Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà Vu All Over Again (Studies in Canadian Military History)

Since the mid-1950s, successive Canadian governments have responded to US ballistic missile defence initiatives with fear and uncertainty. Officials have endlessly debated the implications – at home and abroad – of participation. Drawing on previously classified government documents and interviews with senior officials, James Fergusson offers the first full account of Canada’s unsure response to US initiatives. He reveals that factors such as weak leadership and a tendency to place uncertain and ill-defined notions of international peace and security before national defence have resulted in indecision. In the end, policy-makers have failed to transform the ballistic missile defence issue into an opportunity to define Canada’s strategic interests at home and on the world stage. ""This is the first attempt to tell the full story of Canada's policy regarding ballistic missile defence. Fergusson lives and breathes this topic and, in this book, he demonstrates unsurpassed personal experience and knowledge of all the relevant government documents and academic literature from Canada, the US, and elsewhere. He is Mr̀. BMD' in Canada, and few can approach his expertise. His book is a much-needed corrective to the biased and often ideologically based accounts dealing with different aspects of Canadian policy-making in this area."Co-author of Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants" ""This is important scholarship. It is the first history of Canada and ballistic missile defence, placing the most recent debates in the context of more than fifty years of developments and revealing recurring (and lamentable) patterns of Canadian decision making. Moreover, it sheds needed light on Canadian involvement in NORAD, Canada-US relations more broadly, and how important defence decisions are made in Canada."author of Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History" "Since the mid-1950s, successive Canadian governments have responded to US ballistic missile defence initiatives with fear and uncertainty. Officials have endlessly debated the implications - at home and abroad - of participation. Drawing on previously classified government documents and interviews with senior officials, James Fergusson Offers the first full account of Canada's unsure response to US initiatives. He reveals that factors such as weak leadership and a tendency to place uncertain and ill-defined nations of international peace and security before national defence have resulted in indecision. In the end, policy-makers have failed to transform the ballistic missile defence issue into an opportunity to define Canada's strategic interests at home and on the world stage."--BOOK JACKET

Since the mid-1950s, successive Canadian governments have grappled with the issue of Canada's participation in US ballistic missile defence programs. Until Paul Martin's Liberal government finally said no, policy-makers responded to US initiatives with fear and uncertainty as they endlessly debated the implications — at home and abroad — of participation. However, whether this is the end of the story remains to be seen.

Drawing on previously classified government documents and interviews with senior officials, James Fergusson assesses Canada's policy deliberations and rationales for avoiding a definitive commitment in response to five major US initiatives. He reveals that a combination of factors resulted in indecision: weak leadership, wrangling between the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, a belief that the United States would defend Canada without much Canadian participation,
and a tendency to place uncertain and ill-defined notions of international security before national defence. Successive Canadian governments have failed to transform the debate over ballistic missile defence into an opportunity to define Canada's strategic interests at home and on the world stage.

Balanced and engaging, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense
offers the first full account of Canada's uncertain response to US ballistic missile defence initiatives and an exploration of the implications of this indecision.

Anti-ballistic missiles : don't worry, be happy (1954-71) The strategic defense initiative : much ado about very little (1972-85) Global protection against limited strikes : too close for comfort (1986-92) National missile defense : let sleeping dogs lie (1993-2000) Ground-based midcourse defense : is this the end? (2001-05) Forward to the past (2006-beyond). This insightful book offers an explanation for Canada’s uncertain response to US ballistic missile defence initiatives from the 1950s to the present.