Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century (Military History and Policy Series)

This is a fascinating new insight into the British army and its evolution through both large and small scale conflicts. To prepare for future wars, armies derive lessons from past wars. However, some armies are defeated because they learnt the wrong lessons, fighting new conflicts in ways appropriate to the last. For the British Army in the twentieth century, the challenge has been particularly great. It has never had the luxury of emerging from one major European war with the time to prepare itself for the next. The leading military historians show how ongoing commitments to a range of ‘small wars’ have always been part of the Army’s experience. After 1902 and after 1918 they included colonial campaigns, but they also developed into what we would now call counter-insurgency operations, and these became the norm between 1945 and 1969. During the height of the Cold War, in 1982, the Army was deployed to the Falklands. Since 1990 the dominant tasks of the Army have been peace support operations. This is an excellent resource for all students and scholars of military history, politics and international relations and British history. Book Cover......Page 1 Half-Title......Page 2 Series Title......Page 3 Title......Page 6 Copyright......Page 7 Contents......Page 8 Contributors......Page 9 Preface and acknowledgements......Page 11 Introduction......Page 14 1 Between the South African War and the First World War, 1902–14......Page 34 2 Big wars and small wars between the wars, 1919–39......Page 49 3 Learning new lessons: The British Army and the strategic debate, 1945–50......Page 67 4 Lost and found in the jungle: The Indian and British Army jungle warfare doctrines for Burma, 1943–5, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60......Page 97 5 Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966–76......Page 128 6 The unchanging lessons of battle: The British Army and the Falklands War, 1982......Page 158 7 The Gulf War, 1990–1......Page 175 Index......Page 193 "This book sets out to show how in the twentieth century the British army learnt lessons from one war in order to prepare for the next. The challenge was particularly great, as it never had the luxury of going directly from one major war to another, but always had to reckon with ongoing commitments to a range of 'small wars'. These included colonial campaigns between 1902 and 1914; counter-insurgency operations between 1945 and 1969; and peace support operations after 1991. The army believed that by preparing for major war it also enabled itself to prepare for lesser conflicts, and that is still its current doctrine This volume explores the historical dimension to this debate, and offers analyses by the most prominent experts in the field, including Hew Strachan, Edward Spiers, David French, Paul Cornish, Daniel Marston, David Benest, Simon Ball and Colin McInnes." "This book will be of great interest to students of military history and strategic studies in general, and of particular interest to students of the British Army and British military doctrine."--Jacket This book examines how in the twentieth century the British army learnt lessons from past wars, both large and small, in order to prepare for the future. This new book examines how in the 20th century the British army learnt lessons past wars, both large and small, in order to prepare for the future Edited By Hew Strachan. Series Numbering From Publisher's List. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.