British Military Intelligence in the Crimean War, 1854-1856 (Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence)

This is a study of the British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's, need for information on the enemy, and traces the subsequent development of the system. "This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. At the outbreak of war with Russia in March 1854, the British Army found itself without even rudimentary intelligence on the enemy. The British Commander, Lord Raglan, initially turned for basic intelligence on Russian forces in the Balkans and the Crimea to travelogues, amateur volunteers, and conjecture. However, after the blind victory at the Alma, followed by the near disastrous battles of Balaclava and Inkerman, Raglan realized the need to gather adequate military intelligence, and acquired it through a civilian, Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, routinely supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea, and even strategic advice to Allied commanders. Cattley's system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some precision, thus paving the way to victory. This book demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence."--Jacket