Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making (Econometric Society Monographs, Series Number 15)

Axioms of cooperative decision making provides a unified and comprehen- sive study of welfarism, cooperative games, public decision making, and voting and social choice theory - technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms. Herve Moulin studies these areas from an axiomatic perspective. Every axiom conveys a certain ethical principle (e.g., "one man one vote," or "to each according to his contribution"). Axiomatic theory examines the compatibility of various combinations of axioms. The book describes recent successes of this method. It gives many examples of the axiomatic approach, rangIng from the construction of numerical indices for measuring inequality, to the pricing of a regulated monopoly, to the comparison of various voting rules. About thirty axioms are discussed, and one hundred exercises and problems are provided. Some familiarity with microeconomics and mathematical model- ing is assumed. The book will be useful to mathematical modelers, especially those interested in economics and political science. Over the past fifty years game theory has had a major impact on the field of economics. It was for work in game theory that the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded. Although non-cooperative game theory is better known, the theory of cooperative games has contributed a number of fundamental ideas to microeconomic analysis. Cooperative Microeconomics is the definitive textbook on these contributions. Designed to be used by undergraduate and graduate students, the book provides a thorough introduction and overview of its subject. Herve Moulin distinguishes among three primary modes of cooperation: cooperation by direct agreements; cooperation by just, equitable compromise; and cooperation by decentralized behavior. This tri-modal methodology is applied successively to the exchange of private goods, the fair division of unproduced commodities, the cooperative production of private and public goods, and cost-sharing Foreword by Amartya Sen Acknowledgments Introduction Overview Part I. Welfarism Chapter 1. Egalitarianism versus utilitarianism Chapter 2. Social welfare orderings Chapter 3. Axiomatic bargaining Part II. Cooperative games Chapter 4. Cost-sharing games and the core Chapter 5. Values of cooperative games Part III. Public decision mechanisms Chapter 6. Equal versus proportional sharing Chapter 7. Regulated monopoly Chapter 8. Strategyproof mechanisms Part IV. Voting and social choice Chapter 9. Majority voting and scoring methods Chapter 10. Strategyproofness and core stability Chapter 11. Aggregation of preferences Bibliography Author index Subject index Problems of fair division, equitable cost-sharing, division of a joint benefit, or the choice of a truly democratic voting rule are familiar subjects of dispute in technologically advanced democracies. This book provides a comprehensive and unified presentation of these technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms.

this Book Provides A Unified And Comprehensive Study Of Welfarism, Cooperative Games, Public Decision Making, And Voting And Social Choice Theory.

Utilitarianism is a philosophical thesis two centuries old.