Behaviour and Rationality in Corporate Governance (Routledge Series in Corporate Governance)

corporate Scandals Due To Bad Accounting Happen Far Too Frequently For A System Of Corporate Governance To Be Deemed Effective. This Book Tells Why The Safeguards Designed To Prevent Bad Accounting So Often Fail. By Studying Why The Auditors And Members Of A Board Of Directors Regularly Fail To Deliver The Truth About A Company’s Financial State Of Affairs, This Provocative Book Explores A Serious Problem In The System Of Reporting Financial Information. this Book Is Unique In That It Draws Together Various Strands Of The Literature On Corporate Governance, Accounting, Law, Cognitive Research, Psychology, Behavioural Economics And Conventional Economics To Shed Light On Questions Regarding The Feasibility Of Independence And Impartiality Of Boards Of Directors And External Auditors As Monitors And Gatekeepers In Corporate Governance. The Book Is Essential Reading For Professional Accountants And Auditors, Directors, Regulators, Law Makers, Corporate Lawyers, And Investment Bankers. It Will Appeal To All Those Interested In Behavioural Economics And Corporate Governance.

Corporate scandals due to bad accounting happen far too frequently for a system of corporate governance to be deemed effective. This book tells why the safeguards designed to prevent bad accounting so often fail. By studying why the auditors and members of a board of directors regularly fail to deliver the truth about a company’s financial state of affairs, this provocative book explores a serious problem in the system of reporting financial information.

This book is unique in that it draws together various strands of the literature on corporate governance, accounting, law, cognitive research, psychology, behavioural economics and conventional economics to shed light on questions regarding the feasibility of independence and impartiality of boards of directors and external auditors as monitors and gatekeepers in corporate governance. The book is essential reading for professional accountants and auditors, directors, regulators, law makers, corporate lawyers, and investment bankers. It will appeal to all those interested in behavioural economics and corporate governance.

Corporate scandals due to bad accounting happen far too frequently for a system of corporate governance to be deemed effective. This book tells why the safeguards designed to prevent bad accounting so often fail. By studying why the auditors and members of a board of directors regularly fail to deliver the truth about a companys financial state of affairs, this provocative book explores a serious problem in the system of reporting financial information. This book is unique in that it draws together various strands of the literature on corporate governance, accounting, law, cognitive research, psychology, behavioural economics and conventional economics to shed light on questions regarding the feasibility of independence and impartiality of boards of directors and external auditors as monitors and gatekeepers in corporate governance. The book is essential reading for professional accountants and auditors, directors, regulators, law makers, corporate lawyers, and investment bankers. It will appeal to all those interested in behavioural economics and corporate governance. Discusses issues of corporate governance following the Enron and other scandals. Focuses on policy reforms and the independence of reputational intermediaries in the monitoring model of corporate governance. Questions the traditional economic approach to such issues which is based on the rational actor using available information to make judgements which then guide their decisions. Suggests that conventional proposals to reform corporate governance through legislation, codes of best practice, and the like are necessary, but underestimate the pressures which reputational intermediaries face from inevitable conflicts of interest and bias in judgement and decision-making. Demonstrates how a behavioural perspective can add value to the rational actor model of conventional economics to better understand the causes of failures in corporate governance Corporate scandals due to bad accounting happen too frequently for a system of corporate governance to be deemed effective. Exploring the reasons behind corporate misbehaviour, this book also answers the question of whether recent reforms are sufficient to prevent further scandals from occurring in the future Introduction Overview of corporate governance Earnings management Rationality or rational behaviour? Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance Independence of auditors and directors Recent corporate governance failures Implications for governance policy Conclusion.