Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Brokers, Voters, And Clientelism Addresses Major Questions In Distributive Politics. Why Is It Acceptable For Parties To Try To Win Elections By Promising To Make Certain Groups Of People Better Off, But Unacceptable, And Illegal, To Pay People For Their Votes? Why Do Parties Often Lavish Benefits On Loyal Voters, Whose Support They Can Count On Anyway, Rather Than On Responsive Swing Voters? Why Is Vote Buying And Machine Politics Common In Today's Developing Democracies But A Thing Of The Past In Most Of Today's Advanced Democracies? This Book Develops A Theory Of Broker-mediated Distribution To Answer These Questions, Testing The Theory With Research From Four Developing Democracies, And Reviews A Rich Secondary Literature On Countries In All World Regions. The Authors Deploy Normative Theory To Evaluate Whether Clientelism, Pork-barrel Politics, And Other Non-programmatic Distributive Strategies Can Be Justified On The Grounds That They Promote Efficiency, Redistribution, Or Voter Participation. -- Publisher Website. Part I. Modalities Of Distributive Politics: 1. Between Clients And Citizens: Puzzles And Concepts In The Study Of Distributive Politics; Part Ii. The Micro-logic Of Clientelism: 2. Gaps Between Theory And Fact; 3. A Theory Of Broker-mediated Distribution; 4. Testing The Theory Of Broker-mediated Distribution; 5. A Disjunction Between The Strategies Of Leaders And Brokers?; 6. Clientelism And Poverty; Part Iii. The Macro-logic Of Vote-buying: What Explains The Rise And Decline Of Political Machines?: 7. Party Leaders Against The Machine; Part Iv. Clientelism And Democratic Theory: 8. What's Wrong With Buying Votes? Susan C. Stokes, Yale University, Thad Dunning, Yale University, Marcelo Nazareno, National University Of Córdoba, Valeria Brusco, National University Of Córdoba. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 299-310) And Index. "Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable, and illegal, to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation."--Descripción del editor