Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco Opposition, 1940-1950

The staff of the National Library, Madrid, were efficient and cheerful. And even though my request to consult the Fundación Francisco Franco in Madrid proved ultimately unsuccessful, it was listened to with characteristic courtesy. I am, finally, deeply grateful to my wife, Mary, for her patient viii understanding during my four years' suspension of essential tareas domésticas. ## Note To avoid confusion, 'republican' will be used to denote all Spaniards who supported the Frente Popular governments against the nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, while 'republican' will be used to denote only members of the actual republican parties of the Second Republic, such as Izquierda Unida, Unión Republicana, or the Partido Republicano Federalista. Accordingly, after the Civil War, the socialists and anarchosyndicalists were part of the 'republican' opposition but not members of the 'republican' parties. Acknowledgements ix \* Hoare was made Lord Templewood on 3 July 1944; in this chapter he will, however, still be referred to as 'Hoare'. "This book examines the reasons for the British government's failure to cooperate with Franco's Spanish opponents during and immediately after the Second World War. Divisions in the Spanish opposition were one factor and a close study, based on British and Spanish archives and secondary works, follows attempts throughout this period to establish an anti-Franco front. However, without a guarantee of a peaceful transition to democracy the British government kept the opposition at arm's length in order to protect its strategic and commercial interests in Franco Spain. Only when international pressure for sanctions threatened those interests in 1947 did the Foreign Office briefly sponsor opposition talks in London. With the coming of the Cold War, British interest in the Spanish opposition ended. Foreign Office archives on the Spanish opposition clearly demonstrate that, whatever its pretension to an ethical foreign policy, it was never British policy to eject the Franco regime from the postwar order."--BOOK JACKET.

After-Fascism's defeat in 1945 Britain did not cooperate with Franco's Spanish opponents to end his dictatorship. This study demonstrates how divisions in the Spanish opposition were one factor but argues that Britain's strategic and commercial interests in Spain also acted as a disincentive. Only when international pressure for sanctions threatened Iberian stability in 1947 did the British government turn to the Spanish opposition. With the advent of the Cold War, however, the opposition became irrelevant to British needs and Franco's survival was guaranteed.

After fascism's defeat in 1945, Britain did not co-operate with Franco's Spanish opponents to end his dictatorship. This study demonstrates how divisions in the Spanish opposition were one factor, but argues that Britain's strategic and commercial interests in Spain also acted as a disincentive. Only when international pressure for sanctions threatened Iberian stability in 1947 did the British government turn to the Spanish opposition. With the advent of the Cold War, however, the opposition became irrelevant to British needs and Franco's survival was guaranteed Cover......Page 1 Contents......Page 8 Acknowledgements......Page 9 Introduction......Page 12 1 Spanish Opposition before 1945......Page 22 2 Britain and the Spanish Opposition until 1944......Page 39 3 1945: Adjusting to Peace......Page 56 4 1946: International Confrontation......Page 84 5 1947: British Intervention......Page 113 6 1948–1950: The Frustration of the Anti-Franco Impulse......Page 143 7 Conclusion......Page 172 Notes......Page 180 References......Page 216 Index......Page 239