Boom bust : house prices, banking and the depression of 2010

Using the United Kingdom as a case study, this well-researched account shows how, for more than 200 years, a remarkably regular 18-year cycle of boom and bust can be traced to the peaks and troughs in land prices. This exploration reveals how governments, during the upswing of the cycle, are complicit in encouraging a belief that property prices will continue upwards indefinitely because of their skilled management of the economy and attributes the current crises to public policy on both sides of the Atlantic. An alternative plan to neutralize the next boom—one that would lead to a more stable and environmentally friendly economy with a more equitable distribution of wealth—is also presented. Annotation When the first edition appeared in 2005, the consensus among forecasters was that the boom in house prices would cool to an annual 2 or 3% rise over the following years. As predicted by the author, however, prices continued to rise by more than 10% well into 2007. Basing his argument on a study of property markets over the last 200 years, Harrison warns of the danger to banks, business and jobs of ignoring a remarkably regular 18-year cycle. Recent events have proved the accuracy of his prediction. He accuses Gordon Brown of giving people a false sense of security by his oft repeated claim, last made in his 2007 Budget speech, that & lsquo;we will never return to the old boom and bust & rsquo;. Alan Greenspan in the US encouraged a similar belief which led to the risky sub-prime mortgage spree. The reason for the instability, Harrison explains, is not the housing market itself but the land market on which all buildings stand. Land is in fixed supply & ndash; as Mark Twain noted: & lsquo;They & rsquo;re not making any more of it & rsquo;. Therefore, as the demand for land for new homes and offices rises with population growth and economic expansion, market forces, which normally increase supply to reduce prices, have the reverse effect: prices rise. This encourages speculation, with banks lending more against escalating asset values and reinforcing the upward spiral. Under existing government policies, the only way land prices can be brought back to affordable levels is a slump, undermining the banking system and causing widespread unemployment and repossessions. This is what happened with the collapse of US sub-prime mortgages. The author argues that monetary policy and bank regulation only have a marginal impact on land speculation. The only way of neutralising the boom bust cycle and creating conditions of economic stability is a fundamental reform of the tax system This work identifies an 18-year property cycle, recurring with remarkable regularity and similarity over the last 200 years, in different countries under different political, economic and cultural conditions