Brainstorms, Fortieth Anniversary Edition: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (The MIT Press)

An anniversary edition of a classic in cognitive science, with a new introduction by the author.When Brainstorms was published in 1978, the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science was just emerging. Daniel Dennett was a young scholar who wanted to get philosophers out of their armchairs—and into conversations with psychologists, linguists, computer scientists. This collection of seventeen essays by Dennett offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will. Using careful arguments and ingenious thought experiments, the author exposes familiar preconceptions and hobbling intuitions. The essays are grouped into four sections: “Intentional Explanation and Attributions of Mentality”; “The Nature of Theory in Psychology”; “Objects of Consciousness and the Nature of Experience”; and “Free Will and Personhood.”This anniversary edition includes a new introduction by Dennett, “Reflections on Brainstorms after Forty Years,” in which he recalls the book's original publication by Harry and Betty Stanton of Bradford Books and considers the influence and afterlife of some of the essays. For example, “Mechanism and Responsibility” was Dennett's first articulation of his concept of the intentional stance; “Are Dreams Experiences?” anticipates the major ideas in his 1991 book Consciousness Explained; and “Where Am I?” has been variously represented in a BBC documentary, a student's Javanese shadow puppet play, and a feature-length film made in the Netherlands, Victim of the Brain. Contents 13 Reflections on Brainstorms after Forty Years 15 Preface 25 Introduction 29 What is a philosophical theory of the mind? 29 What is my theory? 33 I Intentional Explanation and Attributions of Mentality 43 1 Intentional Systems 45 I 45 II 51 III 59 2 Reply to Arbib and Gunderson 67 I 67 II 75 3 Brain Writing and Mind Reading 85 Postscript, 1978 97 II The Nature of Theory in Psychology 99 4 Skinner Skinned 101 5 Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away 121 6 A Cure for the Common Code? 141 7 Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology 161 III Objects of Consciousness and the Nature of Experience 181 8 Are Dreams Experiences? 183 9 Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness 205 I 205 II 206 III 211 IV 221 V 226 VI 228 10 Two Approaches to Mental Images 231 11 Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain 249 II 258 III 277 IV Free Will and Personhood 291 12 Mechanism and Responsibility 293 I 293 II 294 III 297 IV 299 V 303 VI 307 VII 314 13 The Abilities of Men and Machines 317 14 Conditions of Personhood 329 15 On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want 349 16 How to Change Your Mind 365 17 Where Am I? 375 Acknowledgments 389 Notes 393 Introduction 393 Chapter 1: Intentional Systems 393 Chapter 2: Reply to Arbib and Gunderson 394 Chapter 3: Brain Writing and Mind Reading 395 Chapter 4: Skinner Skinned 396 Chapter 5: Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away 399 Chapter 7: Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology 400 Chapter 8: Are Dreams Experiences? 401 Chapter 9: Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness 402 Chapter 10: Two Approaches to Mental Images 403 Chapter 11: Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain 404 Chapter 12: Mechanism and Responsibility 405 Chapter 13: The Abilities of Men and Machines 407 Chapter 14: Conditions of Personhood 407 Chapter 15: On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want 408 Chapter 16: How to Change Your Mind 408 Chapter 17: Where Am I? 409 Index 411 Intentional explanation and attributions of mentality -- International systems -- Reply to Arbib and Gunderson -- Brain writing and mind reading -- The nature of theory in psychology -- Skinner skinned -- Why the law of effect will not go away -- A cure for the common code? -- Artificial intelligence as philosophy and as psychology -- Objects of consciousness and the nature of experience -- Are dreams experiences? -- Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness -- Two approaches to mental images -- Why you can't make a computer that feels pain -- Free will and personhood -- Mechanism and responsibility -- The abilities of men and machines -- Conditions of personhood -- On giving libertarians what they say they want -- How to change your mind -- Where am I?