Capitalising on constraint : bailout politics in eurozone countries

Since 2010, five Eurozone governments in economic difficulty have received assistance from international lenders on condition that certain policies specified in the Memoranda of Understanding were implemented. How did negotiations take place in this context? What room for manoeuvre did the governments of these countries have? After conditionality, to what extent were governments willing and able to roll back changes imposed on them by the international lenders? Do we find variation across governments, and, if so, why? "This book is an essential analysis of what really happens behind closed doors during and after a bailout. In the last decade, five Eurozone governments in economic difficulty received assistance from international lenders on the condition that certain policies specified in the Memoranda of Understanding were implemented. How did negotiations take place in this context? What room for manoeuvre did the governments of these countries have? After conditionality, to what extent were governments willing and able to roll back changes imposed on them by the international lenders? This book explores the constraints on national executives in the five bailed out countries of the Eurozone during and beyond the crisis, from 2008 to 2019. The authors argue that despite international market pressure and creditors' conditionality, governments had some room for manoeuvre during a bailout and were able to advocate, resist, shape or roll back some of the policies demanded by external actors. Under certain circumstances, domestic actors were also able to exploit the constraint of conditionality to their own advantage. Capitalising on constraint shows that after a bailout programme, governments could use their discretion to revert the measures that brought the greatest benefits at a lower cost. The authors provide a valuable insight into the determinants of bargaining leverage, the importance of credibility, and the limits of conditionality that might inform the design of international and European lending during future crises." -- Provided by publisher This book is an essential analysis of what really happens behind closed doors during and after a bailout.0In the last decade, five Eurozone governments in economic difficulty received assistance from international lenders on the condition that certain policies specified in the Memoranda of Understanding were implemented. How did negotiations take place in this context? What room for manoeuvre did the governments of these countries have? After conditionality, to what extent were governments willing and able to roll back changes imposed on them by the international lenders?0This book explores the constraints on national executives in the five bailed out countries of the Eurozone during and beyond the crisis, from 2008 to 2019. The authors argue that despite international market pressure and creditors' conditionality, governments had some room for manoeuvre during a bailout and were able to advocate, resist, shape or roll back some of the policies demanded by external actors. Under certain circumstances, domestic actors were also able to exploit the constraint of conditionality to their own advantage.0Capitalising on constraint shows that after a bailout programme, governments could use their discretion to revert the measures that brought the greatest benefits at a lower cost. The authors provide a valuable insight into the determinants of bargaining leverage, the importance of credibility, and the limits of conditionality that might inform the design of international and European lending during future crises This Book Explores The Constraints And Opportunities Of The Adjustment Programs In The Five Bailed Out Eurozone Countries, In The Period During And Beyond The Crisis (2007-2019). It Shows That Bailed Out Governments Had Room For Manoeuvre And, Under Certain Circumstances, Were Able To Exploit The Constraint Of Conditionality To Their Own Advantage. It Additionally Demonstrates That After A Bail-out Programme Governments Use Their Discretion To Revert The Measures Which Bring The Greatest Benefits At A Lower Cost. Front matter 1 Contents 7 Figures 8 Tables 9 Contributors 10 Acknowledgements 12 Abbreviations 14 Introduction 17 The politics of conditionality: a theoretical framework 32 Greece 46 Ireland 82 Portugal 104 Spain 125 Cyprus 146 Capitalising on external constraint: six things you should know about Eurozone bailouts 162 References 180 Index 208 This book explores the constraints on national executives in the five bailed out countries of the Eurozone - namely Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. It also sheds light on the policy-makers’ discretion and motivations to revert, or alternatively to keep, policies that had been taken under conditionality. -- .