Causal powers

Causal powers are ubiquitous. Electrons are negatively charged; they have the power to repel other electrons. Water is a solvent; it has the power to dissolve salt. We use concepts of causal powers and their relatives-dispositions, capacities, abilities, and so on-to describe the world around us, both in everyday life and in scientific practice. But what is it about the world that makes such descriptions apt? On one view, the neo-Humean view, there is nothing intrinsic about, say, negative charge, that makes its bearers have the power to repel other negatively charged particles. Rather, matters extrinsic to negative charge, the patterns and regularities in which negatively charged particles are embedded, fix the powers its bearers have. But on a different view, the anti-Humean view, causal powers are intrinsically powerful, bringing with them their own causal, nomic, and modal nature independent of extrinsic patterns and regularities-even fixing those patterns and regularities. This collection brings together new and important work by both emerging scholars and those who helped shape the field on the nature of causal powers, and the connections between causal powers and other phenomena within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Contributors discuss how one who takes causal powers to be in some sense irreducible should think about laws of nature, scientific practice, causation, modality, space and time, persistence, and the metaphysics of mind. Cover 1 Causal Powers 4 Copyright 5 Contents 6 Acknowledgments 8 List of Figures 10 List of Contributors 12 1: Introduction 14 1. The Chapters 15 PART I: Science and Laws of Nature 20 2: Causal Powers: Why Humeans Can’t Even Be Instrumentalists 22 1. What This Chapter Aims to Do 22 2. Contributions:WhyWe NeedThem 23 3. A Powers Ontology 24 4. Mill–Ramsey–Lewis: An Objection and a Rescue 26 5. Causal Powers andTheir Markers 30 6. Why InstrumentalismWill Not Rescue MRL 35 7. Conclusion 36 3: Saving the Scientific Phenomena: What Powers Can and Cannot Do 37 1. Dispositions, Laws, and Scientific Practice 37 2. Dispositional Realism: Two Contrasts 39 3. Arguments for Dispositional Realism 40 4. Arguments from Scientific Explanation 42 5. Arguments from Scientific Abstraction 44 6. An Argument from Coherence: Property Identity 45 7. The Dialectic of Dispositions 48 Acknowledgments 49 4: Powerful Properties,Powerless Laws 51 1. Introduction 51 2. The Categorical Best System Account 52 2.1. Science-Friendliness 53 2.2. The Mismatch Objection 54 2.3. ImpoverishedWorlds Objection 56 2.4. Metaphysical Oomph Objection 57 3. Potencies: Fundamental Dispositional Properties 58 3.1. Potencies are Science-Friendly 60 4. Potency-Best System Account of Basic Laws 61 4.1. Why Systematize Properties in non-ActualWorlds? 62 4.2. A Potency-BSA Matches our TOE 63 4.3. ImpoverishedWorlds and the Potency-BSA 63 4.4. Potencies do MetaphysicalWork 64 5. Conclusion 65 Acknowledgments 66 PART II: Causation and Modality 68 5: Aristotelian Powers at Work: Reciprocity without Symmetry in Causation 70 1. Introduction 70 2. Powers and Manifestations 71 2.1. Is There Only Potentiality in aWorld of ‘Pure’ Powers? 73 2.2. Are Powers Monadic or Relational Properties? 75 3. The Interdependencies among Fundamental Powers 76 3.1. Do Powers Depend on Other Powers forTheir Existence? 76 3.2. Do Powers Depend on Other Powers for Their Activation? 77 4. Causal Powers are Relatives 78 5. The Modality of Powers 80 6. Causation Is the Mutual Activation of Two (or More) Causal Powers 82 7. Each Instance of Causation Involves Two (or More) Manifestations 84 8. Active and Passive Causal Roles 85 9. Conclusions 88 Acknowledgments 89 6: Mutual Manifestation and Martin’s Two Triangles 90 1. Triggers and Partners 90 2. Triangles 92 3. Time and Process 94 4. Emergence 96 5. Nonlinearity 97 6. Contribution and Identity 99 7. Reckoning 101 7: Real Modalities 103 1. Modal Modesty 103 2. Laws 104 3. Causation 107 4. Dispositions 109 5. Nondeterministic Causation 110 6. Antidotes, Blockers, Finks, and Absences 113 7. Modal Truthmakers 114 8. Counterfactual and Subjunctive Conditionals,and Other Loose Ends 115 9. Concluding Remarks 117 Acknowledgments 117 8: Nine Problems (and Even More Solutions) for Powers Accounts of Possibility 118 1. Introduction 118 2. The Far Too Strong Powers Account and Its Problems 119 3. The Moderate Powers Account and Its Response to the Previous Three Problems 121 4. Powers to Bring about Powers: the Iteration Principle 124 5. Three Objections to the Conjunction of the Moderate Powers Account with the Iteration Principle 129 6. Conclusion 135 Acknowledgments 136 PART III: Space, Time, and Persistence 138 9: Manifesting Time and Space: Background-Free PhysicalTheories 140 1. 140 2. 140 3. 142 (i) 143 (ii) 143 (iii) 144 (iv) 144 4. 145 5. 147 6. 150 7. 151 Acknowledgments 151 10: Powerful Perdurance: Linking Parts with Powers 152 1. Introduction 152 2. Parts, Perdurance, and Persistence 153 3. Immanent Causation and Powers 155 4. Powers as Identical with their Manifestations 159 5. Reciprocity and Unilateral Powers 164 6. Antidotes for Stage-Fright: Static Parts and Dynamic Processes 168 7. Conclusion 177 PART IV: Mind 178 11: Conflicts of Desire: Dispositions and the Metaphysics of Mind 180 1. Desire as Dispositions 182 2. Alternative Dispositional Structures 184 3. Choosing between Alternative DispositionalStructures 186 4. Conclusion 189 Acknowledgments 189 12: Colors and Appearances as Powers and Manifestations 190 1. Introduction 190 2. An Analysis in Terms of Powers and Manifestations 191 3. Denying UP 195 4. Denying SP, Supposing that Representations of Colors Are Exact: Goodman/Clark 197 5. Denying SP, Supposing that Representations of Colors Are Inexact: Hardin 200 6. Denying SP, Supposing that Representations of Colors Are Inexact: Hellie 202 7. Looks as Manifestations of Powers 203 8. Conclusion 205 Acknowledgments 206 13: Must Functionalists Be Aristotelians? 207 1. Functionalism 207 2. Conditional Functionalisms 209 2.2. Non-material Conditionals 209 2.3. Rylean Conception of Dispositions 210 2.4. Nomological-deductive Model of Powers 211 3. ThreeTheories of Normativity 211 3.1. Aristotelian Normativity 211 3.2. Agential Normativity 212 3.3. Objections to Evolutionary Accounts of Normativity 212 4. Conclusions 216 14: Power for the Mental as Such 218 1. Introduction 218 2. The as-such Objection 219 3. Sketch of a Powers Ontology 222 4. Power for the Mental as Such 224 5. Mental Qualities 225 6. Too Much Power? 226 Acknowledgments 228 Bibliography 230 Index 242 Causal Powers Are Ubiquitous. Electrons Are Negatively Charged; They Have The Power To Repel Other Electrons. Water Is A Solvent; It Has The Power To Dissolve Salt. We Use Concepts Of Causal Powers And Their Relatives-dispositions, Capacities, Abilities, And So On-to Describe The World Around Us, Both In Everyday Life And In Scientific Practice. But What Is It About The World That Makes Such Descriptions Apt? This Collection Brings Together New And Important Work By Both Emerging Scholars And Those Who Helped Shape The Field On The Nature Of Causal Powers, And The Connections Between Causal Powers And Other Phenomena Within Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Science, And Philosophy Of Mind. Contributors Discuss How One Who Takes Causal Powers To Be In Some Sense Irreducible Should Think About Laws Of Nature, Scientific Practice, Causation, Modality, Space And Time, Persistence, And The Metaphysics Of Mind. Introduction / Jonathan D. Jacobs -- Causal Powers: Why Humeans Can't Even Be Instrumentalists / Nancy Cartwright -- Saving The Scientific Phenomena: What Powers Can And Cannot Do / Anjan Chakravartty -- Powerful Properties, Powerless Laws / Heather Demarest -- Aristotelian Powers At Work: Reciprocity Without Symmetry In Causation / Anna Marmodoror -- Mutual Manifestation And Martin's Two Triangles / Rani Lill Anjum And Stephen Mumford -- Real Modalities / John Heil -- Nine Problems (and Even More Solutions) For Powers Accounts Of Possibility / Timothy Pawl -- Manifesting Time And Space: Background-free Physical Theories / Alexander Bird -- Powerful Perdurance: Linking Parts With Powers / Neil E. Williams -- Conflicts Of Desire: Dispositions And The Metaphysics Of Mind / Lauren Ashwell -- Colors And Appearances As Powers And Manifestations / Max Kistler -- Must Functionalists Be Aristotelians? / Robert C. Koons And Alexander Pruss -- Power For The Mental As Such / David Robb. Edited By Jonathan D. Jacobs. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 217-227) And Index. We use concepts of causal powers and their relatives-dispositions, capacities, and abilities-to describe the world around us, both in everyday life and in scientific practice. This volume presents new work on the nature of causal powers, and their connections with other phenomena within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind.