British Foreign Policy in Former Yugoslavia 1989–1999 : Brotherhood and Unity Lost

British Foreign Policy in former Yugoslavia 1989-1999: Brotherhood and Unity Lost, gives a broad analysis of Britain’s foreign policy during the wars of Yugoslav secessions from 1992 to 1999. Normative approaches to Britain’s foreign policy during this period ‘have tended to place it’ in to two halves. The notion, there was a new morality in Britain’s foreign policy appeared after New Labour‘s election landslide on 1 May 1997. Robin Cook declared shortly after the victory there would be an ‘ethical dimension’ to Labour‘s foreign policy, and this appeared to chart new territory. As a result, this would be a departure from what former US Assistant Secretary of State, James Rubin, believed was the hyper-realism of the traditional British kind under British Prime Minister, John Major. The book includes interviews with key actors, provides new archive material and re-examines claims by the ‘New Orthodoxy’ which became prevalent after 1999. Acknowledgements Introduction Contents List of Maps List of Tables 1 Yugoslavia: A Brief Background 1919–1990 Prologue Pre-Yugoslavia The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–1929)—The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1941) Tito’s Yugoslavia 1945 to 1980 The Rise of Nationalism The Kosovo Question Economic Stagnation, Corruption and Slovene Opposition Greater Serbia: The Annexation of Kosovo and Vojvodina The Start of the Secession Process in Slovenia and Croatia Summary 2 Britain’s Role in Post-war Yugoslavia and the Slovene and Croat Secessions Prologue—Brotherhood and Unity Postponed Part A: Britain and Yugoslavia During the Cold War British Support for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia End of the Cold War Part B: Yugoslavia Starts to Disintegrate The West’s ‘Muddled’ Response’ to the Secessions of Slovenia and Croatia The WEU, France and Germany: Search for a Military/Peacekeeping Solution A Resurgent Germany and US Congress Involvement, Ushers Prudence in Britain, France and the Soviet Union ‘The Hour for Europe Has Come. It Is Not the Hour of the Americans’ the EC: ‘Takes Control’ Britain Advocates a New Direction: A CSCE Approach Part C: ‘The End of the Beginning.’ The UN Enters the Fray and the EC Scraps Carrington’s Peace Plan The Resumption of the EC’s Leading Role and an Unsteady Peace Croatia: War and Ethnic Division—The EC Struggles to Keep the Peace as Moscow Warns Against Military Intervention Lord Carrington, Robert Badinter and The Hague Peace Conference Britain’s Support for the Carrington Peace Process and UN Intervention Carrington’s Declaration of His ‘Arrangements for a General Settlement’ and the Bosnia Sovereignty Declaration Increased UN’s Intervention and German Pressure During Carrington Peace Plan Talks Part D: Recognition, Realism and the Maastricht Treaty Negotiations Initial British Support for Carrington Counter German Interests The Maastricht Treaty Negotiations and the Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia Recognition, Triumphalism, Anger and Acquiescence 3 Nationalism in Bosnia and Western Approaches Prologue Part A: Nationalism and the Secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina Nationalism in Bosnia and the Drift to Conflict The EC Cutileiro-Carrington Peace Initiative and Its Failure Part B: Western Responses to Early Bosnian Power Politics British Perspectives The West’s Support for Bosnia’s Declaration of Sovereignty Britain’s and France’s Coordinated Response Carrington and Cutileiro Keep Trying Part C: The US and Sarajevo, the Collapse of the EC Peace Plan Washington’s Advice to Sarajevo Britain’s Attempt at Instilling European Discipline Britain’s EC Presidency Role; Consensus and Doubts The UN’s Reticent Position and Lord Owen’s Appeal to John Major Summary 4 British Initiatives, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and Its Failure Prologue Part A: The London Conference and the Establishment of the ICFY The FCO’s Attempt to Bring Owen On-board as Pressure for Intervention Intensified The London Peace Conference Part B: Autumn–Winter 1992: Early Bosnian and Western Alliances on the Ground The Breakdown of the Croat-Muslim Alliance British Responses to the Beginning of a Three-Way Civil War in Bosnia US State Department’s Interests and Bosnia: (British and Pentagon Resistance to Armed Intervention) Part C: How Britain and France Looked for Innovative Policies Other Than Armed Intervention During the Bosnian Winter The UN’s Support for Franco-British Approaches UN Intervention and Humanitarian Aid Flowing. Nevertheless, Britain Becomes Wary of US Criticism Part D: How the United States Manoeuvred Against the VOPP The Vance-Owen Peace Plan Is Announced The Croat/Bosnian-Muslim Civil War and Washington’s Rejection of the Vance Owen Peace Plan 5.3. Britain Presses the US on the Vance Owen Peace Plan. Nevertheless, US Rejection Was Total Part E: Debates on Armed Intervention During the British/US Fall-Out Owen’s Insistence on Armed Intervention and Russia’s Increasing Assertiveness Margaret Thatcher’s Criticism, Nevertheless, the Labour Party and the UN were Supportive of the British Government Bosnian-Serb Obstinacy and Milošević’s Support for the Vance Owen Peace Plan Pressure on the British Cabinet US/German and a British/French/UN Impasse Part F: The Ditching the Vance-Owen Peace Plan Warren Christopher’s Visit to London Boutros-Ghali’s Control of the UN Military Command The Bosnian-Serbs Rejection of the VOPP The VOPP Is Dismissed, Enter the Joint Action Plan Summary 5 Engaging the Americans and Russians for Armed-Mandated Military Intervention Prologue Part A: Safe Havens, the Fear of Unilateral NATO Air Strikes and the Powers’ Failed Peace Plans during 1993 The ‘Joint Action Plan’ and ‘Union of Three Republics Plan’ The UN’s Support for Air Strikes The Union of Three Republics The HMS Invincible Talks The EC Action Plan Part B: Strains on the British-French Alliance The Sarajevo Market (Markale) Bombing and Britain’s response Straining of the Franco-British Alliance over Air Strikes General Rose’s Sarajevo Airport Agreement and the End of the (Croat/Bosnian-Croat) Muslim Civil War Part C: The Bosnian-Serbs Attack Goražde; Britain Struggles to Avoid a ‘US-Somalia Type Disaster’ Goražde: The UN and NATO’s First Real Test The Conflict Within the FCO over ‘Lift and Strike’ and the Lessons from US Intervention in Somalia Enter the ‘Great Powers’: The Contact Group The US/Iranian Support for Sarajevo and Zagreb and Belgrade’s Rejection of Karadžić and the Pale Government Part D: The Manoeuvring of the US into Action by Britain, France and the UN British and French ‘Withdrawal’ Plans The British-French Rapid Reaction Force and NATO’s Op-Plan 40104 Attacks on the Bosnian-Serbs by Croatia and NATO Part E: The Dayton Peace The Dayton Peace Plan Summary Appraisal: Britain’s Interventions during the Secessions of Croatia and Slovenia and the Civil War in Bosnia 1991–1995 Britain and the Slovene and Croat Secessions Britain and Bosnia: The Secession and War 6 Britain’s Intervention During the Insurgency and the War in Former Yugoslavia and Kosovo 1998–1999 Prologue: Serbian and Albanian Claims to Kosovo Part A: Yugoslavia’s Intractable Kosovo Problem Kosovo and Pre-Socialist Yugoslavia Kosovo in Federal Yugoslavia The Re-annexation of Kosovo and Ensuing Muddled Western Responses Part B: The Internationalisation of Yugoslavia’s Intractable Kosovo Problem The Emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 1997 and Labour’s New Ethical British Foreign Policy Washington’s Praise for Belgrade: Serbia and the Insurgency Summary 7 British Diplomacy and the Build-up to the Kosovo War Prologue Part A: ‘Progressives’ (Tony Blair and Bill Clinton) Manoeuvre Against the Demagogue The Insurgency in Kosovo and Tony Blair’s Calls for Intervention ‘Our Man in the UN’—Kofi Annan: The UN Side-lined The 1998 Serb Elections, Belgrade’s Spring Offensive and Robin Cook’s ‘Ethical Third Way’ Russia Side-lined Serb Summer Offensives and British Condemnation Palpable NATO Intervention Threatened: Milošević Yields Part B—The West Further Cranks-up the Pressure The Arrival of the KVMs, Together with the KLA’s Winter Offensive and the Overlooking of the UN General Assembly The Račak Massacre and the Summoning of Belgrade and the Kosovar-Albanians to Rambouillet The Debate in Britain Post-Račak The Rambouillet Peace Talks The Importance of Rambouillet and the Basis for Permissible Armed Humanitarian Intervention 8 Britain and NATO’s Military Intervention in Kosovo Prologue Immediate Responses Regarding NATO’s Ultimatum and the Bombing of the FRY The House of Commons Debate on NATO Intervention Part B: Britain’s Assertions; NATO Action averted a Greater Disaster and All the Targets were chosen with Enormous Care Cook’s Assertion, the Situation would be worse Without NATO Intervention and Escalation George Robertson’s Claim, All Targets would be Military and Chosen with Enormous Care Part C: The War Doesn’t go to Plan Further NATO Justification, Just War and Tony Blair’s Defining Chicago Speech Immediate Results on the Ground and Criticism of NATO’s Bombing Campaign Against Civilian Targets Whitehall’s Targeting of the British Media Serbia’s Refusal to Capitulate, Discontent in NATO, and Russia’s Growing Role The Endgame: The Move to a Negotiated Settlement Kosovo after the War, Spill Over Summary: Britain’s Intervention During the Insurgency and the War in Former Yugoslavia and Kosovo 1998–1999 9 Ethics and Morals Prologue The Ethical and Moral Basis of British Intervention in Former Yugoslavia: 1989–1995 The Ethical and Moral Basis of British Intervention in Kosovo and Serbia (1998–1999) Index