Battling Western Imperialism : Mao, Stalin, and the United States

One of the central issues in the study of the Chinese Communist Party and its foreign policy is its relations with Moscow. Was the CCP a Chinese nationalist party antagonistic to an intrusive Soviet Union or was it rather an internationalist party with ideological-political and strategic-military ties to Moscow, faithfully adhering to Marxist-Leninist principles as well as to Stalin's policy advice? For the past two decades a number of historians have argued that the CCP was a nationalist movement and that the United States missed its opportunity to establish friendly relations because U.S. leaders were blinded by fears of an international Communist threat. In his provocative book, Michael Sheng strongly challenges this position. On the basis of extensive new information obtained from recently available Chinese sources, Sheng demonstrates that the foreign policy of the CCP under Mao Zedong did, in fact, follow the directions recommended by Joseph Stalin. Sheng reveals that Mao and Stalin were in frequent and direct contact by radio and by correspondence, beginning in 1936, and that Mao consistently acted on Stalin's advice. Battling Western Imperialism analyzes the CCP's relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States and provides conclusive evidence that there was no "lost opportunity" for the U.S. in China. He shows that the CCP viewed the United States as a hostile capitalist power that opposed its revolutionary aims. The author has drawn on an unprecedented collection of Chinese-language materials to make a powerful new argument. Contents 7 Acknowledgments 9 Introduction 13 I The Roots of Mao’s Pro-Soviet Policy before 1937 25 CCP-MOSCOW RELATIONS BEFORE 1935 25 THE CCP-MOSCOW RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 31 MOSCOW’S ROLE IN THE CCP’S STRATEGIC PLANNING, 1935-1936 33 II CCP-Moscow Relations during the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945 41 MOSCOW AND THE XI’AN INCIDENT 45 THE DEBATE OVER CCP MILITARY STRATEGY 50 MOSCOW’S SUPPORT FOR THE CCP’S DUAL POLICY: 1937-1941 55 III From Enemies to Friends: CCP Policy toward the United States before Pearl Harbor 67 THE CCP’S ANIMOSITY TOWARD THE U.S. BEFORE 1935 68 BATTLING THE BOURGEOISIE AT HOME AND ABROAD: 1939-1941 73 IV Courting the Americans: The CCP’s United Front Policy toward the U.S., 1942-1945 84 MAO HANDLES PATRICK HURLEY 95 FROM FRIENDS TO ENEMIES 102 V Postwar Alignment: CCP-Moscow versus GMD-Washington in Manchuria, August-December 1945 108 MAO’S INITIAL ADJUSTMENT TO STALIN’S POSTWAR POLICY 108 CCP-SOVIET COOPERATION IN MANCHURIA 115 VI Mao Deals with George Marshall, November 1945-December 1946 129 THE CCP’S COOPERATION WITH MARSHALL 133 VII. The CCP and the Cold War in Asia: Mao’s “Intermediate-Zone” Theory and the Anti-American United Front, 1946-1947 155 MAO’S RADICAL ANTI-AMERICAN-IMPERIALISM STAND 156 VIII Mao’s Revolutionary Diplomacy and the Cold War in Asia, 1948-1949 171 CCP-MOSCOW SOLIDARITY 173 CCP-MOSCOW COOPERATION AND MAO’S RADICAL DIPLOMACY 181 “UNGQILUZAOTHE CCP’S DETERMINATION FOR A REVOLUTION 184 THE CCP’S DILEMMA: HOSTILITY OR FRIENDLINESS? 188 Conclusion 197 Notes 207 Introduction 207 Chapter I 209 Chapter II 212 Chapter V Postwar Alignment 222 Chapter VI 227 1946-1947 230 Chapter VIII 233 Select Bibliography 239 Index 255

One of the central issues in the study of the Chinese Communist Party and its foreign policy is its relations with Moscow. Was the CCP a Chinese nationalist party antagonistic to an intrusive Soviet Union or was it rather an internationalist party with ideological-political and strategic-military ties to Moscow, faithfully adhering to Marxist-Leninist principles as well as to Stalin's policy advice? For the past two decades a number of historians have argued that the CCP was a nationalist movement and that the United States missed its opportunity to establish friendly relations because U.S. leaders were blinded by fears of an international Communist threat. In his provocative book, Michael Sheng strongly challenges this position.

On the basis of extensive new information obtained from recently available Chinese sources, Sheng demonstrates that the foreign policy of the CCP under Mao Zedong did, in fact, follow the directions recommended by Joseph Stalin. Sheng reveals that Mao and Stalin were in frequent and direct contact by radio and by correspondence, beginning in 1936, and that Mao consistently acted on Stalin's advice. Battling Western Imperialism analyzes the CCP's relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States and provides conclusive evidence that there was no lost opportunity for the U.S. in China. He shows that the CCP viewed the United States as a hostile capitalist power that opposed its revolutionary aims. The author has drawn on an unprecedented collection of Chinese-language materials to make a powerful new argument.

One of the central issues in the study of the Chinese CommunistParty and its foreign policy is its relations with Moscow. Was theCCP a Chinese nationalist party antagonistic to an intrusive SovietUnion or was it rather an internationalist party withideological-political and strategic-military ties to Moscow,faithfully adhering to Marxist-Leninist principles as well as toStalin's policy advice? For the past two decades a number ofhistorians have argued that the CCP was a nationalist movement andthat the United States missed its opportunity to establish friendlyrelations because U.S. leaders were blinded by fears of aninternational Communist threat. In his provocative book, MichaelSheng strongly challenges this position. On the basis of extensivenew information obtained from recently available Chinese sources,Sheng demonstrates that the foreign policy of the CCP under MaoZedong did, in fact, follow the directions recommended by JosephStalin. Sheng reveals that Mao and Stalin were in frequent anddirect contact by radio and by correspondence, beginning in 1936,and that Mao consistently acted on Stalin's advice. BattlingWestern Imperialism analyzes the CCP's relations with both theSoviet Union and the United States and provides conclusive evidencethat there was no "lost opportunity" for the U.S. in China. Heshows that the CCP viewed the United States as a hostile capitalistpower that opposed its revolutionary aims. The author has drawn onan unprecedented collection of Chinese-language materials to make apowerful new argument.