Causal Pluralism in the Life Sciences: A Journey Along the Frontiers of Conceptual Plurality (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, 25)

This book takes a new approach to the debate on causal pluralism in the philosophy of biology by asking how useful pluralism is instead of debating its truth. The core thesis in this work is that many problems do not hinge on the question of whether or not we subscribe to causal pluralism. As one step in this central argument, the author develops an account that reasonably distinguishes pluralism from monism; in another step he studies cases that allegedly motivate causal pluralism in biology. Examining these cases shows how pluralism is often irrelevant and why pursuing pluralism is sometimes dangerous, since it may generate pseudo solutions to persistent philosophical problems. This book offers a systematic approach to this subject matter and argues that we might have overestimated the significance of the monism-pluralism distinction and at the same time failed to see the risks of pursuing causal pluralism. Preface Contents 1 Conceptual Pluralism 1.1 A Salesperson's Paradise 1.2 Singling Out a Relevant Notion of Causal Pluralism 1.3 A Brief Outline of Conceptual Causal Pluralism 1.4 Putting Pluralist Ideas to the Test 1.5 What Not to Expect From This Book References 2 Theories of Causation 2.1 Regularity Theory 2.2 Counterfactual Theory 2.3 Probabilistic Theory 2.4 Interventionist Theory 2.5 Process Theory 2.6 Normality Theory References 3 Recognising Pluralism and Arity Pluralism 3.1 Extensions of Concepts of Cause and Effect 3.2 Recognising Pluralist Accounts 3.3 Recognising Arity Pluralist Accounts 3.4 Conclusion and Outlook References 4 The Concepts of Ultimate and Proximate Cause 4.1 Precursors of Mayr's Ultimate-Proximate Distinction 4.2 Dividing Biology According to Question Types 4.3 New Hampshire on the Night of the 25th of August 4.4 The Program Account of Ultimate and Proximate Causes 4.5 Extensional Analysis of `Ultimate' and `Proximate Cause' 4.6 Are Ultimate Causes Just Functional Explanations? 4.7 Are Ultimate Causes Reducible to Proximate Causes? 4.8 Leaving the Ultimate-Proximate Account Behind 4.9 Conclusion References 5 Permissive and Instructive Causes 5.1 Versions of the Permissive-Instructive Distinction 5.2 The Notion of Influence Doesn't Apply to the RNA Polymerase 5.3 Problems with Analogy Models 5.4 Limitations of a Second Notion of Specificity 5.5 Confusion About Causal Backgrounds 5.6 Waddington's Epigenetic Landscape 5.7 Conclusion References 6 Distinctions Between Production and Dependence 6.1 Hall on the Causes of Forest Fires 6.2 Sober on Genealogy and Genetic Drift 6.3 Glennan on Frequency-Dependent Selection 6.4 Conclusion References 7 Omissions and Conceptual Distinctions of Causal Concepts 7.1 Five Reservations About Omissions 7.2 Omissions in Biology (and Beyond) 7.3 Normality Approaches 7.4 Interventionism 7.5 Counterfactual Theory 7.6 Causal Explanation as an Exit Strategy? 7.7 Pluralism as an Answer? 7.8 Conclusion References 8 Epilogue References Index