Becoming who we are : politics and practical philosophy in the work of Stanley Cavell

While much literature exists on the work of Stanley Cavell, this is the first monograph on his contribution to politics and practical philosophy. As Andrew Norris demonstrates, though skepticism is Cavell's central topic, Cavell understands it not as an epistemological problem or position, but as an existential one. The central question is not what we know or fail to know, but to what extent we have made our lives our own, or failed to do so. Accordingly, Cavell's reception of Austin and Wittgenstein highlights, as other readings of these figures do not, the uncanny nature of the ordinary, the extent to which we ordinarily fail to mean what we say and be who we are. Becoming Who We Are charts Cavell's debts to Heidegger and Thompson Clarke, even as it allows for a deeper appreciation of the extent to which Cavell's Emersonian Perfectionism is a rewriting of Rousseau's and Kant's theories of autonomy. This in turn opens up a way of understanding citizenship and political discourse that develops points made more elliptically in the work of Hannah Arendt, and that contrasts in important ways with the positions of liberal thinkers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas on the one hand, and radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on the other. This Monograph On Stanley Cavell Focuses On His Contribution To Politics And Practical Philosophy. Andrew Norris Demonstrates That Cavell Understands Skepticism Not As An Epistemological Problem Or Position, But As An Existential One. The Central Question Is Not What We Know Or Fail To Know, But To What Extent We Have Made Our Lives Our Own, Or Failed To Do So. Accordingly, Cavell's Reception Of Austin And Wittgenstein Highlights, As Other Readings Of These Figures Do Not, The Uncanny Nature Of The Ordinary, The Extent To Which We Ordinarily Fail To Mean What We Say And Be Who We Are. Becoming Who We Are Charts Cavell's Debts To Heidegger And Thompson Clarke, Even As It Allows For A Deeper Appreciation Of The Extent To Which Cavell's Emersonian Perfectionism Is A Rewriting Of Rousseau's And Kant's Theories Of Autonomy. This In Turn Opens Up A Way Of Understanding Citizenship And Political Discourse That Develops Points Made More Elliptically In The Work Of Hannah Arendt, And That Contrasts In Important Ways With The Positions Of Liberal Thinkers Like John Rawls And Jurgen Habermas On The One Hand, And Radical Democrats Like Ernesto Laclau And Chantal Mouffe On The Other. -- Adapted From The Dust Jacket. Ordinary Language And Philosophical Conversion -- Skepticism And Transcendence -- Community And Voice -- Walden And The Foundations Of True Political Expression -- Receiving Autonomy. Andrew Norris. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. While a number of books and many articles have been written on the work of Stanley Cavell, this is the first monograph on his contribution to politics and practical philosophy. Though skepticism is Cavell’s central topic, he understands it not as an epistemological problem or position but as an existential one. The central question is not what we know or fail to know, but to what extent we have made our lives our own, or failed to do so. Accordingly, Cavell’s reception of Austin and Wittgenstein highlights, as other readings of these figures do not, the __uncanny__ nature of the ordinary, the extent to which we ordinarily fail to mean what we say. Bringing this out highlights Cavell’s debts to Heidegger and Thompson Clarke, even as it allows for a deeper appreciation of the extent to which Cavell’s perfectionism is a rewriting of Rousseau’s and Kant’s theories of autonomy. This in turn opens up a way of understanding citizenship and political discourse that develops points made more elliptically in the work of Hannah Arendt, and that contrasts in important ways with the positions of liberal thinkers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas on the one hand, and radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on the other. This monograph on Stanley Cavell focuses on his contribution to politics and practical philosophy. Andrew Norris demonstrates that Cavell understands skepticism not as an epistemological problem or position, but as an existential one. The central question is not what we know or fail to know, but to what extent we have made our lives our own, or failed to do so. Accordingly, Cavell's reception of Austin and Wittgenstein highlights, as other readings of these figures do not, the uncanny nature of the ordinary, the extent to which we ordinarily fail to mean what we say and be who we are. Becoming Who We Are charts Cavell's debts to Heidegger and Thompson Clarke, even as it allows for a deeper appreciation of the extent to which Cavell's Emersonian Perfectionism is a rewriting of Rousseau's and Kant's theories of autonomy. This in turn opens up a way of understanding citizenship and political discourse that develops points made more elliptically in the work of Hannah Arendt, and that contrasts in important ways with the positions of liberal thinkers like John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas on the one hand, and radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on the other. -- Adapted from the dust jacket. Provided by publisher 'Becoming Who We Are' clarifies the political and existential aspects of Stanley Cavell's understanding of ordinary language and of skepticism, and shows the close connection between his reception of Kant, Heidegger, and Austin and his exploration of what Emersonian Perfectionism offers to democracy and modern life