Caught in the Middle East : U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961

American postwar efforts to ameliorate Arab-Israeli relations entangled the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict in complex ways. Peter L. Hahn explores the diplomatic and cultural factors that influenced the policies of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower as they faced the escalation of one of the modern world's most intractable disputes. Truman tended to make decisions in an ad hoc, reactive fashion. Eisenhower, in contrast, had a more proactive approach to the regional conflict, but strategic and domestic political factors prevented him from dramatically revising the basic tenets Truman had established. American officials desired--in principle--to promote Arab-Israeli peace in order to stabilize the region. Yet Hahn shows how that desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S. leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between Israel and its neighbors. During these critical years the United States began to supplant Britain as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, and U.S. leaders found themselves in two notable predicaments. They were unable to relinquish the responsibilities they had accepted with their new power--even as those responsibilities became increasingly difficult to fulfill. And they were caught in the middle of the Arab-Israeli conflict, unable to resolve a dispute that would continue to generate instability for years to come. Postwar American officials desired--in principle--to promote Arab-Israeli peace in order to stabilize the region. Yet Peter L. Hahn shows how, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, that desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S. leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between Israel and its neighbors. During these critical years the United States began to supplant Britain as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, and U.S. leaders found themselves in two notable predicaments. They were unable to relinquish the responsibilities they had accepted with their new power--even as those responsibilities became increasingly difficult to fulfill. And they were caught in the middle of the Arab-Israeli conflict, unable to resolve a dispute that would continue to generate instability for years to come. As Is All Too Clear Today, American Postwar Efforts To Ameliorate Arab-israeli Relations Before They Could Damage American Interests In The Middle East Failed To Achieve A Lasting Peace And Entangled The United States In The Conflict In Complex Ways. Peter L. Hahn Explores The Strategic, Diplomatic, Political, And Cultural Factors That Influenced The Policies Of Presidents Harry S. Truman And Dwight D. Eisenhower As They Confronted The Origins And Escalation Of One Of The Modern World's Most Intractable Disputes.--jacket. I: Genesis: The Palestine Conflict To 1945 -- Security And Politics: The Context Of U.s. Policy Toward Palestine After 1945 -- Ambivalence: Truman's Policy Toward Palestine, 1945-1947 -- Diplomacy And Conflict: The Creation Of Israel And The Arab-israeli War Of 1948-1949 -- Ii: Security Commitments: U.s. Strategic Interests In The Middle East, 1949-1953 -- Presidential Passivity: Truman And The Peace Process, 1949-1953 -- Repatriation Versus Resettlement: The Palestinian Refugee Crisis, 1949-1953 -- Holy Places: The Question Of Jerusalem, 1949-1953 -- Tangled Web: The U.s. Failure To Solve Multiple Controversies, 1949-1953 -- The Impact Of Conflict: U.s. Relations With Israel And The Arab States, 1949-1953 -- Iii: Cold War Framework: U.s. Perspectives On The Middle East, 1953-1957 -- Border Wars: Eisenhower, Dulles, And Arab-israeli Frontiers, 1953-1955 -- Cornucopia Of Conflict: Water, Jerusalem, Refugees, And Trade, 1953-1955 -- Stillborn: The U.s. Peace Process And The Resumption Of War, 1955-1956 -- Desperation Diplomacy: U.s. Policy During The Suez-sinai War Of 1956 -- Persistent Conflict: The Aftermath Of The Suez-sinai War -- Iv: Security Affirmed: U.s. Regional Considerations In The Middle East After The Suez-sinai War -- Containing Conflict: U.s. Efforts To Avert Arab-israeli Clashes, 1957-1961 -- Selective Activism: U.s. Efforts To Solve Arab-israeli Disputes, 1957-1961 -- Cost Of Conflict: U.s. Relations With Israel And The Arab States, 1953-1961 -- Caught In The Middle East. Peter L. Hahn. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 367-387) And Index. As is all too clear today, American postwar efforts to ameliorate Arab-Israeli relations before they could damage American interests in the Middle East failed to achieve a lasting peace and entangled the United States in the conflict in complex ways. Peter L. Hahn explores the strategic, diplomatic, political, and cultural factors that influenced the policies of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower as they confronted the origins and escalation of one of the modern world's most intractable disputes. President Truman tended to make decisions in an ad hoc, reactive fashion, Hahn argues. Thus Truman formulated a policy prone to inconsistency and contradiction. Eisenhower, on the other hand, is shown to have taken a more evenhanded and a more proactive approach to the regional conflict. Yet even he found that strategic and domestic political conditions prevented him from dramatically revising the basic tenets Truman had established.American officials desired -- in principle -- to promote Arab-Israeli peace in order to stabilize the region. Yet Hahn shows how that desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S. leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between Israel and its neighbors. During these critical years the United States began to supplant Britain as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, and U.S. leaders found themselves in two notable predicaments. They were unable to relinquish the responsibilities that they had accepted with their newfound power, even as those responsibilities became increasingly difficult to fulfill. And they were caught in the middle of the Arab-Israeli conflict, unable to resolve a dispute that would continue to generate instability for years to come. Content 8 Introduction 18 Part I 24 1. Genesis: The Palestine Conflict to 1945 26 2. Security and Politics: The Context of U.S. Policy toward Palestine after 1945 37 3. Ambivalence: Truman’s Policy toward Palestine, 1945–1947 49 4. Diplomacy and Conflict: The Creation of Israel and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949 61 Part II 82 5. Security Commitments: U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East, 1949-1953 84 6. Presidential Passivity: Truman and the Peace Process, 1949-1953 103 7. Repatriation versus Resettlement: The Palestinian Refugee Crisis, 1949-1953 116 8. Holy Places: The Question of Jerusalem, 1949-1953 129 9. Tangled Web: The U.S. Failure to Solve Multiple Controversies, 1949-1953 140 10. The Impact of Conflict: U.S. Relations with Israel and the Arab States, 1949-1953 150 Part III 162 11. Cold War Framework: U.S. Perspectives on the Middle East, 1953-1957 164 12. Border Wars: Eisenhower, Dulles, and Arab-Israeli Frontiers, 1953-1955 175 13. Cornucopia of Conflict: Water, Jerusalem, Refugees, and Trade, 1953-1955 187 14. Stillborn: The U.S. Peace Process and the Resumption of War, 1955-1956 199 15. Desperation Diplomacy: U.S. Policy during the Suez-Sinai War of 1956 211 16. Persistent Conflict: The Afermath of the Suez-Sinai War 227 Part IV 238 17. Security Affirmed: U.S. Regional Considerations in the Middle East after the Suez-Sinai War 240 18. Containing Conflict: U.S. Efforts to Avert Arab-Israeli Clashes, 1957-1961 252 19. Selective Activism: U.S. Efforts to Solve Arab-Israeli Disputes, 1957-1961 265 20. Cost of Conflict: U.S. Relations with Israel and the Arab States, 1953-1961 278 Conclusion: Caught in the Middle East 293 Notes 312 Bibliography 384 Index 406 The Arab-Israeli conflict that emerged after World War II originated in ideological, political, and military developments of preceding decades.