Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World? (Cold War History)

This Book, Based On Recently Declassified Documents In Britain And The Usa, Is The First Detailed Account Of Britain's East Of Suez Decision, Which Was Taken By The Harold Wilson Government In 1967-68. Contrary To Received Opinion, The Author Argues That The Decision Was Not Taken Hastily As A Result Of The November 1967 Devaluation. Nor Is There Any Hard Evidence To Support The Notion That There Existed A 'pound-defence' Deal With The Usa. Despite Washington's Pressure To Maintain Britain's East Of Suez Role, The Decision Was Taken By The Labour Government On The Basis Of A Long-term Effort To Re-examine Britain's World Role Since 1959, And It Marked The End Of An Era For Postwar Britain. During the Kennedy years, American policy-makers considered French President, Charles de Gaulle, an obstruction within the Atlantic Alliance. Summoning a wide range of French and American archival sources as well as British and German materials, this book demonstrates that the structure and dynamics of the Franco-American relationship during this period were embedded in complex multilateral relationships within the Western Alliance. The book argues that differences between France and the United States during the early 1960s were the outcome of a series of mutually reinforcing security and economic problems, driven by domestic agendas, and shaped by differing conceptions about the containment of the Soviet Union and Germany. Dr. Mahan provides a subtle synthesis and definitive analysis of the key issues and events that generated conflict between Kennedy and de Gaulle: the Berlin crisis, British membership in the European Economic Community, a balance-of-payments disputes and nuclear sharing with NATO Front Matter....Pages i-xvi Introduction....Pages 1-7 Power and Influence, 1945–58....Pages 8-26 Three Roles, 1959–64....Pages 27-42 Labour in Charge: Reassessing Defence Priorities....Pages 43-75 Spreading the Butter Too Thin: Military Capabilities versus Political Commitments....Pages 76-104 Vietnam, the Pound and Britain’s Role East of Suez....Pages 105-121 The Decision to Withdraw from Aden and Singapore: The Defence Review, June–December 1965....Pages 122-137 The Completion of the Defence Review, January–February 1966....Pages 138-156 The Choice between Europe and ‘East of Suez’, March–December 1966....Pages 157-177 The Final Verdict: January 1967–January 1968....Pages 178-208 Conclusion....Pages 209-226 Back Matter....Pages 227-293 "This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-8. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain."--BOOK JACKET. This analysis of US policy toward Indonesian nationalism argues that Truman's support for independence was based on his Cold War priorities and not principled backing for self-determination. It reveals how Eisenhower's New Look led to a disastrous CIA-backed intervention in 1957-58 and propelled Indonesia toward the Soviet bloc. Exposing the extent of Australian influence on US policy, this account reveals how the personal prejudices of Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles undermined the notion of rational policymaking. Annotation Based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, this is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson government in 1967-68