre‐Sylvain Régis, Nicolas Malebranche, and Robert Boyle. This is a study of one of the most important debates in 17th- and 18th-century philosophy: the nature of causation. Ott offers controversial readings of such canonical figures as Descartes, Locke, and Hume, and explores related topics such as intentionality, necessity, and relations