Biased Trials: Insights from Behavioral Law and Economics (Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts | Economic Analysis of Law)

Goran Dominioni argues that research in behavioral economics, psychology, and neurosciences can offer novel insights on whether court decisions are accurate, non-discriminatory, and maximize social welfare. The author also shows that insights from these areas of research can help to improve trial outcomes if carefully applied to craft trial rules and practices. He covers central themes in behavioral law and economics, such as implicit racial biases, the fundamental attribution error, and gender-related biases. Contents The Behavioral Economics of Accuracy and Discrimination at Trial Truth Standards in Behavioral Law and Economics The Fundamental Attribution Error and Accuracy in Trial Settings: Judges vs Jurors Implicit Racial Biases in Tort Trials Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in European Tort Trials Accuracy and Discrimination at Trial: Putting the Pieces Together Target Groups Researchers and students in the fields of behavioral law and economics, evidence law, tort law, judicial decision making Policy-makers, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers The Author Goran Dominioni holds a PhD from Bologna University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Hamburg University. He has conducted research at Cornell Law School, Copenhagen University, Hamburg University, and UC Louvain Table of Contents 7 List of Abbreviations 11 List of Tables and Figures 12 1 The Behavioral Economics of Accuracy and Discrimination at Trial: An Introduction 13 1.1 Aim and Scope 13 1.2 Methodology 16 1.2 Scientific and Societal Relevance 18 1.3 Limitations 22 2 Truth Standards in Behavioral Law and Economics 24 2.1 Introduction 24 2.2 Truth in Adjudication and JDM 25 2.3 The Economic Value of Truth in the Imposition of Liability 27 2.4 An Example: Truth Standards and Attribution in Legal Scholarship 31 2.4.1 Correspondence and Coherence in Attribution 32 2.4.1.1 Correspondence in Attribution 32 2.4.1.2 Coherence in Attribution Theory 33 2.4.2 Overestimation and Underestimation: Empirical Studies on the Fundamental Attribution Error and Their Interpretation 36 2.4.2.1 The Milgram’s Experiment 36 2.4.2.2 The Quiz Game Experiment 38 2.4.2.3 The Castro Essay Experiment 39 2.4.3 The Fundamental Attribution Error in Legal Scholarship 41 2.4.5 Fundamental Attribution Error in Legal Scholarship: Truth Related Issues 44 2.5 Conclusions 47 3 The Fundamental Attribution Error and Accuracy: Judges vs Jurors 50 3.1 Introduction 50 3.2 Background Literature 53 3.2.1 A Short Introduction to the Economics of Evidence Law 53 3.2.2 The Fundamental Attribution Error: Contextual Determinants 54 3.2.3 The Fundamental Attribution Error and Expert Adjudicators’ Decision-Making 56 3.3 The Experiment 62 3.3.1 Participants 62 3.3.2 Design 65 3.3.3 Stimuli and Measures 65 3.4 Results 68 3.4.1 Manipulation check 68 3.4.2 Attribution of causality 69 3.4.3 Responsibility 70 3.4.4 Percentage of Damages Awarded 70 3.5 Discussion 71 3.6 Limitations 74 3.7 Conclusion 74 4 Implicit Racial Biases in Tort Trials 76 4.1 Introduction 76 4.2 The Economics of Discrimination: An Introduction 78 4.3 IRBs: An Introduction 80 4.4 IRBs and Evidence in Tort Trials 84 4.4.1 The Presentation and Evaluation of Brute Facts 85 4.4.1.1 Implicit Biases and the Presentation of Evidence 85 4.4.1.1.1 Brute Facts, IRBs and the Creation of Evidence at the Trial 86 4.4.1.1.2 Brute Facts, IRBs and Pre-Constituted Evidence 87 4.4.1.2 Implicit Biases and the Evaluation of Evidence Regarding Brute Facts 90 4.4.2 The Evaluation of Facts Evaluatively Determined 91 4.5 The Effect of IRBs on the Functioning of Tort Law 93 4.5.1 Setting the Stage 93 4.5.2 The Effects of IRBs on Deterrence 94 4.5.2.1 Direct Harm and Implicit Biases 94 4.5.2.2 Implicit Bias and Signalling Direct Harm 95 4.5.3 Impact Size on Trial Outcomes 96 4.5.4 IRBs and Deterrence 98 4.5.4.1 IRBs and Tort Law When the Victim is a Member of a Discriminated Group 98 4.5.4.2 IRBs and Deterrence When the Tortfeasor is a Member of a Discriminated Group 102 4.5.5 Stereotypes and Deterrence 105 4.5.5.1 On the (In)Accuracy of Stereotypes 105 4.5.5.2 Beyond Accuracy: Implicit Stereotypes and the Economics of Character Evidence 107 4.5.5.3 Beyond Accuracy: Other Relevant Aspects 109 4.5.6 Implicit Racial Biases in the Cathedral: Issues of Optimal Deterrence 110 4.6 Policy Responses 110 4.6.1 Debiasing and Insulating Implicit Biases 110 4.6.2 Looking Beyond Behavioral Strategies: Traditional Instruments to Solve a New Problem? 113 4.7 Conclusions 114 5 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in European Tort Trials 116 5.1 Introduction 116 5.2 The Economics of Accuracy in the Determination of Damages 118 5.3 Race and Gender-Based Statistical Tables and Targeting 120 5.4 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables: A Comparative Analysis 124 5.4.1 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in the US 124 5.4.2 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in Italy 127 5.4.3 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in England 131 5.4.4 Gender and Race Based Statistical Tables in France 133 5.4.5 Comparative Analysis on Targeting Incentives 135 5.5 The Neoclassical Law and Economics of Targeting 137 5.5.1 The Law and Economics Arguments Pro Non-Blended Tables 137 5.5.2 Neoclassical Arguments Against Non-Blended Tables 138 5.6 A Behavioral Perspective of the Use of Blended vs Non-Blended Tables 144 5.6.1 Outgroup Homogeneity Bias and Non-Blended Tables 144 5.6.2 WTA-WTP Gap and Non-Blended Tables 148 5.6.3 Anchoring and Non-Blended Tables 151 5.7 Conclusion 155 6 Accuracy and Discrimination at Trial: Putting the Pieces Together 157 6.1 Main Findings 157 6.2 The Interplay Between Accuracy and Behavioral Law and Economics 157 6.3 Future Research 162 Bibliography 165