Boundaries of the Mind : The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition

Where does the mind begin and end? Robert Wilson establishes the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. He blends traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. Wilson then develops novel accounts of mental representation and consciousness, discussing a range of other issues, such as nativism and the idea of group minds. Boundaries of the Mind re-evaluates the place of the individual in the cognitive, biological and social sciences (what Wilson calls the fragile sciences) with an emphasis on cognition. The book will appeal to a broad range of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioral and human sciences. Robert A. Wilson is professor of philosophy at the University of Alberta. He is author or editor of five other books, including the award-winning The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (MIT Press, 1999). Half-title......Page 2 Title......Page 4 Copyright......Page 5 Dedication......Page 6 Contents in Brief......Page 8 Contents......Page 10 List of Tables and Figures......Page 14 Acknowledgments......Page 16 PART ONE DISCIPLINING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE MIND......Page 22 1 INDIVIDUALS AND THE MIND......Page 24 2 INDIVIDUALS AND SCIENCE......Page 25 3 THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 29 4 INDIVIDUALISM IN THE COGNITIVE, BIOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 30 5 INSIDE THE THINKING INDIVIDUAL......Page 35 6 THE BEAST WITHIN......Page 38 7 CULTURE, NATURE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL......Page 40 8 THE METAPHYSICAL PICTURE: SMALLISM......Page 43 9 A PATH THROUGH BOUNDARIES OF THE MIND......Page 45 1 PSYCHOLOGY AMONGST THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 48 2 THE DISCIPLINING OF PSYCHOLOGY......Page 51 3 FROM PHYSIOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY: WUNDT AND JAMES......Page 52 4 DISCIPLINING THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MIND......Page 57 5 WUNDT’S INDIVIDUALS......Page 61 6 GALTON’S INDIVIDUALS......Page 62 7 NATIVISM AND THE CONTINUITY THESIS......Page 66 8 OVERLAYING THE MIND......Page 69 1 NATIVIST THREADS......Page 71 2 FROM CHOMSKY TO FODOR TO PINKER: A THUMBNAIL......Page 72 3 EMPIRICIST ALTERNATIVES TO NATIVISM......Page 75 4 THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH......Page 77 5 MAKING DO WITH LESS?......Page 81 6 SATISFYING SOME DESIDERATA......Page 86 7 BUT COULD TWO DIMENSIONS BE ENOUGH?......Page 88 8 NATIVISM ABOUT COGNITION AND BIOLOGY......Page 89 9 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND NATIVISM......Page 93 PART TWO INDIVIDUALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES......Page 96 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE INDIVIDUALISM-EXTERNALISM DEBATE......Page 98 2 INDIVIDUALISM, TAXONOMY, AND METAPHYSICAL DETERMINATION......Page 100 3 GETTING TO TWIN EARTH: WHAT’S IN THE HEAD?......Page 103 4 THE SOCIAL ASPECT TO HAVING A MIND......Page 108 5 NARROW AND WIDE CONTENT......Page 111 Peter thinks that wolves are placental......Page 112 6 FUNCTIONALISM, PHYSICALISM, AND INDIVIDUALISM......Page 114 7 THE APPEAL TO CAUSAL POWERS......Page 117 8 METAPHYSICS AND THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 119 1 THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND AND THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 121 2 REALIZATION WITHIN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND......Page 122 3 A SKETCH OF TWO VIEWS OF REALIZATION......Page 123 4 THE STANDARD VIEW (I): REALIZERS AS METAPHYSICALLY SUFFICIENT......Page 124 5 THE STANDARD VIEW (II): REALIZERS AS PHYSICALLY CONSTITUTIVE......Page 125 6 SMALLISM, THE STANDARD VIEW, AND THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 126 7 CONTEXT-SENSITIVE REALIZATION AND METAPHYSICAL SUFFICIENCY......Page 128 8 PHYSICAL CONSTITUTIVITY AND WIDE REALIZATIONS......Page 132 9 WIDE REALIZATIONS IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 135 10 TWO VIEWS RECONSIDERED......Page 138 1 ADJUSTING ONE’S METAPHYSICS......Page 141 2 MICROPHYSICAL DETERMINISM, RELATIONS, AND SMALLISM......Page 142 3 DISPOSITIONS AND SCIENCE......Page 146 4 NONREDUCTIVE MATERIALISM......Page 149 5 THE MODIFIED STANDARD VIEW: CAUSATION AND REALIZATION......Page 151 6 CONTEXT SENSITIVITY WITHIN THE STANDARD VIEW......Page 154 7 KEEPING REALISM AFLOAT......Page 158 8 PLURALISM ABOUT REALIZATION......Page 160 9 ABANDONING THE SUBJECT?......Page 162 10 PUTTING OUR METAPHYSICS TO WORK......Page 164 1 THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE GESTURE......Page 165 2 INDIVIDUALISM IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE......Page 166 3 MENTAL REPRESENTATION AS ENCODING......Page 168 4 THE DEBATE OVER MARR’S THEORY OF VISION......Page 171 5 SEGAL AND EGAN ON COMPUTATION AND REPRESENTATION......Page 176 6 EXPLOITATIVE REPRESENTATION AND WIDE COMPUTATIONALISM......Page 183 7 NARROW CONTENT AND MARR’S THEORY......Page 193 8 LOCATIONAL VERSUS TAXONOMIC EXTERNALISM......Page 195 9 HAVING IT BOTH WAYS?......Page 199 10 BEYOND COMPUTATION......Page 200 PART THREE THINKING THROUGH AND BEYOND THE BODY......Page 202 1 REPRESENTATION AND PSYCHOLOGY......Page 204 2 LIFE AND MIND: FROM REACTION TO THOUGHT......Page 205 3 THE EMBEDDEDNESS AND EMBODIMENT OF HIGHER COGNITION......Page 208 4 MEMORY......Page 210 5 COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT......Page 219 6 FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF MIND......Page 227 7 THE MIND BEYOND ITSELF......Page 231 1 THE RETURN OF THE CONSCIOUS......Page 235 2 PROCESSES OF AWARENESS AND PHENOMENAL STATES......Page 236 3 EXPANDING THE CONSCIOUS MIND: PROCESSES OF AWARENESS......Page 238 4 ARGUING FOR EXPANDED CONSCIOUSNESS......Page 242 5 GLOBAL EXTERNALISM AND PHENOMENAL STATES......Page 246 6 TESEE AND SENSORY EXPERIENCE......Page 253 7 INDIVIDUALISTIC RESIDUES......Page 259 8 GLOBAL EXTERNALISM AND THE TESEE VIEW......Page 261 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY......Page 263 2 DIMENSIONS OF THE INSEPARABILITY THESIS......Page 265 3 DEFLATING THE INSEPARABILITY THESIS......Page 267 4 PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY......Page 273 5 INDIVIDUALISM AND PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY......Page 276 6 HOW TO BE A GOOD PHENOMENOLOGIST......Page 281 PART FOUR THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 284 1 GROUP MINDS AND THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 286 2 TWO TRADITIONS......Page 288 3 THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY TRADITION......Page 290 4 THE SUPERORGANISM TRADITION......Page 295 5 GROUP MINDS AND THE SOCIAL MANIFESTATION THESIS......Page 301 6 COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY, SUPERORGANISMS, AND SOCIALLY MANIFESTED MINDS......Page 303 7 FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT......Page 305 1 REVIVING THE GROUP MIND......Page 307 2 ON HAVING A MIND......Page 309 3 MINIMAL MINDS, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND HOLISM......Page 314 4 THE CONTEMPORARY DEFENSE OF THE GROUP MIND HYPOTHESIS......Page 316 5 THE SOCIAL MANIFESTATION THESIS......Page 320 6 THE COGNITIVE AND THE SOCIAL......Page 323 7 FROM GROUP MINDS TO GROUP SELECTION......Page 324 8 GROUPS, MINDS, AND INDIVIDUALS......Page 327 1: The Individual and the Mind......Page 330 2: Individuals, Psychology, and the Mind......Page 332 3: Nativism on My Mind......Page 334 4: Individualism: Philosophical Foundations......Page 337 5: Metaphysics, Mind, and Science: Two Views of Realization......Page 339 6: Context-Sensitive Realizations......Page 341 7: Representation, Computation, and Cognitive Science......Page 342 8: The Embedded Mind and Cognition......Page 345 9: Expanding Consciousness......Page 348 10: Intentionality and Phenomenology......Page 350 11: Group Minds in Historical Perspective......Page 352 12: The Group Mind Hypothesis in Contemporary Biology and Social Science......Page 353 References......Page 356 Index......Page 376 "Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Rob Wilson, in this new book, provides the foundation for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual." "The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. There are discussions of the origin of psychology, nativism about the mind, contemporary views of computation, mental representation, consciousness, the metaphysics of mind, the idea of group minds, and how to think about the individual in the cognitive, biological, and social sciences, what Wilson refers to as the fragile sciences. A companion volume Genes and the Agents of Life explores this general theme in the biological sciences." "This book will appeal to a broad swath of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioral and human sciences."--BOOK JACKET Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. A forthcoming companion volume Genes and the Agents of Life will explore the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences. Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging new book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. A forthcoming companion volume Genes and the Agents of Life will explore the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. In this 2004 book, Robert Wilson provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual.