Bootleggers and Baptists : how economics forces and moral persuasion interact to shape regulatory politics

Policy analysts, academics, journalists, and even politicians lament the influence of money on politics. But in the political economy, politicians often carefully design regulations so that two very different interest groups will be satisfied. The Bootlegger and Baptist theory, an innovative public choice theory developed more than 30 years ago, holds that for a regulation to emerge and endure, both the bootleggers, who seek to obtain private benefits from the regulation, and the Baptists, who seek to serve the public interest, must support the regulation. Economists Adam Smith and Bruce Yandle provide an accessible description of the theory and cite numerous examples of coalitions of economic and moral interests who desire a common goal. The book applies the theorys insights to a wide range of current issues, including the recent financial crisis and environmental regulation, and provides readers with both an understanding of how regulation is a product of economic and moral interests and a fresh perspective on the ongoing debate of how special interest groups influence politics.

In Bootleggers & Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics, economists Bruce Yandle and Adam Smith explain how money and morality are often combined in politics to produce arbitrary regulations benefiting cronies, while constraining productive economic activities by the general public. Yandle's theory asserts that regulatory "bootleggers" are parties taking political action in pursuit of economic gain. Regulatory "Baptists" are parties participating in group action driven by an avowed higher moral purpose or desire to serve the public interest.By examining major regulatory activities including Obamacare, the recent financial crisis bailouts, climate change legislation, and rules governing "sinful" substances, Bootleggers & Baptists reveals that lasting regulations require moral and financial advocacy to survive the American political process. With countless regulatory initiatives on the horizon, this book is a must-read for all who are concern about over-regulation and government intrusion in our daily lives.

In Bootleggers & Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics , economists Bruce Yandle and Adam Smith explain how money and morality are often combined in politics to produce arbitrary regulations benefiting cronies, while constraining productive economic activities by the general public. Yandles theory asserts that regulatory bootleggers are parties taking political action in pursuit of economic gain. Regulatory Baptists are parties participating in group action driven by an avowed higher moral purpose or desire to serve the public interest. By examining major regulatory activities including Obamacare, the recent financial crisis bailouts, climate change legislation, and rules governing sinful substances, Bootleggers & Baptists reveals that lasting regulations require moral and financial advocacy to survive the American political process. With countless regulatory initiatives on the horizon, this book is a must-read for all who are concern about over-regulation and government intrusion in our daily lives. Policy analysts, academics, journalists, and even politicians lament the influence of money on politics. But in the political economy, politicians often carefully design regulations so that two very different interest groups will be satisfied. The Bootlegger and Baptist theory, an innovative public choice theory developed more than 30 years ago, holds that for a regulation to emerge and endure, both the "bootleggers," who seek to obtain private benefits from the regulation, and the "Baptists," who seek to serve the public interest, must support the regulation. Economists Smith and Yandle provide a description of the theory and cite numerous examples of coalitions of economic and moral interests who desire a common goal.--Publisher's description