Building the Cold War Consensus : The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949-51

Explains the basis in domestic politics of the political consensus in support of large defense spending in the early stages of the Cold War | In 1950, the U.S. military budget more than tripled while plans for a national health care system and other new social welfare programs disappeared from the agenda. At the same time, the official campaign against the influence of radicals in American life reached new heights. Benjamin Fordham suggests that these domestic and foreign policy outcomes are closely related. The Truman administration's efforts to fund its ambitious and expensive foreign policy required it to sacrifice much of its domestic agenda and acquiesce to conservative demands for a campaign against radicals in the labor movement and elsewhere. Using a statistical analysis of the economic sources of support and opposition to the Truman Administration's foreign policy, and a historical account of the crucial period between the summer of 1949 and the winter of 1951, Fordham integrates the political struggle over NSC 68, the decision to intervene in the Korean War, and congressional debates over the Fair Deal, McCarthyism and military spending. The Truman Administration's policy was politically successful not only because it appealed to internationally oriented sectors of the U.S. economy, but also because it was linked to domestic policies favored by domestically oriented, labor-sensitive sectors that would otherwise have opposed it. This interpretation of Cold War foreign policy will interest political scientists and historians concerned with the origins of the Cold War, American social welfare policy, McCarthyism, and the Korean War, and the theoretical argument it advances will be of interest broadly to scholars of U.S. foreign policy, American politics, and international relations theory. Benjamin O. Fordham is Assistant Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany.

In 1950, the U.S. military budget more than tripled while plans for a national health care system and other new social welfare programs disappeared from the agenda. At the same time, the official campaign against the influence of radicals in American life reached new heights. Benjamin Fordham suggests that these domestic and foreign policy outcomes are closely related. The Truman administration's efforts to fund its ambitious and expensive foreign policy required it to sacrifice much of its domestic agenda and acquiesce to conservative demands for a campaign against radicals in the labor movement and elsewhere.

Using a statistical analysis of the economic sources of support and opposition to the Truman Administration's foreign policy, and a historical account of the crucial period between the summer of 1949 and the winter of 1951, Fordham integrates the political struggle over NSC 68, the decision to intervene in the Korean War, and congressional debates over the Fair Deal, McCarthyism and military spending. The Truman Administration's policy was politically successful not only because it appealed to internationally oriented sectors of the U.S. economy, but also because it was linked to domestic policies favored by domestically oriented, labor-sensitive sectors that would otherwise have opposed it.

This interpretation of Cold War foreign policy will interest political scientists and historians concerned with the origins of the Cold War, American social welfare policy, McCarthyism, and the Korean War, and the theoretical argument it advances will be of interest broadly to scholars of U.S. foreign policy, American politics, and international relations theory.

Benjamin O. Fordham is Assistant Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany.

"Using a statistical analysis of the economic sources of support and opposition to the Truman administration's foreign policy and a historical account of the crucial period between the summer of 1949 and the winter of 1951, Fordham integrates the political struggle over NSC 68, the decision to intervene in the Korean War, and congressional debates over the Fair Deal, McCarthyism, and military spending. The Truman administration's policy was politically successful not only because it appealed to internationally oriented sectors of the U.S. economy, but also because it was linked to domestic policies favored by domestically oriented, labor-sensitive sectors that would otherwise have opposed it." "This interpretation of Cold War foreign policy will appeal to political scientists and historians concerned with the origins of the Cold War, American social welfare policy, McCarthyism, and the Korean War. The theoretical argument that Fordham advances will be of interest broadly to scholars of U.S. foreign policy, American politics, and international relations theory."--Jacket Contents......Page 6 Acknowledgments......Page 8 List of Abbreviations......Page 10 1. The Domestic Political Economy and U.S. National Security Policy......Page 12 2. The Politics of Rearmament in the Executive Branch I: The Fiscal 1951 Budget......Page 36 3. The Politics of Rearmament in the Executive Branch II: NSC 68 and Rearmament......Page 52 4. The Political and Economic Sources of Divergent Foreign Policy Preferences in the Senate, 1949−51......Page 86 5. The Conflictual Politics of Consensus Building I: Korea, Rearmament, and the End of the Fair Deal......Page 114 6. The Conflictual Politics of Consensus Building II: The Development of the Internal Security Program......Page 142 7. The Conflictual Politics of Consensus Building III: Rearmament and the Red Scare......Page 162 8. Conclusion: Domestic Politics and Theories of National Security Policy......Page 196 Appendix: Data Collection......Page 214 Notes......Page 218 References......Page 250 Name Index......Page 264 Subject Index......Page 270 Why was there a political consensus in support of large defense spending in the early stages of the Cold War? Political scientist Benjamin Forham draws a correlation between a 1950 increased military budget--at the expense of national health care and other social reforms--and a campaign against the influence of radicals in American life. Forham's interpretation will interest political scientists, historians, and anyone interested in Cold War politics.