Bargaining and Markets (Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics) (Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics)
معرفی کتاب «Bargaining and Markets (Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics) (Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics)» نوشتهٔ Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein، منتشرشده توسط نشر Emerald Publishing Limited در سال 1990. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book. It uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points, and includes detailed proofs given as explanations for the models. The text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course. The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book.
Key Features
* Uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points
* Detailed proofs are given as explanations for the models
* Text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course
دانلود کتاب Bargaining and Markets (Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics) (Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics)
Key Features
* Uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points
* Detailed proofs are given as explanations for the models
* Text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course
Audience: Researchers and graduate students in economics, especially those in microeconomics; courses in bargaining and game theory.
The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses the developments in this theory. It uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly, and also applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets.