Brokers and Bureaucrats : Building Market Institutions in Russia

A classic problem of social order prompts the central questions of this book: Why are some groups better able to govern themselves than others? Why do state actors sometimes delegate governing power to other bodies? How do different organizations including the state, the business community, and protection rackets come to govern different markets? Scholars have used both sociological and economic approaches to study these questions; here Timothy Frye argues for a different approach. He seeks to extend the theoretical and empirical scope of theories of self-governance beyond groups that exist in isolation from the state and suggests that social order is primarily a political problem. Drawing on extensive interviews, surveys, and other sources, Frye addresses these question by studying five markets in contemporary Russia, including the currency futures, universal and specialized commodities, and equities markets. Using a model that depicts the effect of state policy on the prospects for self-governance, he tests theories of institutional performance and offers a political explanation for the creation of social capital, the formation of markets, and the source of legal institutions in the postcommunist world. In doing so, Frye makes a major contribution to the study of states and markets. The book will be important reading for academic political scientists, economists (especially those who study the New Institutional Economics), legal scholars, sociologists, business-people, journalists, and students interested in transitions. Timothy Frye is Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University.

A classic problem of social order prompts the central questions of this book: Why are some groups better able to govern themselves than others? Why do state actors sometimes delegate governing power to other bodies? How do different organizations including the state, the business community, and protection rackets come to govern different markets? Scholars have used both sociological and economic approaches to study these questions; here Timothy Frye argues for a different approach. He seeks to extend the theoretical and empirical scope of theories of self-governance beyond groups that exist in isolation from the state and suggests that social order is primarily a political problem.

Drawing on extensive interviews, surveys, and other sources, Frye addresses these question by studying five markets in contemporary Russia, including the currency futures, universal and specialized commodities, and equities markets. Using a model that depicts the effect of state policy on the prospects for self-governance, he tests theories of institutional performance and offers a political explanation for the creation of social capital, the formation of markets, and the source of legal institutions in the postcommunist world. In doing so, Frye makes a major contribution to the study of states and markets.

The book will be important reading for academic political scientists, economists (especially those who study the New Institutional Economics), legal scholars, sociologists, business-people, journalists, and students interested in transitions.

Timothy Frye is Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University.

Contents 6 List of Figures 8 List of Tables 10 Preface 12 Acknowledgments 14 Introduction: The Problem of Social Order 18 1. Institutions and Social Order: Sociological and Economic Approaches 34 2. Self-Governance and Social Order: A More Political Approach 50 3. Benign Neglect: Self-Governance on Currency Futures Markets 73 4. The Meddlesome Leviathan: Self-governance on the Commodities Markets 101 5. Toward a Politics of Social Order: Self-Governance on the Equities Market 124 6. What Governs? Organizational Competition and the Weak Russian State 160 7. State Policy and Self-Governance: The Political Roots of Social Order 182 8. The Bear’s Bear: Institutional Developments and the Crash of 1998 210 Conclusion: Social Order and Social Science 232 Notes 240 References 266 Index 280