Boundaries of the Mind : The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition

Where does the mind begin and end? Robert Wilson establishes the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. He blends traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. Wilson then develops novel accounts of mental representation and consciousness, discussing a range of other issues, such as nativism and the idea of group minds. Boundaries of the Mind re-evaluates the place of the individual in the cognitive, biological and social sciences (what Wilson calls the fragile sciences) with an emphasis on cognition. The book will appeal to a broad range of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioral and human sciences. Robert A. Wilson is professor of philosophy at the University of Alberta. He is author or editor of five other books, including the award-winning The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (MIT Press, 1999). Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents in Brief......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 List of Tables and Figures......Page 15 Acknowledgments......Page 17 PART ONE DISCIPLINING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE MIND......Page 23 1 INDIVIDUALS AND THE MIND......Page 25 2 INDIVIDUALS AND SCIENCE......Page 26 3 THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 30 4 INDIVIDUALISM IN THE COGNITIVE, BIOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 31 5 INSIDE THE THINKING INDIVIDUAL......Page 36 6 THE BEAST WITHIN......Page 39 7 CULTURE, NATURE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL......Page 41 8 THE METAPHYSICAL PICTURE: SMALLISM......Page 44 9 A PATH THROUGH BOUNDARIES OF THE MIND......Page 46 1 PSYCHOLOGY AMONGST THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 49 2 THE DISCIPLINING OF PSYCHOLOGY......Page 52 3 FROM PHYSIOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY: WUNDT AND JAMES......Page 53 4 DISCIPLINING THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MIND......Page 58 5 WUNDT’S INDIVIDUALS......Page 62 6 GALTON’S INDIVIDUALS......Page 63 7 NATIVISM AND THE CONTINUITY THESIS......Page 67 8 OVERLAYING THE MIND......Page 70 1 NATIVIST THREADS......Page 72 2 FROM CHOMSKY TO FODOR TO PINKER: A THUMBNAIL......Page 73 3 EMPIRICIST ALTERNATIVES TO NATIVISM......Page 76 4 THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH......Page 78 5 MAKING DO WITH LESS?......Page 82 6 SATISFYING SOME DESIDERATA......Page 87 7 BUT COULD TWO DIMENSIONS BE ENOUGH?......Page 89 8 NATIVISM ABOUT COGNITION AND BIOLOGY......Page 90 9 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND NATIVISM......Page 94 PART TWO INDIVIDUALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES......Page 97 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE INDIVIDUALISM-EXTERNALISM DEBATE......Page 99 2 INDIVIDUALISM, TAXONOMY, AND METAPHYSICAL DETERMINATION......Page 101 3 GETTING TO TWIN EARTH: WHAT’S IN THE HEAD?......Page 104 4 THE SOCIAL ASPECT TO HAVING A MIND......Page 109 5 NARROW AND WIDE CONTENT......Page 112 Peter thinks that wolves are placental......Page 113 6 FUNCTIONALISM, PHYSICALISM, AND INDIVIDUALISM......Page 115 7 THE APPEAL TO CAUSAL POWERS......Page 118 8 METAPHYSICS AND THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 120 1 THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND AND THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 122 2 REALIZATION WITHIN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND......Page 123 3 A SKETCH OF TWO VIEWS OF REALIZATION......Page 124 4 THE STANDARD VIEW (I): REALIZERS AS METAPHYSICALLY SUFFICIENT......Page 125 5 THE STANDARD VIEW (II): REALIZERS AS PHYSICALLY CONSTITUTIVE......Page 126 6 SMALLISM, THE STANDARD VIEW, AND THE FRAGILE SCIENCES......Page 127 7 CONTEXT-SENSITIVE REALIZATION AND METAPHYSICAL SUFFICIENCY......Page 129 8 PHYSICAL CONSTITUTIVITY AND WIDE REALIZATIONS......Page 133 9 WIDE REALIZATIONS IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 136 10 TWO VIEWS RECONSIDERED......Page 139 1 ADJUSTING ONE’S METAPHYSICS......Page 142 2 MICROPHYSICAL DETERMINISM, RELATIONS, AND SMALLISM......Page 143 3 DISPOSITIONS AND SCIENCE......Page 147 4 NONREDUCTIVE MATERIALISM......Page 150 5 THE MODIFIED STANDARD VIEW: CAUSATION AND REALIZATION......Page 152 6 CONTEXT SENSITIVITY WITHIN THE STANDARD VIEW......Page 155 7 KEEPING REALISM AFLOAT......Page 159 8 PLURALISM ABOUT REALIZATION......Page 161 9 ABANDONING THE SUBJECT?......Page 163 10 PUTTING OUR METAPHYSICS TO WORK......Page 165 1 THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE GESTURE......Page 166 2 INDIVIDUALISM IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE......Page 167 3 MENTAL REPRESENTATION AS ENCODING......Page 169 4 THE DEBATE OVER MARR’S THEORY OF VISION......Page 172 5 SEGAL AND EGAN ON COMPUTATION AND REPRESENTATION......Page 177 6 EXPLOITATIVE REPRESENTATION AND WIDE COMPUTATIONALISM......Page 184 7 NARROW CONTENT AND MARR’S THEORY......Page 194 8 LOCATIONAL VERSUS TAXONOMIC EXTERNALISM......Page 196 9 HAVING IT BOTH WAYS?......Page 200 10 BEYOND COMPUTATION......Page 201 PART THREE THINKING THROUGH AND BEYOND THE BODY......Page 203 1 REPRESENTATION AND PSYCHOLOGY......Page 205 2 LIFE AND MIND: FROM REACTION TO THOUGHT......Page 206 3 THE EMBEDDEDNESS AND EMBODIMENT OF HIGHER COGNITION......Page 209 4 MEMORY......Page 211 5 COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT......Page 220 6 FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF MIND......Page 228 7 THE MIND BEYOND ITSELF......Page 232 1 THE RETURN OF THE CONSCIOUS......Page 236 2 PROCESSES OF AWARENESS AND PHENOMENAL STATES......Page 237 3 EXPANDING THE CONSCIOUS MIND: PROCESSES OF AWARENESS......Page 239 4 ARGUING FOR EXPANDED CONSCIOUSNESS......Page 243 5 GLOBAL EXTERNALISM AND PHENOMENAL STATES......Page 247 6 TESEE AND SENSORY EXPERIENCE......Page 254 7 INDIVIDUALISTIC RESIDUES......Page 260 8 GLOBAL EXTERNALISM AND THE TESEE VIEW......Page 262 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY......Page 264 2 DIMENSIONS OF THE INSEPARABILITY THESIS......Page 266 3 DEFLATING THE INSEPARABILITY THESIS......Page 268 4 PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY......Page 274 5 INDIVIDUALISM AND PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY......Page 277 6 HOW TO BE A GOOD PHENOMENOLOGIST......Page 282 PART FOUR THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 285 1 GROUP MINDS AND THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES......Page 287 2 TWO TRADITIONS......Page 289 3 THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY TRADITION......Page 291 4 THE SUPERORGANISM TRADITION......Page 296 5 GROUP MINDS AND THE SOCIAL MANIFESTATION THESIS......Page 302 6 COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY, SUPERORGANISMS, AND SOCIALLY MANIFESTED MINDS......Page 304 7 FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT......Page 306 1 REVIVING THE GROUP MIND......Page 308 2 ON HAVING A MIND......Page 310 3 MINIMAL MINDS, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND HOLISM......Page 315 4 THE CONTEMPORARY DEFENSE OF THE GROUP MIND HYPOTHESIS......Page 317 5 THE SOCIAL MANIFESTATION THESIS......Page 321 6 THE COGNITIVE AND THE SOCIAL......Page 324 7 FROM GROUP MINDS TO GROUP SELECTION......Page 325 8 GROUPS, MINDS, AND INDIVIDUALS......Page 328 1: The Individual and the Mind......Page 331 2: Individuals, Psychology, and the Mind......Page 333 3: Nativism on My Mind......Page 335 4: Individualism: Philosophical Foundations......Page 338 5: Metaphysics, Mind, and Science: Two Views of Realization......Page 340 6: Context-Sensitive Realizations......Page 342 7: Representation, Computation, and Cognitive Science......Page 343 8: The Embedded Mind and Cognition......Page 346 9: Expanding Consciousness......Page 349 10: Intentionality and Phenomenology......Page 351 11: Group Minds in Historical Perspective......Page 353 12: The Group Mind Hypothesis in Contemporary Biology and Social Science......Page 354 References......Page 357 Index......Page 377 "Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Rob Wilson, in this new book, provides the foundation for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual." "The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. There are discussions of the origin of psychology, nativism about the mind, contemporary views of computation, mental representation, consciousness, the metaphysics of mind, the idea of group minds, and how to think about the individual in the cognitive, biological, and social sciences, what Wilson refers to as the fragile sciences. A companion volume Genes and the Agents of Life explores this general theme in the biological sciences." "This book will appeal to a broad swath of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioral and human sciences."--BOOK JACKET Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. A forthcoming companion volume Genes and the Agents of Life will explore the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences. Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging new book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. A forthcoming companion volume Genes and the Agents of Life will explore the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences